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Evaluating the Effectiveness of Rural Development Policy in 
Meeting Environmental Objectives 




This study aims to evaluate Rural Development Policy (RDP) and its ability to meet 
environmental objectives at European, national and regional levels. Policy evaluation is 
necessary to assess the processes and impact of policies and programmes to meet 
desired outcomes, to further ensure accountability of public funds. There a number of 
evaluation approaches that have varying abilities to examine the variety of interacting 
policy determinants. This study explores both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
evaluate the Scottish RDP Rural Priorities scheme performance for the programme 
period 2007-2013. The Rural Priorities scheme is an important mechanism for 
achieving environmental objectives through regionalisation. Spatial econometrics, in-
depth interviews, and stakeholder power mapping were used to assess policy 
determinants, such as; farming characteristics, land capability, designated sites status, 
and accessibility and population as well as less tangible policy aspects such as; policy 
design, stakeholder power balances, and governance structures. Furthermore these 
methods were assessed singularly and in collaboration in their abilities to identify 
strengths and weakness in RDP participatory and environmental performance. This 
diversity of information contributes to the European Commission funded research 
project, SPARD (Spatial Analysis of Rural Development), which aims to help policy-
makers understand the causal relationships between rural development measures and 
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reformulated into papers and submitted to peer-reviewed journals. For instance Chapter 
2 has been adapted to paper format and accepted by the Journal of Environmental 
Management; as has Chapter 3 to the Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management; Chapter 1, 4 and 5 have been reformulated, submitted and are awaiting 
decisions. Chapter 4 was submitted to the Journal of Environmental Policy and 
Governance; whilst Chapters 1 and 5, have been submitted to a special issue publication 
in the Journal of Ecological Indicators.  
Each chapter follows a logical progression linking their common aim to examine 
Rural Development Policy in Scotland and environmental targeting efforts. Due to the 
common subject matter, some overlap between chapters is inevitable; however this is 
reduced by each focusing on different data, methodologies and aspects of policy 
analysis.  
The work is predominately that of the author including the literature review, 
method design, data collection, statistical analysis, and write up. This research also 
contributes to a larger EU FP7 funded project called SPARD (Spatial analysis of Rural 
development Measures). The project, co-ordinated by Annette Piorr from the ZALF 
research institute, had a core aim to develop a modelling tool that will help policy-
makers to understand the causal relationships between Rural Development measures 
and their results in a spatial dimension. Scotland was one of six European case studies 
to test the applicability of spatial econometrics on the analysis of Rural Development 
measures. The University of Edinburgh was one of nine partners on the project, and the 
team consisted of the case study leader Prof. Mark Rounsevell and the author. Therefore 
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to methods adopted in Chapter 2. 
The research was undertaken at the University of Edinburgh, and also includes 
contributions from the authors supervisors each providing advice, support and feedback 
for each chapter. Prof. Mark Rounsevell was the primary supervisor and was involved 
from start to finish in supporting the author develop research questions, design and 
outputs. Dr. Claire Haggett and Dr. Ron Wilson, as co-supervisors, also provided 
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Chapter 1:  
  
Introduction:  
1. Chapter overview 
This Chapter aims to introduce the Rural Development Policy (RDP) and its aim to 
meet environmental objectives at European, national and regional levels. Policy 
evaluation is necessary to assess the processes and impact of policies and programmes 
to meet desired outcomes, to further ensure accountability of public funds. There are a 
number of evaluation approaches that have varying abilities to examine the variety of 
interacting policy determinants. This chapter, therefore, explores both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to evaluate RDP 2007-2013, introducing Scotland’s Rural Priorities 
scheme as a case study. 
 
1.1 Rural development 
Rural Development is an evolving paradigm that has changed according to the varied 
relationships and values between Europeans and the rural environment (Van Der Ploeg 
et al., 2000). The concept of ‘rurality’ for instance, has many interpretations, and due to 
the diversity of conditions across Europe it is difficult to provide a single definitive 
definition. However, traditionally these ‘rural’ areas where accepted as places where 
humans and nature interact, mainly in the form of agriculture or other natural resource 
production processes (Elands and Wiersum, 2001).  
Over time, landscapes and the relationships between rural and urban areas have 
evolved (Pizzoli and Gong, 2007). The boundaries between urban and rural areas have 
become further integrated due to processes such as urbanisation, changes in human 
demographics and globalisation (Swaffield and Primdahl, 2006). All of these have 
altered the rural economy, and as a consequence, agriculture now playing less of a role 
(Bollman, 2007; Pizzoli and Gong, 2007). In response to these transformations, a more 
widely used approach for defining rural areas was developed in 2005 by the OECD 
based on human population density criteria (see Fig. 1) (Organisation for Economic Co-






















However due to the diversity of European rural areas, the OECD approach has 
been further tailored to European Union (EU) conditions by adjusting the population 
thresholds criteria. This adaptation by the European Commission also allows further 
statistical comparisons at European, national and regional levels (COM, 2013a). 
Individual Member States have also adopted a more refined urban-rural classification 
system; for instance the Scottish Government incorporates both size of settlements and 
accessibility into its definition (Scottish Government, 2012a). 
In terms of ‘development’, the same complexities exist in its definition; but as a 
core theme of EU policy and the Lisbon strategy, rural development is proposed as key 
to promoting ‘sustainable development’ across Europe (COM, 2006a). ‘Sustainable 
development’ is most commonly known as ‘meeting the needs of present generations 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs’ (WCED, 
1987, p.43). This is the overarching aim of all EU policies, and also addressed through 
the international commitment to the UNDPs (United Nations Development Programme) 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (COM, 2009b).   
 The EU is working to foreground the objective of sustainable development into 
all EU policies and has consequently devised a Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) 
in order to accomplish this (COM, 2009b). The SDS framework promotes the view that 
human progress should incorporate and integrate present and long term objectives, at 
Fig. 2. Designation of EU rural areas based on OECD approach (COM, 2009a) 
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local and global levels, with social, economic and environmental issues seen as 
inseparable and interdependent components (COM, 2009b). Several key challenges 
were outlined by the SDS: climate change and clean energy; sustainable transport; 
sustainable consumption and production; conservation and management of natural 
resources; public health; social inclusion, demography and migration; and global 
poverty (COM, 2009b). The majority of these challenges, particularly those oriented on 
the environment, also come under the remit of Rural Development Policy (RDP) (COM, 
2006a).   
Over the last two decades the European Commission, through its SDS 
framework and increasing focus on rural development, does at least appear to be 
meeting its responsibilities. However, whether environmental objectives are actually 
being achieved in practice is unclear.  Agriculture undoubtedly still applies a major 
pressure on the environment, with changing land practices, primarily as a result of 
farming intensification, abandonment, and afforestation of poorer land (EEA, 2009). 
Therefore across Europe, rural policy known as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
has a major role in limiting these pressures and encouraging sustainable agricultural 
practices (COM, 2005).  
 
1.2 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
The proposing, legislation, and implementation of European agricultural and rural 
policy, known as the CAP, is under the remit of European Commission and the 
‘Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development’. The CAP is the 
overarching policy system, and it includes RDP as one of its principal components. 
Therefore an understanding of the CAP is pivotal to this investigation. It is necessary to 
understand the history and evolution of agricultural policy within the EU, to be able to 
evaluate what rural policy means today and in the future.  Policy itself can be 
considered as a “web of decisions [or non-decisions that] may take place over a long 
time period” (Winter, 1996, p.9). This definition of policy is particularly apparent in the 
story of the CAP over the last few decades.  
The CAP was developed in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome, alongside the original 
formation of the EU. Agriculture was at the centre of the agenda at this time, to ensure 
post-war food security in the Member States of Europe (Artis and Lee, 1995). In order 
to achieve this objective, amongst others, the CAP governed the production and 
marketing of agricultural products, and managing the socio-structural policy and 
coordinating the process of adapting farm structures (COM, 2001a). These policy 
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actions are all market based and were known as the ‘first pillar’ of the CAP (COM, 
2001a).  
In its first stages, CAP promoted intense production by supporting farms to 
specialise, guaranteeing fixed prices for their produce, and providing grants and 
payments (Donald et al. 2002). The CAP was consequently successful in meeting its 
aims for food security and self-sufficiency (COM, 2001a). However, along with CAP’s 
achievements, a number of disadvantages had also been realised and as a result CAP 
became increasingly criticised.  
 
1.3 The CAP reforms 
Firstly to address structural inequalities, farming within disadvantaged areas was 
recognised within CAP (IEEP, 2006). Disadvantages related to farms in locations with 
unfavourable natural conditions such as poor climate, and slope lands, and poor 
accessibility to markets etc. It is argued that CAP should provide further support to 
farmers within these areas, in order to maintain rural populations, and protect the 
environment by sustaining these mostly traditional farming practices (IEEP, 2006; 
Ruben and Pender 2004). This recognition came in the form of a new measure call Less-
favoured areas (LFA) introduced in 1975. 
Changes in CAP continued in the 1980’s, and a shift started to occur from the 
‘first pillar’ of the CAP, to the ‘second pillar’ of the CAP which is concerned with ‘rural 
development’ as illustrated in Figure 2. These policy shifts have meant that the CAP has 
undergone a number of reforms, following public and international criticism related to 
protectionism, expenditure and negative environmental and social consequences 
(Swinbank and Tanner, 1996; Potter, 1998; COM, 1999a). The reforms consequently 
aimed to address these criticisms by shifting priorities and changing policy instruments 
and budget. Such reforms notably include the MacSharry reform, Agenda 2000, and the 
Fischler that have assisted in the rising importance of rural development within the CAP 
(Gay et al. 2005).  
The MacSharry reform in 1992 for example, saw reductions in price support and 
increases in direct aid for farmers (COM, 2012a). Furthermore, farmers were 
encouraged to become more environmentally friendly through compulsory set aside 
schemes and other policy measures such as agri-environment programmes (COM, 
2013b). Following MacSharry, Agenda 2000 saw further emphasis on encouraging 
farmers to be more market-oriented in addition to forming solid objectives for economic, 
social and environmental goals. These changes also saw the introduction of the ‘second 
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pillar’ of the CAP known as Rural Development Policy (RDP) (COM, 2012a; 2013b). 
The Fischer reform followed in 2005, and led to the introduction of single farm 
payments which meant farm income support was largely decoupled from production 
along with further strengthening of the second pillar (Cunha and Swinbank, 2011) 
Fig.2. The CAP reforms and associated comparative budgets (adaptation from 
HSBC, 2010) 
 
1.4 The Rural Development programme (RDP) 2007- 2013 
The most recent and relevant change to the CAP is the RDP 2007-2013 (COM, 2009c). 
The RDP 2007-2013 is mainly a list of measures (a set of 42 altogether) for policy to 
adapt to changing circumstances within the EU. The aim, as with previous reforms, was 
not to dramatically change the CAP but work with the current system by streamlining 
objectives and reducing bureaucracy (Boel, 2007; Cooper et al., 2007). For instance 
including subsuming the LFA measure into the RDP. Another significant way of 
achieving this was the introduction of a single funding body: the European Agriculture 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). This in itself has simplified the monitoring and 
financial analysis of RDP, compared to the previous programmes (COM, 2006a). 
 The policy framework for the CAP and the RDP is outlined in Figure 3, indicating 
main areas of input for the European Commission and individual Member States. 
Notably, however the European Commission input is constant due to their responsibility 




















Direct / Coupled 
Payments: arable 
area aid, livestock 
headage payments 










Single Payment – 
Decoupled. 















Chapter 1. Introduction 
6 
 
Fig.3. The Common Agricultural Policy and RDP framework  
 
The RDP 2007-2013 is based on essential rules and measures available to 
Member States, set out in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/2005 (COM, 2005). 
Thereby in the construction of RDPs, Member States are obligated to use the ‘thematic 
Axes’ in their RDP design (COM, 2005). There are four ‘strategic objectives’, known as 
Axes (COM, 2006a): 
1. Improving the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry through support to 
restructuring, development and innovation (Axis 1); 
2. Improving the environment and the countryside by supporting land management 
(Axis 2);  
3. Improving the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging diversification of 
economic activity (Axis 3); and 
4. The LEADER programme which stands for the links between actions of rural 
development, and encourages local capacity building (Axis 4)  
 
These objectives are the basis for the European ‘Strategic Guidelines’, which go further 
to identify priority areas of action (COM, 2005). For instance, the three priority areas as 
related to Axis 2 include: “biodiversity, and preservation and development of high 
nature value (HNV) farming and forestry systems and traditional agricultural 
landscapes, water, and climate change” (COM, 2005, p.8). Member States prepared 
their own ‘National Strategy Plan’ (NSP), justifying their own nations needs in 
Community Policies 




“Pillar One” “Pillar Two”  
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alignment with these EU priorities. The NSP recorded the specific situation of that 
country, in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats and also their 
potential for development according to their ex ante evaluation (COM, 2005). 
Consequently the assessment of the programming regions circumstances guides 
Member States selection of appropriate RDP measures (COM, 2005).  
 After receiving approval for their NSP, Member States translated these strategies 
into action through their RDP (COM, 2006a). Member States may have submitted either 
a single RDP for its entire territory or a set of regional RDPs. For instance, the United 
Kingdom (UK) has a set of four regional RDPs for Scotland, England, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland (European Commission, 2003). The RDP should include: 1) 
justification of the priorities as identified in their NSP; 2) the delivery mechanisms to 
meet these priorities; 3) and their expected impact. A breakdown of the expenditure per 
measure is also required in terms of public and private expenditure; as unlike pillar one 
of the CAP, RDP whilst financed predominately by the EAFRD, needs co-financing by 
the Member States (COM, 2005).  
 The amount of further public spending per Member State is dependent on their 
economic status (convergence or non-convergence1 region of the EU) and the Axis and 
measures. For instance the highest minimum funding allocation is required for Axis 2 at 
25%, with a maximum of 55% of the EAFRD budget eligible for convergence regions, 
and 80% for non-convergence regions (Schmid et al. 2010). The funding and eligibility 
status will be part of the RDP financial plan, which should include the total annual 
EAFRD contribution, and also the total EAFRD budget for the entire programming 
period. These European RDP funds should be matched with national public funding, in 
regards to each Axis, and the amount earmarked for technical assistance (COM, 2005).  
 
1.5 The RDP and the environment 
RDP environmental actions come in the form of environmental measures mainly found 
under Axis 22. This environmental Axis, out of all the Axes, has the highest total 
EAFRD EU-27 expenditure contribution of 44.1%, (COM, 2009c)3 highlighting how 
environmental objectives stand out in terms of relative importance in EU policy. 
Furthermore Axis 2 contains the one single mandatory measure under RDP: agri-
                                                 
1 Convergence regions are those regions having per capita gross domestic product (GDP) less than 75% 
of the average GDP of the EU-25 (COM, 2006b). 
2 Other environmentally related measures are also present under the other Axes e.g. the treatment of 
nutrient run-off  nutrients and other pollutants measure is found under Axis 1.  
3 These calculations do not include Axes 4, as this is ‘horizontal’ and are incorporated into the other three 
axes.  
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environmental payments (AEP). This measure is also noted by the European 
Commission as being a key policy action in integrating environmental concerns into the 
CAP (COM, 2012b; 2012c). AEP is a voluntary measure which provides financial 
incentives to encourage environmentally beneficial land management activities (COM, 
2006a). Such land management activities can be further refined to national, regional, or 
local level conditions by Member States and can be referred to as ‘options’. AEP 
options can include, for example: support for organic farming, continuation of 
traditional land management practices, and conservation of high-value habitats and their 
associated biodiversity (COM, 2012b). The government then pays the farmer to supply 
environmental goods and services, through these options who may otherwise not supply 
them (COM, 2012b). Therefore farmers, through sustainable use of agricultural land, 
are perceived to have a critical role in providing environmental ecosystem services 
(COM, 2006a). Thus AEP measures can be a used as a targeted tool for reaching 
environmental goals (COM, 2012b). Consequently this measure with both EAFRD and 
co-funding amounts to 22 % of the overall RDP expenditure, totalling around €22 
billion (COM, 2012b). 
Furthermore, due to the voluntary nature of AEP options (i.e. being up to land 
managers, and in particular famers whether to adopt them or not), the success of AEP 
option implementation varies widely (Edwards-Jones, 2006). It is up to each Member 
State how to implement these measures, and crucially, how to make these voluntary 
options attractive to farmers. In order to make them attractive it is necessary to 
understand what factors influence individual’s decision to adopt AEP option (Edwards-
Jones, 2006). Ruto and Garrod (2009) identify a number of variables which may 
influence the uptake of AEP option by farmers, including socio-demographics and 
psychological make-up of farmers, farm household characteristics, structure of farm 
business, other social factors such as networks and finally the characteristics of the 
policy itself.  In their EU survey on farmer’s motivations for AEP option adoption, 
Wilson and Hart (2000) argue that ‘economic considerations’ are the most important 
influence for participation. Thus, developing the monetary costs of these public goods 
by policy decision makers is challenging, particularly as there is no interaction of 
demand and supply due to an absence of a market (Welsh Assembly Government, 2008). 
Nevertheless Member State governments are still required to estimate how much 
consumers would be willing to pay for that public good, and develop a motivational 
price for land managers to provide the delivery of that good, considering income 
forgone if they were to participate (Welsh Assembly Government, 2008). Therefore the 
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policy ramification of Wilson and Hart’s (2000) research would imply that if higher 
payments were provided to farmers, thus making them more attractive, AEP option 
uptake would increase. However, the  co-operation of farmers in such schemes, as 
argued by Siebert et al. (2006) cannot be attributed to solely one factor, but is an: 
“intricate interaction of contingencies affected by locality and specific 
context, such as agronomic, cultural, social and psychological factors. 
Each of these factors plays interwoven roles in each national, regional 
and specific farm context. These in turn affect the individual farmer’s 
response to biodiversity-promoting policies for agriculture” (p.319). 
This quote summarises the importance of a need to acknowledge the numerous 
interacting factors at play that could influence policy adoption. Whilst factors 
influencing individual decisions of RDP applicants should be considered, so too should 
factors that influence their eligibility for funding subsequent to how the scheme is 
framed. Consequently policy analysis “should draw on ideas from a range of disciplines 
in order to interpret the cause and consequence of government actions” (Ham and Hill, 
1993, p.11). An interdisciplinary examination into these differing policy influences is a 
key aim of this study, and accordingly both quantitative methods (i.e. in sections 2.2 
and 2.3) and qualitative methods (i.e. in sections 2.4 to 2.4.3) are considered for RDP 
evaluation. 
 
2. Policy evaluation  
Policy evaluation is necessary in order to assess the processes and impacts of European 
governmental policies and programmes to meet desired outcomes. Policy evaluation is 
described as:  
“a range of research methods to systematically investigate the 
effectiveness of policy interventions, implementation and processes, and 
to determine their merit, worth, or value in terms of improving the 
social and economic conditions of different stakeholders” (Government 
Social Research Unit, GSR, 2007 p.3). 
This comment reflects the aims of this research, although in terms of RDP, and 
improvements to environmental conditions should also be included to determine the 
complete ‘value’ of RDP.  
Policy evaluation however is inherently complex due to the number of potential 
influential factors especially in regards to environmental policy. There are a large 
number of studies that focus on AEP policy analysis (Hanley et al. 1999; Whitby, 2000; 
Kleijin et al. 2004; Morris 2006; Franks and Mc Gloin, 2007; Baylis et al. 2008; Finn et 
al. 2009 etc). These studies, amongst others, highlight the number of problems that exist 
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in policy analysis, in terms of monitoring and evaluation. The challenges associated 
with environmental policy analysis should be recognised in order to account for these 
weaknesses in any investigation. These challenges predominately include (Finn, et al. 
2008; OECD, 2009; Bernd Schuh, personal communication, 2010): 
1) The absence of clarity from both policy and guidelines to measure progress, 
especially for AEP; 
2) Conflicting objectives and effects in some circumstances between present 
measures and earlier programmes; 
3) The complexity of evaluation and impact i.e. it is difficult to isolate an individual 
measure from other influential factors (e.g. other policy instruments); 
4) Monitoring and other datasets often do not provide a sufficient basis for impact 
assessment of RDP (e.g. information gap); 
5) The time frames of policy measures are still too young to see any significant 
impacts; 
6) An absence of time series data from some indicator datasets, making the 
measurement of impacts difficult to estimate, when no time scale is available; 
7) Incompatibility of available data due to scaling issues, with spatial data 
inconsistencies and variation in data collection methodologies by Member States and 
data collection agencies.  
 
To account for some of these challenges and compare policy performances, from 
local to international levels, the European Commission introduced a consistent system 
for monitoring and evaluating RDP (COM, 2006a). Therefore Member States are 
required to provide a number of quantitative and qualitative ‘indicators’ to assess 
whether policies are meeting their objectives based on the Common Monitoring and 
Evaluation Framework (CMEF) (COM, 2006a). 
 
2.1 The Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) 
In terms of AEP indicators, there are many varieties in use which can be used to assess 
the environmental state and trends, although the effectiveness and reliability of some of 
these indicators is questionable (EEA, 2009; Langeveld et al. 2007). It is understandable, 
with the wealth of information on indicators, that there is a necessity for standardised 
indicators for RDP evaluation. This is demonstrated by the large number of studies and 
indicators used and  the lack of consistency between them (Bastian and Lutz (2006), 
Bockstaller et al. (2008), Buchs (2003), Buchs et al. (2003), Cabral et al. (2007), Hoft et 
al. (2010), Langeveld et al. (2007), Lutz and Felici (2009), Menge (2003), Moxey et al. 
(1998), Onate et al. (2000), Parris (1998), Piorr (2003), Sepp et al. (2005), Wetterich 
(2003), Yli-Viikari et al. (2007), Zalidis et al. (2004). The CMEF therefore specifies a 
number of ‘common indicators’ applicable to each RDP measure, to assess their 
progress in relation to social, economic and environmental impacts. These indicators are 
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related to the baseline situation as well as to inputs, outputs, results and impact of the 
programmes as illustrated in Figure 4 (COM, 2006a). These indicators are also linked to 
the hierarchy of objectives, to assist assessment of how policy interventions link to 
global objectives; known as the intervention logic (COM, 2006a).   
 
Fig. 4.  Intervention logic and the CMEF indicators for RDP 2007-2013 (COM, 
2006a) 
 
Firstly the ‘baseline’ indicators are used by Member States in order to do a 
SWOT4  analysis, revealing the economic, social, and environmental conditions (COM, 
2006a). Baseline indicators reflect the situation at the beginning of the programming 
period and are used to help develop the RDP and measure trends over time (COM, 
2006a). The baseline indicators have two categories including; ‘objective related’, 
which are directly linked to the wider objectives of the programme and used as a 
baseline in which impact indicators will be compared, and secondly ‘context related’, 
focused on the more general contextual trends (COM, 2006a). 
‘Input’ indicators represent allocated funds to each measure or programme 
reflective of baseline conditions (COM, 2006a). These inputs will generate outputs 
which are related to the ‘operational’ objectives of the RDP. The ‘output’ indicators 
therefore, are associated with directly measuring the activities within programmes, 
measured by physical or monetary units such as committed expenditure or numbers of 
participants (COM, 2006a). Then the subsequent direct and immediate effects of these 
interventions can be measured using the ‘result’ indicators, which are connected to the 
more specific objectives. Result indicators go further to represent the benefits gained by 
implementation e.g. area of land under successful management (COM, 2006a) 
Finally the impact indicator relate to the wider overall objectives as well as 
being able to link back to the initial needs as identified by the baseline indicators. Thus 
measures will be expressed in ‘net’ terms, which means subtracting effects that cannot 
                                                 
4 SWOT is a strategic planning method used to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats of particular features. 
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be attributed to the intervention (e.g. double counting, deadweight), and taking into 
account in direct effects (displacement and multipliers) (COM, 2006a). Such indicators 
may be for example, the ‘maintenance of high nature value farming and forestry areas’ 
or ‘change in trend in biodiversity decline as measured by farmland bird species 
population’ (COM, 2006a). Impact indicators can be provided through quantitative 
and/or qualitative methods (COM, 2006a).  
The CMEF is a working guide for all Member States to assess progress, 
‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ towards European and national objectives for the RDP 
2007-2013 (COM, 2006a). The two terms ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ are used 
throughout descriptions on RDP performance and have been used interchangeably in 
policy analysis. However for this investigation a distinction between the two is 
necessary as each requires different indicators and specific methodologies in order to 
measure (Mandl et al., 2008). 
 
2.2 Defining efficiency and effectiveness  
Firstly, in considering the most appropriate definition for the two terms, the dictionary 
definition provides a good foundation. For instance the word ‘effective’ in the Oxford 
English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010) is defined as “producing the result 
that is wanted or intended; producing a successful result” therefore effectiveness could 
be interpreted as a measuring whether the results have had the desired effect. The word 
‘efficient’ on the other hand is defined “as doing something well and thoroughly with 
no waste of time, money, or energy” (Oxford University Press, 2010).  The dictionary 
definitions of these words show that whilst both are concerned generally with success of 
a particular action, effectiveness is determined with resulting impact, whereas efficiency 
is more closely related to how cost-effective5 in terms of resource use, those actions 
have been.  
These dictionary definitions give a general perspective on how these two terms 
are related and also how they differ, but further explanation is required to highlight 
exactly how to differentiate between the two, and what this means in terms of RDP 
policy analysis. Mandl’s et al. (2008) report addresses these issues, and argued that any 
analysis into effectiveness and efficiency should be concerned with the “relationship 
between inputs, outputs and outcomes” (p.2). This is a core function of the CMEF 
                                                 
5 Cost- effectiveness is described as the ability to achieve a maximum output for a given financial budget 
(Drechsler et al. 2007; Klimek et al. 2008). 
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providing input, output, baseline, results and impact indicators and guidance (COM, 
2006a).  
Mandl et al. (2008) provide a conceptual framework, as seen in Figure 5, 
showing the distinction between ‘inputs, outputs and outcomes’ and their relationship 
with efficiency and effectiveness. Mandl et al. (2008) suggest the ‘input-output ratio,’ 
albeit a basic method is how efficiency can be measured. Simply put, the greater the 
‘output’ for a given ‘input’ the greater the efficiency of that measure will be. For 
example efficiency of the RDP AEP measure can be measured by relating the CMEF 
‘input’ indicators on allocated expenditure6, with the ‘output’ indicators which represent 
initial activities such as committed expenditure and numbers of participants. Therefore 
if the expenditure has met expectations i.e. allocated budgets have been totally 
committed, than it could be deemed successful. Furthermore this outcome would 
indicate the ‘transactions costs’, i.e. those associated with expenditures related to design, 
implementation and enforcing contractual arrangements, have been successfully kept to 









Effectiveness, within this conceptual framework in Figure 5, is also related to 
‘input’ and ‘output’ but crucially, in addition, links objectives with the resulting 
‘outcome’. For instance, can be assessed in whether the ‘outcome’ of that measure has 
met its objectives, for the CMEF these would include the ‘result’ and ‘impact’ 
indicators (COM, 2006a). By using the measure AEP as a continuing example, this 
would be an assessment to how implementation of this measure has contributed to the 
overall objective of; 
“enhancing the environment and the countryside by supporting land 
management” with more specific objectives to “contribute to the 
priority areas of biodiversity, and preservation and development of 
high nature value (HNV) farming and forestry systems and traditional 
                                                 
6 but also include non-monetary (physical) resources (Mandl et al. 2008) 
Fig. 5 Conceptutal framework of efficency and effectivness (adaptaion from Mandl 
et al. 2008)  
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agricultural landscapes, water, and climate change” (COM, 2006a, 
p.9).  
Mandl et al. (2008) also highlight the difficulty in isolating effects to assess 
efficiency and effectiveness due to external ‘environmental factors’. Figure 5 
demonstrates the multiple influences possibly outside the control of policy makers that 
can impact measure ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’ (Mandl et al. (2008).  This study aims to 
identify these determinants in order to improve understanding on how these have 
impacted efficiency and effectiveness of RDP. However, these influences whether they 
are recognised as being within the control of policy-makers or not, may be dependent 
(among other things) on the level of aggregation of that analysis (Mandl et al. 2008) 7. 
For example, potential explanatory determinants might be important at one scale level, 
but not another (Steel and Holt, 1996). This refers to the term ‘ecological fallacy’ which 
“occurs when spatially aggregated data are analysed and the results are assumed to 
apply to individual relationships” (Steel and Holt, 1996, p.40). Furthermore, as data is 
aggregated, information subsequently can be lost (Henderson-Sellers et al., 1985; 
Meentemeyer and Box, 1987). Therefore this study applies the smallest spatial 
resolution for analysis in accordance to data availability.  
Finally in understanding efficiency and effectiveness, it should be pointed out 
that while similar in principle, it is still possible to achieve one without the other. 
Efficiency for instance, might be considered high in terms of the ‘input’ and ‘output’ 
ratio, but the measure in question may still fail to meet its objectives, consequently 
being ineffective. However, a measure can be effective in achieving the desired ‘result’ 
but still be inefficient in its implementation e.g. the ‘input’ of resources (include 
expenditure and also time) may have been high in comparison to the ‘output’. 
Furthermore, Farrell (1957) explains the importance for policy-makers of knowing how 
‘outputs’ could be further enhanced by increasing efficiency without using further 
resources. Policy-makers must therefore decide whether to justify additional 
expenditure on a measure to improve the ‘output’, or/and whether attempts to improve 
the efficiency of a measures implementation and maintenance is required. Essentially 
the European Commission and Member States should be continually evolving policy in 
order to make them more ‘efficient’ whilst achieving optimum ‘effectiveness’ in 
meeting both European, national and local objectives. 
                                                 
7 However for the purposes of this study, data on both the results and impact CMEF indicators were 
unavailable, particularly in the scale required for the analysis. These data gaps reflect the limitations 
earlier mentioned. 
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Hence, policy analysis prior to implementation should account for and mitigate 
potential implementation issues. Emphasis at this stage should also be on the ‘feedback 
loop’ to learn from and link past and present programming features. Building on from 
past lessons avoids ‘path dependency’, which would indicate a reluctance to change or 
reform due to constraints accrued to previous decision-making (Wilsford, 1994). By 
using an ex-ante (prior to implementation) evaluation should serve as a ‘critical mirror’ 
for managing authorities to re-assess for future improvement (COM, 2012d).  
In summary, measuring the economic efficiency and effectiveness of policies is 
an important task for policy-makers in evaluating policy performance and an aim of this 
study. For policy makers this is necessary to ensure that public funds are being targeted 
to meet policy needs without excess; in other words to show public accountability that 
funds are being spent in the most ‘cost-effective’ manner. As discussed, both policy 
effectiveness and efficiency can be measured to some extent through quantitative 
indicators, including those in the CMEF. Schneider, (1986) states “evaluation needs to 
be viewed as part of an information-producing system which feeds into a cyclical 
policy-making process” (p.362). Considering the importance of evaluation at various 
stages of policy cycle it is then the question of the information requested vs availability, 
and also appropriate methods for collection and analysis. Furthermore recognising that 
no single evaluation method will be fit for all emphasises a requirement for a range of 
methods (Pawson, 2002).  
 
2.3 Spatial targeting indicators 
Quantitative indicators enable ‘statistical generalisations’ from findings, and 
consequently inferences can be made from statistical sampling (Onwuegbuzie and 
Collins, 2007). The European Commission uses the CMEF for this purpose, defining 
EU averages of the CMEF indicators to compare conditions and performance across 
Member States. Quantitative methods are described as a ‘positivist approach’ concerned 
with objectivity, replicability and causality (Bryman, 1984). Policy makers are expected 
to be able to assess efficiency and effectiveness through the CMEF indicators, and to 
understand the current situation and the ramifications of policy actions with greater 
certainty (Walker and Young, 1997). 
The input and output CMEF indicators, however, only go so far in the 
assessment of policy performance, but, an understanding of the ‘determinants’ of uptake 
and payments could take policy evaluation a step further. An analysis, for instance, of 
the influence of spatial variability on the uptake and expenditure of RDP measures 
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would provide insights into ‘how’ and ‘where’ these priorities are being met in 
accordance with policy objectives . 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) provide an opportunity to accomplish 
this, integrating environmental, socio-economic, and agricultural policy indicators 
across time and space (Walker and Young, 1997). By using CMEF output indicators 
and GIS, the uptake of AEP options both in terms of quantity, space, and funding can be 
compared to spatial targeting objectives. In the past, policy has arguably failed to adopt 
an integrated approach that accounts for tradeoffs between environmental and socio-
economic considerations (Walker and Young, 1997). Furthermore policy relied heavily 
on aspatial information that “doesn’t account for a more complete understanding of 
spatial interactions critical to ecosystem function” (Walker and Young, 1997, p.620). 
However, there is increasing recognition for the need for empirical information to 
support policy design to ensure goals are achieved (Piorr, 2003). Consequently a 
growing number of studies have used spatial analysis as a tool to help define target 
areas in policy (Walpole and Sinden, 1997; Cook and Norman, 1996; Van der Horst, 
2007). However, despite the rising recognition of spatial analysis for policy targeting 
evaluation, the effectiveness of targeting formulation itself should firstly be considered, 
as this is an aspect that has been criticised in the past.  
Criticism centres on how target areas are defined, as firstly targets areas are seen 
to be heavily influenced by administrative boundaries, rather than based on cost and 
benefits; and secondly benefits provided per area do not account for spatial 
heterogeneity (Van der Horst, 2007).  However studies that have accounted for 
heterogeneity have effectively demonstrated how spatial environmental benefits greatly 
differ, for example, according to woodland recreation (Brainard, et al., 1999), 
biodiversity (Van der Horst and Gimona, 2005) and carbon sequestration (Batemen and 
Lovett, 2000; Van der Horst, 2007). These studies, amongst others, demonstrate the 
need for improved spatial targeting and analysis in environmental policy.  
Additionally it is argued that when quantitative environmental targets are set, 
these are commonly done inconsistently and without scientific rigour (Tear et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless such targets are essential for policy makers to justify expenditure and 
determine goal performance. Tear et al. (2005) claim that “whereas goals need to be 
broad and visionary, objectives must be measurable in order to ensure effective 
evaluation of progress” (p.837). Tear et al. (2005) outline principles for enhancing 
science in conservation objective setting, suggesting ideally quantifiable targets are set 
through a hierarchal process, including a “broad, visionary, long-term goal; a 
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measurable expression of that goal; multiple supporting objectives to meet the goal; 
and specific performance measures to monitor shorter-term progress toward 
accomplishing the objectives” (p.837). 
 These actions can be identified to some extent in the RDP framework guidelines 
and the CMEF indicators and intervention logic (COM, 2006a). For instance, in RDP 
the broad goals reflect the Axes and the ‘measurable aspect’ as the allocated 
expenditure and expected uptake (CMEF input indicators). The multiple supporting 
objectives are the measures themselves, whereas the specific performance monitoring 
could relate to the specific options. However options are drawn up by Member States to 
fit their own circumstances and are absolved of EU targeting requirements. Therefore in 
the absence of quantified targets at option level, option design may provide an 
alternative means to indicate specific objectives. These objectives will reflect applicant 
eligibility, and will likely be determined by spatial attributes, related to farm types 
or/and biophysical characteristics.  
In summary, despite the risks of setting quantifiable targets, there are specific 
actions that can be taken in order to minimise them (Tear et al. 2005). For instance, 
targeting effort can be improved by accounting for heterogeneity of different areas and 
also by breaking down targets themselves to enable monitoring (Tear et al., 2005). GIS 
applications would therefore provide the means for a comprehensive RDP evaluation to 
analyse such targets using spatial information on the current trends for agricultural and 
rural development, this could be achieved through the application of spatial 
econometrics, a core method applied in this study.  
 
2.3.1 Spatial econometrics  
Spatial econometrics provides an important methodological approach that can account 
for spatial effects and also identify determinants and evaluate policy performance of 
both RDP measures and options (Brady and Irwin, 2009). Spatial econometrics is 
consequently one of the core approaches taken in this study to evaluate RDP. 
Spatial econometric modelling is defined as the incorporation of spatial 
dependence interaction (spatial autocorrelation) and spatial structure (heterogeneity) in 
regression models (Paelinck and Klaassen, 1979; Anselin, 1988). Spatial heterogeneity 
refers to variation across space, whilst spatial autocorrelation, considering the first law 
of geography that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970, p. 236), indicating that data observations are 
not independent. Alternatively the more commonly used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
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(also known as linear regression) models assume observations are independent from one 
another. Anselin (1988) warns that if OLS are used on spatially dependent data this can 
create biased and inconsistent model outcomes, whereas with spatial econometrics, 
spatial dependency is accounted for and provides better quality models as a result 
(Kazar and Celik, 2012).  
There are, among others, two main types of spatial models: lag and error. The 
spatial lag model accounts for the dependency of a variable being jointly determined by 
neighbouring values, referring to a ‘spill-over effect’ (Anselin et al. 2008). The spatial 
error model alternatively assumes that spatial dependency occurs in the error terms, 
indicating that an explanatory variable has been omitted (LeSage and Pace, 2009). Each 
of the models can be applied, but according to the type of spatial dependency at play, 
one model may be stronger than the other (Anselin, 1988). It was assumed in this study 
that RDP participation and expenditure was affected by spatial dependency, this was 
tested through preliminary diagnostic tests, in addition to the testing of the different 
models. 
In summary, spatial econometrics is potentially able to provide stronger and 
more reliable models for analysing RDP participation and expenditure by accounting for 
spatial dependency. These models will then be able to provide a more accurate analysis 
of how RDP targets for both measures and options have been met, identifying where 
certain policy decisions have influenced policy outcomes. These will relate quantitative 
CMEF indicators for AEP measure participation and expenditure, preferably at the 
lowest disaggregated level, to possible explanatory variables based on socio-economic, 
agricultural and bio-physical characteristics. Such information would be informative at 
both regional to national scales on the cause and effect relationships of policy 
implementation (Piorr, 2003). Consequently, the applicability of spatial econometrics 
for RDP measure analysis has been tested as a key aim of this study  
However despite these strengths, the caveats of using purely qualitative 
indicators is that the findings may be inflexible in terms of identifying novel or 
unanticipated findings due to rigidity of understanding phenomena only within the 
available dataset under observation (Bryman, 1984).  Therefore ‘other’ influencing 
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2.4 Qualitative analysis  
There has been increasing recognition that qualitative research can contribute to policy 
formulation, evaluation and refinement, and it is therefore widely employed in policy 
analysis (Spencer et al. 2003, p.10). For instance in RDP in Scotland, stakeholder 
interviews have been used to assess policy performance for both the first stage RDP 
review (Cook, 2009) and the RDP mid-term evaluation report (Scottish Government, 
2010a). Qualitative research techniques may include in-depth interviews and other 
forms of participatory research techniques such as focus group interviews or participant 
observation. Garbarino and Holland (2009) claim “these methods are designed to 
capture judgements and perceptions and allow complex analyses of often non-
quantifiable cause-and-effect processes” (p.7). Therefore this research has expanded the 
analysis beyond the CMEF and other quantitative indicators, to use qualitative methods: 
in-depth interviews and mixed methods with stakeholder mapping, to understand wider 
‘processes’ and influences on RDP performance. In particular the research has focused 
on the influence of stakeholders and governance structures in RDP policy design. 
2.4.1 RDP governance and decentralisation  
Stakeholders are most commonly defined as “any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984 p.46). 
Stakeholders are increasingly recognised as important in policy outcomes and therefore 
there are increasing attempts to integrate stakeholders in the policy development and 
implementation processes (Brugha and Varavasovszky, 2000; COM, 2006a; Scottish 
Government, 2008). The European Commission introduced the importance of adopting 
a more inclusive stakeholder approach in policy through the White Paper in 2001 (COM, 
2001b). This included promoting the concept of governance defined as “the means rules, 
processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised” (COM, 
2001b, p.8). Member States were further advised to achieve ‘good governance’ by 
following five principles on; openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence (COM, 2001b).  
Governance structures and processes have become ever more important for both 
describing and proposing centralised and decentralised strategies in policy making and 
implementation (Berger, 2003). Governance ‘structure’ refers to the institutional 
arrangements and inclusivity of stakeholders under new conditions, whilst ‘processes’ 
of governance refer to the interaction between these structures. Berger’s (2003) review 
of governance literature identified five governance structures, including; networks, 
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inclusion of wider parts of society, multilevel government, new public management 
(NPM), and hierarchies. Policy design and performance can be examined through these 
governance ‘structures’ and ‘processes’ as outlined by Berger (2003), arguably 
providing an appropriate framework for policy assessment. 
 For example, Multilevel governance is arguably a suitable framework for 
policy analysis in order to understand the “dynamic inter-relationship within and 
between different levels of governance and government” (Bache and Flinders, 2004 p.1). 
Multilevel governance was defined by the European Commission as; “coordinated 
action by the EU, the Member States and local and regional authorities, based on 
partnership and aimed at drawing up and implementing EU policies”(COM, 2009d, 
p.6). This definition of multilevel governance emphasises the inclusive role of each tier 
of government and identified that the original principles of ‘good governance’ would 
still be maintained and enhanced as a result. 
However the extent of autonomy to plan, finance, and administer policy at a 
regional level will depend on the policy structuring and resource provision, as decided 
by central government (Grocnctulijkll, 1998; de Sadeleer, 2012). For instance, under 
this ethos, decentralisation should include the transfer of power and resources from 
centralised governments to local level governments to bring decision-making closer to 
the citizens (COM, 2009d). 
It is debatable whether a more participatory decentralised approach is more 
suitable for environmental policy or not (Mann and Gennaio, 2010). These debates 
follow the number of cost and benefits associated with decentralisation. A key argument 
for more inclusive policy however is that local decision makers are better equipped to 
understand issues at that level and also enhances implementation and acceptance by 
citizens and therefore effectiveness (Mann and Gennaio, 2010). This is recognised in the 
EU policy literature with the promotion of the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ that 
acknowledges that decisions be as close to the citizen as possible (COM, 2001b). This 
has the advantage of avoiding the information costs of knowledge gaps appearing when 
more centralised authorities attempt to make local level decisions (Mann and Gennaio, 
2010). 
In contrast, the argument that a centralised policy approach is more appropriate 
relates to the trans-boundary nature of environmental problems (Dahl, 1994). It is 
argued again in EU policy documents that environmental matters, go beyond local area, 
regions, and national boundaries and therefore a common policy is required (COM, 
2009d). Moreover a centralised system is needed to ensure environmental issues are 
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dealt with in their entirety rather fragmented pockets of policy implementation (Falleth 
and Hovik, 2009; COM, 2009d).  In addition, decentralisation is argued to compromise 
policy efficiency due to the added complexity and costs associated with increased 
stakeholder involvement (Bovaird, 2005). Therefore whether a decentralised RDP 
approach is adopted or not by Member States will likely have strong implications on 
both policy efficiency and effectiveness.  
In summary, the effectiveness of attempts to integrate these governance 
structures and principles into decision-making is yet to be evaluated in RDP, and 
consequently has also been undertaken by this study. Yet examining a policy system by 
policy framework alone is insufficient, and requires in addition an understanding of 
stakeholder interactions in order to identify influences on policy outcomes (Bovaird and 
Löffler, 2003; Bovaird, 2005). An assessment of how governance works therefore 
requires the identification of ‘who’ those stakeholders are and ‘how’ they interact, and 
this can be achieved through stakeholder analysis approach.  
2.4.2 Stakeholder analysis 
Increasing discussion of stakeholder inclusivity by policy makers has in parallel 
encouraged a wave of research based on ‘stakeholder analysis’ (Brugha and 
Varvasovszky, 2000; Reed et al. 2009).  The World Bank (2011) describes stakeholder 
analysis as “a methodology used to facilitate institutional and policy reform process by 
accounting for and often incorporating the needs of those that have a ‘stake’ or an 
interest in the reforms under consideration (p.1)”. The use of stakeholder analysis 
therefore, is seen to be particularly relevant in relation to environmental and natural 
resource management due to the cross-cutting nature of the systems which 
consequentially have an outreach across a large variety of stakeholders (Reed et al. 
2009). Therefore a stakeholder analysis is another approach adopted in this study to 
further understand the influences of stakeholders on RDP performance. 
Reed et al. (2009 p.1936) categorised the three main aims of stakeholder 
analysis as: i) identifying stakeholders; ii) differentiating between and categorising 
stakeholders; and iii) investigating relationships between stakeholders. To achieve these 
aims there are a number of methodologies that can be used, for example some studies 
may use a non-participatory approach; relying on their own expertise on the issue 
supported possibly by secondary data and/or literature to identify stakeholders (Song 
and Mu, 2012; Njaya et al. 2012). Meanwhile other studies are based on participation of 
stakeholders or experts (Billgren and Holmén, 2008, Reed et al. 2009). This may add to 
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complexity of describing a policy system, but will benefit from a comprehensive 
balancing of claims and interests to achieve wider acceptability (Billgren and Holmén, 
2008).  
Notably the type of method used for identifying stakeholders and the purpose of 
the analysis will determine who is, or is not, included (Reed et al. 2009). By including 
direct stakeholder involvement the risks of excluding marginalised stakeholders through 
a top-down analytical approach are reduced (Reed et al. 2009). Stakeholder 
participatory techniques may include interviews or focus groups providing arguably 
more comprehensive stakeholder identification (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). 
However, on a more practical level, facilitated participation involvement will also be 
dependent on resources; such as personnel, finances, and time (Burger et al. 2007). For 
this study, one-to-one in depth interviews with institutional stakeholders was justified as 
a suitable method for the purposes of this research. In addition, a stakeholder mapping 
exercise was incorporated into the interviews to further differentiate and investigate 
relationships between stakeholders (Reed et al. 2009). 
2.4.3 Stakeholder mapping  
Stakeholder mapping provides a means for further refinement of the process for 
identifying stakeholders and their interaction, by differentiating between their attributes 
(Mitchell et al. 1997). For policy analysis a popular method is identifying levels of 
‘interest’ and ‘influence’ of stakeholders (Reed et al. 2009; Song and Mu, 2012). 
Interest refers to the level of importance a stakeholder attaches to seeing a particular 
objective met, whilst influence refers to the ability of a stakeholder to influence that 
objective (Grimble and Wellard, 1997). Both positions of stakeholders’ interest and 
influence can be assessed using a ‘stakeholder mapping’ exercise (Brugha and 
Varvasovszky 2000; Reed et al. 2009). ‘Stakeholder mapping’ is noted as an 
undeveloped research area for exploring roles of government and stakeholders and the 
balances of power (Bovaird, 2003).  
Stakeholder mapping can be a participatory exercise, where identified 
stakeholders are placed on a matrix according to their relative levels of interest and 
influence, and which also provides a visual aid for further interview discussions 
(Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000; Reed et al. 2009). Lindenberg and Crosby (1981) 
advocate this ‘systematic political analysis’ to further understand the importance and 
positions of different actors by gauging their ‘importance’. In business management 
literature this suggests managers could then eliminate the marginal actors and focus on 
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those considered ‘principal decision makers’ (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). A 
potential risk of the mapping approach is the possibility that perhaps previously hidden 
conflicts of interest will be highlighted and consequently be further exacerbated by the 
process (Reed et al. 2009). This may be an inherent risk of the process, yet equally it 
could be argued that identifying such conflicts could be beneficial in terms of the first 
step towards conflict resolution (Sidaway, 2005). Furthermore by revealing those power 
imbalances provides an opportunity to address these issues in future policy design, by 
facilitating empowerment of those who otherwise due to limited resources or 
information are currently sidelined (Song and Mu, 2012).  
In addition, by making power relations explicit and with a suitable sample size, 
outcomes can also be quantified and analysed statistically to verify hypotheses and 
enhance findings validation (Reed et al. 2009). However a quantitative analysis of the 
stakeholder mapping results may also reveal hidden assumptions, therefore the 
importance of gathering qualitative information is emphasised, alongside any 
quantitative analysis (Reed et al. 2009). Therefore a triangulated approach which ‘seeks 
convergence on findings’ is taken in this research also combining stakeholder mapping 
quantitative and qualitative findings (Mark and Shotland, 1987).   
Stakeholder mapping, in summary, provides a useful tool for understanding 
policy directions and decision-making capabilities (Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000). 
This approach, along with qualitative interviews, will strengthen the understanding of 
decision-making and power implications on policy outcomes in this research. In order to 
test the utility of using quantitative spatial econometrics as well as qualitative 
interviews and stakeholder mapping in RDP evaluation, Scotland will be used as a case 
study.  
 
3. Case study: Scotland’s RDP  
This investigation used Scotland as a case study for an in-depth analysis into the 
applicability of RDP 2007-2013 evaluation techniques to identify the effectiveness of 
environmental targeting as well as performance determinants. Firstly, the data 
availability of CMEF indicators on AEP measure and other spatial exploratory variables 
provided the opportunity to identify farm–level and regional determinants of AEP 
adoption. In addition Scotland has applied an integrated regionalised RDP delivery 
approach with strong environmental prioritisation which provided a suitable context for 
a stakeholder analysis, mapping, and interviews to evaluate governance and 
decentralisation strategies. The following sections provide a brief background on the 
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Scottish Rural Development Programme (SRDP), as well as the rural environment. 
Scotland’s RDP Rural Priorities scheme is then introduced as the key delivery 
mechanism for the AEP measure application. Lastly the adoption of governance 
principles and decentralisation in the Rural Priorities scheme formulation is discussed, 
further illustrating the suitability of Scotland as a case study for this investigation. 
 
3.1 Brief background on Scotland’s RDP and rural environment  
Scotland became responsible for its own RDP after the 1999 establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament (White and Yonwin, 2004). This allowed Scotland to design a RDP 
suitable for its own national needs (Scottish Government, 2005). The co-ordination and 
planning of the SRDP is the responsibility of Scottish Executive Environment and Rural 
Affairs Department (SEERAD). The total SRDP is worth around £1.7 billion (Table.1) 
and has incorporated both the European Union (EU) rural development objectives and 
Scottish national objectives. The RDP 2007-2013 has been developed therefore to 
deliver on  national outcomes, which are intended to benefit the Scottish people by 
making  Scotland; greener, wealthier and fairer, and healthier and smarter (Scottish 
Government, 2008).  
Rural areas are prevalent across Scotland, with 96 % of the land area classified 
as ‘rural’ under the OECD rural definition, and consequentially rural regions are 
considered an integral part of Scotland’s economic, environmental and cultural identity 
(Scottish Government, 2008). Scotland has a diverse range of landscapes, in terms of 
land cover and land use. The largest agricultural land use is rough grazing (57%), with 
24% as grassland, and just 10% used for crops or left fallow (Scottish Government, 
2010b). Notably, ‘Less Favoured Areas’ (LFA) are very important regions in Scotland 
as they extend across the majority of the countries agricultural land, with 85 % 
designated as LFA and typically around 13,000 farms and crofts that will apply for LFA 
support each year (Scottish Government, 2008). This may reflect the low Gross Value 
Added (GVA) contribution of Scotland’s agriculture to the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
total GVA in 2010 at just 0.8 % (£654 million) (Scottish Government, 2010b). This is in 
despite of a reported 52,000 farm holdings in Scotland in 2010 covering 71.6 % (5.64 
million ha) of Scotland’s total land area (Scottish Government, 2010b). Agriculture in 
Scotland is evidently not a strong economic contributor, but it is nevertheless well 
recognised that rural land managers, such as farmers, are vital in the sustainable care 
and management of the rural environment (Scottish Government, 2008). Consequently 
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Axis 2 is a core focus of the SRDP, with 60% (over £1 billion) of the programmes total 
allocated expenditure (Scottish Government, 2008). 
 
3.2 Scottish Rural Development Programme (SRDP) Framework  
The SRDP framework is relatively complicated, compared to other RDP’s across 
Europe, due to the number of different delivery mechanisms (Figure 6). The ‘delivery 
mechanisms’ in the SRDP are known as umbrella schemes which implement and 
allocate funding for the rural development measures. The AEP measure is represented 
under two of these schemes including: the Land Mangers Options (LMO’s) and Rural 
Priorities (RP) scheme. The RP scheme is however a key mechanism within the SRDP, 
receiving between 2007 and 2010 the highest committed expenditure at £260.7 million 
in comparison to the other seven schemes, For example, Land Manager Options scheme 
had a committed expenditure of £6.4 million, and Less Favoured Area scheme had an 
expenditure of £146.5 million (Scottish Government, 2010a).  
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3.3 SRDP environmental targeting  
The RP scheme is the most prominent funding support mechanism for the AEP measure 
in the SRDP. For instance, from 2008 until 2011, AEP had the highest uptake and 
expenditure of all the RP measures, receiving 39% of the total expenditure for RP (total 
£158 million) and 77% of the total contracts (total 15,322). This number of contracts far 
exceeds the CMEF output targets allocated for this measure by 135% 8  (Scottish 
Government, 2008). There are 68 options and sub options that come under the AEP 
measure, which each have varying eligibility criteria and management actions to meet 
either broad or more targeted objectives (Scottish Government, 2008). The number and 
specificity of options under Scottish AEP measure contrasts to other EU Member States, 
with broader options based for example on overall biodiversity protection rather than 
specific species or habitats (Poláková et al. 2011). For Scotland the array and number of 
options are tailored to address varying needs due to the diversity of Scottish landscapes 
(Scottish Government, 2008; Poláková et al. 2011). 
The policy design of the RP scheme also emphasises a strong regional approach, 
along with national and regional targets to support environmentally beneficial land 
management (Scottish Government, 2008). This includes the introduction of eleven 
regional decision making bodies known as RPACs (Regional Project Assessment 
Committees), which have been tasked with selecting ‘regional priorities’ to target the 
needs of their areas (Scottish Government, 2008). Regional priorities are derived from a 
menu list of general national priorities, many of which are environmentally focussed 
and relate to biodiversity, water and soil quality, and climate change (Scottish 
Government, 2008).  
Another newly introduced aspect to RDP within the RP scheme is its 
implementation as a ‘competitive process’, where all types of rural land managers, 
including individuals, businesses and community groups, can compete for funding 
dependent on their ability to meet these regional priorities of that and other eligibility 
criteria (Scottish Government, 2008). Furthermore, funding scores are influenced by 
applicants’ ability to meet ‘national targets’, another component of the scoring system 
(Scottish Government, 2011a). Six of the seven national targets focus primarily on 
environmental objectives. For example, activities which will bring or maintain 
Scotland’s nationally important nature sites, such as SSSI’s (Site of Special Scientific 
                                                 
8 The output target indicator was 6,565 contracts for the RDP 2007-2013 (Scottish Government, 2008). 
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Interest) into favourable condition, and woodland expansion to mitigate climate change, 
are both national targets (Scottish Government, 2011a).  
In summary, environmental targeting and the prioritisation of the AEP measure 
is evident in Scotland’s RDP RP scheme framework. This is in parallel to promoting a 
decentralised participatory policy with a strong regionalised approach through the 
introduction of the RPACs. Therefore all these components make Scotland a suitable 
case study to assess the varying determinants, processes, and actors that may influence 
RDP performance. 
 
4. Thesis Objectives 
As policy influences are multifaceted it is necessary to use a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative methods to examine determinants of performance in order to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of policy in practice. Therefore, this study uses 
mixed methods: including spatial econometrics, interviews and stakeholder power 
mapping, to examine the performance of RDP in meeting environmental and objectives 
in Scotland 2007-2013. Further, it investigates which variables (whether environmental, 
agricultural or socio-economic), and other less tangible factors such as stakeholders and 
governance structures, could be considered determinants of option uptake. This research 
therefore focuses on the following four objectives: 
 
4.1 Identify the quantifiable determinants of the RDP agri-environmental measure 
uptake and expenditure through the use of spatial econometrics (Chapter 2) 
Spatial econometrics has been used widely in regional economics as well as being 
applied in land use models (Overmars, et al. 2003; Brady and Irwin, 2010). Yet a 
limited number of studies have applied spatial econometrics in order to evaluate RDP 
(Schmidtner et al. 2012; Bartolini et al. 2012; Juvančič et al. 2012). Furthermore whilst 
studies investigating factors of AEP participation are numerous, few have attempted to 
understand the geographical dimensions of AEP and control for spatial dependence 
(Evans and Morris, 1997; Hynes et al., 2008; Schmidtner et al. 2012; Uthes et al. 2010).  
This chapter therefore used spatial econometrics to investigate the spatial 
dependency and determinants of the AEP measure uptake and expenditure in Scotland’s 
RDP. For the purposes of this study and according to data availability, seven categories 
of explanatory variables were explored including: farm type, land ownership, labour 
employment, livestock density, land capability for agriculture (LCA), designated sites, 
and the urban rural classifications (incorporating accessibility and size of settlements). 
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The analysis included variables already identified in the agri-environment literature as 
arguably important determinants, such as farm characteristics and designated sites 
(Wilson and Hart 2000: Defrancesco et al. 2008; Hynes et al. 2008) as well as those 
which have not, such as; the use of the Scotland rural urban, and land capability for 
agriculture classifications. 
In summary, the main three research questions for this chapter include: 1) Are 
uptake and payments for agri-environment measure and option categories spatially 
dependent? 2) If so, what are the spatial determinants for uptake and expenditure in 
Scotland? 3) What impact does the type of model (OLS, lag, and error) have on the 
model quality? 4) What do these results tell us about the targeting effectiveness of the 
SRDP? In order to answer these questions the following methods were applied: the 
construction of an appropriate spatial weight matrix; identification of spatial 
autocorrelation of the dependent variables assessing how these variables meet desired 
policy objectives; and a comparison of model abilities and results between OLS and the 
spatial econometric models lag and error. This information identified areas and groups 
of rural land managers and their characteristics for which certain policies have been 
effective or ineffective, in terms of initial implementation. 
 
4.2 Examine how governance structures and stakeholders influence RDP policy 
performance (Chapter 3) 
The effectiveness of attempts to integrate governance structures and principles into 
decision-making for RDP is yet to be evaluated and therefore was another core 
objective of this study. This chapter provides an expansion to the previous spatial 
analysis approach, by going beyond quantitative datasets to assess the role of 
governance and power relations of stakeholders in the SRDP through a mixed method 
approach. Firstly this chapter discusses governance in the EU, based on the principles of 
good governance and governance structures, providing examples of their application in 
the context of Scotland’s RP scheme (Berger, 2003). Secondly, it reports on research 
findings from semi-structured interviews and a stakeholder mapping exercise to explore 
governance issues with key stakeholders in Scotland. Quantitative data is analysed 
using multivariate statistics to test for differences in interviewees’ perceptions according 
to certain attributes, including, job role, region, and organisation affiliation. In addition, 
an analysis of the interview data provided in-depth insights into the relationships 
between stakeholders and how these influence policy implementation, as well as 
triangulating with data from the stakeholder mapping approach (Reed et al. 2009).  
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4.3 Identify how environmental targeting and multilevel governance within RDP 
has been achieved in practice (Chapter 4) 
This chapter leads on from the previous chapter to go further in-depth into a single 
prominent governance structure of Scotland’s RDP Rural Priorities scheme. Focussing 
on purely the qualitative interview findings with institutional stakeholders, an 
assessment of the application of multilevel governance and decentralisation has been 
made. To do so, this chapter has explored the following three research questions: 1) 
How have environmental targeting and multilevel governance been incorporated into 
RDP design? 2) How effective have these efforts been in practice? 3) What 
recommendations can be made, if any, to better improve targeting at a regional level? 
This chapter therefore firstly discussed the concept of multilevel governance and the 
relationship between centralised and decentralised decision making and policy 
effectiveness. Secondly, it examined how EU RDP – and subsequently Scotland’s Rural 
Priorities scheme – has incorporated aspects of a more inclusive governance approach to 
enhance environmental targeting into its policy design. Thirdly, the chapter reported on 
results from a qualitative methodology used to assess these efforts, including 61 in-
depth interviews with institutional policy stakeholders from both central and regional 
Scottish Government.  
 
4.4. Provide a synthesis of the three methodologies; spatial econometrics, 
stakeholder analysis, and qualitative methodologies for RDP evaluation (Chapter 5) 
This final chapter synthesises the findings from the three RDP evaluation approaches 
presented in chapters 2, 3, and 4, including: spatial econometrics, stakeholder analysis, 
and the qualitative interviews. The strengths and weaknesses of using these different 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies and their abilities to give in-depth insights 
into RDP are examined. Additionally the key findings from each of these approaches 
and future direction of RDP 2014-2020 are identified. 
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Chapter 2:  
  
Analysing determinants of the agri-environmental measure 
uptake and expenditure through the use of spatial 
econometrics  
 
1. Chapter overview  
This chapter discusses the application of spatial econometrics, the first of three 
approaches, to evaluate RDP measure performance. This quantitative spatial approach 
examines the spatial dependency and determinants of Scotland’s agri-environmental 
measure and categorised options participation and expenditure at the parish level. 
Spatial econometrics is applied to test the influence of 40 explanatory variables on 
farming characteristics, land capability, designated sites, accessibility and population. 
Identification  of the influences of spatial variability on the uptake and expenditure of 
RDP measures provides national insights into ‘how’ and ‘where’ environmental 
priorities are being met in accordance with policy criteria. 
2. Introduction 
2.1 The Common Agricultural Policy  
The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will undergo reforms post 2013 in 
order to adapt to evolving environmental and economic challenges (COM, 2012e). 
Alongside the continued economic crisis there is uncertainty about how the balance of 
environmental and economic issues will be addressed both at the European and national 
level (Hodge, 2012). The Rural Development Programmes (RDP) (COM, 2012e) are 
prominent policy mechanisms within the CAP that are designed to meet this challenge. 
RDPs for the programming period 2007-2013 are based on Strategic Guidelines set by 
the European Commission, and have three core objectives known as Axes. Whereas 
Axes 1 and 3 promote ‘competiveness’ and ‘diversification’ in rural areas, Axis 2 
focuses on ‘improving the environment and the countryside by supporting land 
management’. This includes a number of policy ‘measures’, which act as instruments 
for integrating environmental considerations into economic decisions.      
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2.2 The Scottish Rural Development Programme  
Each EU Member State, [in line with the three Axes], has developed its own RDP 
based on national priorities, with budgets set accordingly (COM, 2005). Scotland’s 
RDP is considered to have an “essential role in sustaining land-use systems that 
contribute to the survival of local communities and which are crucial to the delivery of 
environmental benefits, including the delivery of biodiversity targets and the 
maintenance of unique landscape character” (Scottish Government, 2008, p.13). 
Consequently, the Scottish Government has allocated over £1 billion to environmental 
policy measures within the RDP 2007-2013 programming period (Scottish Government, 
2008). The ‘environmental’ budget for Scotland’s RDP is spread across eight different 
delivery mechanisms known as schemes, illustrated in Figure 7. Between 2007 and 
2010 the Rural Priorities (RP) scheme received the highest committed expenditure in 

















Fig. 7. The eight delivery mechanisms of Scotland’s RDP, in order of committed 
expenditure, from 2007 to 2010 (Scottish Government, 2010a)  
 
The RP scheme is unique in comparison to the other delivery schemes in that it 
works as a competitive process where the eligibility of rural land managers to receive 
funding is based on a scoring system. The scoring system assesses the contribution of 
projects, amongst other eligibility criteria, to quantified national and qualitative regional 
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targets both of which link to the EU strategic guidelines and objectives (Scottish 
Government, 2011a). The RP scheme has five environmentally centred measures, 
including agri-environmental expenditure (AEP) as summarised in Table 1. AEP is 
outlined in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005(COM, 2005), and is a broad 
categorisation of numerous land management strategies known as ‘options’. In Scotland 
there are 69 options and sub-options for the AEP measure. These options range from 
wetland management to bird species conservation; all options have the common aim of 
creating, conserving and improving habitats and biodiversity within Scotland (Scottish 
Government, 2008). The number and specificity of options under Scottish the AEP 
measures contrasts with other EU Member States, with broader options based, for 
example, on overall biodiversity protection rather than specific species or habitats 
(Poláková et al. 2011). For Scotland, the array and the number of options are tailored to 
varying needs due to the diversity of Scottish landscapes (Scottish Government, 2008; 
Poláková et al. 2011). 
Table 1. Framework of axes, measures and options under the Scotland’s RDP Rural 
Priorities scheme 2007-2013 
Axis 1 ‘Competiveness’ Axis 2 ‘Environment’ Axis 3 ‘ ‘Diversification’ 
Axis 2: measures (Total: five) 
214 - Agri-environment payments (AEP) 
216 - Support for non productive investments - agriculture 
223 - First afforestation of Non-Agricultural land 
225 - Forest-environment payments 
227 - Support for non productive investments - forestry 
214 - AEP measure: options (Total: 69 options and sub-options) 
Management of wetlands 
Conversion to organic farming 
Management of cover for corncrakes  
Control of grey squirrel for red squirrel conservation 
Hedgerows – 3 years biodiversity benefits     etc.  ... 
 
2.3 Evaluating policy measures  
The Scottish Government is obligated to evaluate and monitor the performance of the 
RDP through the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) (COM, 
2006a). Data on both the number of participants with contracts (uptake) and expenditure 
of RDP measures are required in the form of the CMEF quantitative indicators (COM, 
2006a). Performance can be appraised by comparing these indicators to output 
indicators, which are nationally pre-set Axes and measure targets (COM, 2006a). Such 
evaluation may identify ‘implementation deficits’, describing the gap between policy 
intentions and actual outcomes (Weale, 1992; Winter 1996; Wilson and Hart, 2000). For 
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instance, from 2008 until 2011, AEP had the highest uptake and expenditure across the 
RP measures from each of the Axes; receiving 39% of the total expenditure for RP 
(total £ 158 million) and 77% of the total contracts (total 15,322), far exceeding the 
AEP number of holdings output target by 135% (Scottish Government, 2008). These 
figures indicate that AEP adoption is meeting policy expectations. Yet the level of 
aggregation of these targets and whole measure analysis does little to allow a deeper 
understanding of what AEP management activities are being adopted and across which 
land and farm types.  
Further assessment of option adoption, however, demonstrates a large disparity 
between uptake and expenditure among the 69 options under the RP scheme’s AEP 
measure. For example from 2008 to 2011 the option ‘supplementary food provision for 
raptors - hen harriers’ had only 1 applicant and a committed spend of £5,380. In contrast 
the ‘open grazed or wet grassland for wildlife’ option had the highest uptake with 2,011 
beneficiaries, and over £30 million in committed spend (Scotland’s RDP Scottish 
Government data, 2007-2011). Yet assessing if levels of individual option uptake and 
expenditure are meeting policy objectives is challenging in the absence of quantifiable 
targets that do not go beyond the measure itself. Additionally, Potter et al. (1993) argue 
that “the precision with which target groups or target land are identified will be critical 
in their success or failure” (p.199).  
It is equally challenging, therefore, to assess policy performance regionally because 
policy priorities are less clear at this level. The spatial distribution of AEP clearly 
differs across Scotland, e.g. Figure 8 shows the variation in expenditure across the 
eleven Regional Project Assessment Committees (RPAC) regions of Scotland for AEP. 
These eleven regions also have varying proportions of Scotland’s total UAA (Utilised 
Agricultural Area). Expenditure could reasonably be assumed to be linked to the 
proportion of UAA within a region. However, as Figure 8 demonstrates, this is not 
necessarily the case. For example the Highland RPAC secured a relatively low 
percentage of funds relative to the proportion of its UAA while the Grampian RPAC is 
the opposite.  
Variation in expenditure across regions, when UAA is accounted for, raises inequity 
issues for the targeting of expenditure and uptake for AEP. Justification of regional 
budgets and their targeting performance is uncertain, since in spite of regional targets 
being established per RPAC, these are qualitative and fairly unanimous across the 
regions (Scottish Government, 2011a; RSPB 2011). 













Fig. 8. Percentage of total expenditure for Scotland’s RDP AEP measure and UAA 
per RPAC region, (2008-2011) 
Thus, indicators of uptake and expenditure have only limited use in policy 
assessment. With national targets and regional priorities in the RP scheme, it is only 
possible to assess if broad objectives are being met (Scottish Government, 2011a). 
However, an understanding of the determinants of uptake and expenditures would 
improve policy evaluation. An analysis of the influences of spatial variability on the 
uptake and expenditure of RDP measures for instance, would provide insights into 
‘how’ and ‘where’ these priorities are being met. 
2.4 Influences of spatial uptake and expenditure extent 
The focus of this chapter is on the spatial distribution of uptake and expenditure of 
the AEP RDP measure across Scotland. In line with available data, seven categories of 
explanatory characteristics, with expected spatial variation, were explored by modelling 
their influence on AEP measure uptake and expenditure. Some determinants were 
chosen because they were identified in previous studies as being important, including 
farm level variables such as;  ‘farm type’, ‘livestock’ (Hynes and Garvey, 2009; Wynn 
et al., 2001); ‘labour employment’ and ‘land ownership’ (Defrancesco et al., 2008; 
Dupraz et al.. 2002); as well as the regional variable ‘designated areas’ (Wilson, 1997).  
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Scottish urban-rural classifications were also included because of their importance in 
Scotland.  
For instance LCA considers the bio-physical constraints on land use based on soil, 
relief, and climatic conditions (Brown et al., 2008). The classifications relate to the 
estimated productivity and cropping potential according to those physical features. 
Classifications rank land capability according to its potential for mixed or arable 
agriculture, mixed grassland, and rough grazing (JHI, 2011; JHI, 2014). Acknowledging 
that LCA represents the potential land use as opposed to actual, this provides a more 
appropriate and up-to-date classification for analysing the AEP measure compared to 
other available land cover datasets i.e. CORINE Land Cover Map 2007. 
The Scottish Government (SG) Urban/Rural 6 fold classification system provides a 
consistent way of defining urban and rural areas across Scotland. The classification is 
based upon two main criteria: (i) population and (ii) accessibility based on drive time 
analysis to differentiate between accessible and remote areas in Scotland (Scottish 
Government 2010c). Both LCA and the rural/urban classifications are potentially useful 
indicators for targeting; in identifying how and what LCA types and rural demographic 
levels, impact AEP participation (Potter et al., 1993).  
In the absence of disaggregated quantifiable targets, it is hypothesised that the 
assessment of policy performance can be achieved by analysing the relationships 
between spatial characteristics and AEP participation and expenditure. For instance, by 
linking RP scheme criteria with policy outcomes, such as the criteria defined for scoring 
and eligibility (Scottish Government, 2011a). For example, one of the national targets 
links directly with designated areas; supporting activities that will bring Scotland’s 
nationally important nature sites (with SSSIs as nationally designated and SACs, SPAs 
and Ramsar sites as internationally designated sites9) into favourable condition (Scottish 
Government, 2009). Options related to designated sites attract a higher score and would 
therefore be prioritised (Scottish Government, 2011a). As a result it is expected, as with 
Wilson’s (1997) findings, that the uptake and expenditure of AEP would be positively 
related to designated sites due to this targeting emphasis. As SSSIs are the most 
common of the designated sites, of which there are 1,440 in Scotland, they are assessed 
separately in this study unlike the merged dataset used for the other designated areas 
                                                 
9  Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Special Areas of Conservation, (SAC) are designated sites that 
support rare, endangered or vulnerable natural habitats and species of plants or animals (other than birds) of European 
importance, SSSI also protect geological or physiographical features. Special Protection Areas (SPA) support wild 
birds and their habitats. Ramsar sites are designated areas for wetland conservation (Scottish Government, 2011b). 
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(Scottish Government, 2011b). This is used to test whether there are differences in 
uptake and expenditure of AEP according to the type of designated site. 
Eligibility for funding is also determined by spatially-related attributes. Farm type 
and bio-physical characteristics can indicate how individual option criteria affect 
uptake. The eligibility criteria vary for each individual AEP option, depending on the 
options objective and management requirements. Option criteria range from being 
‘narrow and targeted’, to the more widely applicable ‘broad brush’. For example, a 
more targeted option includes ‘grazed grassland for Corncrakes’. This option is eligible 
only for grazed farm land within the species distribution target areas e.g. the Western 
Isles, from 2008 to 2011, had 135 approved contracts (Scottish Government, 2011c). 
Alternatively hedgerow management’ is a more ‘broad brush’ option and is open to all 
land managers who have established hedgerows (Scottish Government, 2012b). This 
option had the highest uptake of all RP AEP options, with 1,601 contracts from 2008 to 
2011. This supports the findings of Wilson and Hart, (2001) that more generally 
applicable options with undemanding entry conditions are more commonly adopted. 
Option management demands and labour availability are also potentially related to 
AEP uptake. Dupraz et al. (2002) suggested conservation intensive option requirements 
are more likely to be taken up by holdings with an excess of labour. Defrancesco et al. 
(2008) support this finding, by indicating that non-participating farmers cannot easily 
satisfy the extra labour required for the AEP paperwork, administration and 
implementation. Therefore, locations with higher labour densities and the availability of 
full-time staff would be expected to positively influence AEP uptake. 
Land capability for agricultural, determined by bio-physical characteristics, will also 
influence the eligibility of land areas (Wynn et al. 2001; Hynes and Garvey, 2009; 
Buchan et al., 2010). For instance the two most prevalent land capability types in 
Scotland are ‘rough grazing’ referring to uncultivated land used for grazing livestock, 
and ‘mixed agriculture’, which refers to a combination of cropping and livestock, or 
mixed livestock farming approaches. Both of these farm types are prevalent in land 
areas with mountainous terrain, poor soils and harsh climatic conditions (Scottish 
Government 2008; JHI, 2013).  
These land capability types are also associated with extensive farming practices, 
which according to Hynes and Garvey (2009), are more likely to adopt AEP options. 
Such farm practices are also more likely to include mixed cattle and sheep livestock 
(Hynes and Garvey, 2009). Moreover, intensive farms are probably less inclined to 
apply, as this would result in the loss of income when converting areas for AEP 
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practices (Hynes and Garvey, 2009). In this study, therefore, farms with both rough and 
mixed land capabilities with extensive farm characteristics were expected to influence 
positively the uptake of AEP in Scotland.  
The potential explanatory determinants, however, might be important at one scale 
level, but not at another, known as the ‘ecological fallacy’, (Steel and Holt, 1996). 
Furthermore, as data is aggregated, information subsequently can be lost (Henderson-
Sellers et al., 1985; Meentemeyer and Box, 1987). Thus, in this study, the analysis was 
undertaken at the smallest spatial resolution dictated by data availability i.e. at the 
parish10 level; a spatial unit used in the agricultural census and for the expenditure of 
farming grants and subsidies.  
In order to analyse the determinants of AEP uptake and expenditure, whilst taking 
account of measure and option distribution, a spatial modelling approach was applied. 
While previous work on AEP adoption has focused on specific case studies (Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009; Guillem et al., 2012) there are fewer studies that have attempted to model 
determinants at a national level (Crabtree et al., 1999, Wynn et al., 2001, Juvančič et al., 
2012). This approach could have more resonance with policy makers who need to 
consider the broader picture. Therefore this study used a countrywide spatial modelling 
approach to identify determinants of AEP uptake and expenditure across Scotland. 
2.5 Spatial econometric modelling 
Spatial econometrics has been used widely in regional economics as well as being 
applied in land use models (Overmars et al. 2003; Brady and Irwin, 2010). Yet a limited 
number of studies have applied spatial econometrics in order to evaluate RDP 
(Schmidtner et al. 2012; Bartolini et al. 2012; Juvančič et al. 2012). Furthermore, whilst 
there are many studies into the factors that affect AEP participation, few of these have 
attempted to understand the geographical dimensions of AEP and control for spatial 
dependence (Evans and Morris, 1997; Hynes et al., 2008; Uthes et al. 2010; Schmidtner 
et al. 2012). Evans and Morris (1997) argued for the necessity of using a geographical 
approach in order to fully understand the impacts of AEP on “land use patterns and 
habitat and landscape conservation” (p.202).  
Spatial econometric modelling is defined here as the incorporation of spatial 
dependence interaction (spatial autocorrelation) and spatial structure (heterogeneity) in 
regression models (Paelinck and Klaassen, 1979; Anselin, 1988). Spatial heterogeneity 
refers to variation across space, and spatial autocorrelation, considers the first law of 
                                                 
10 There are a total of 891 agricultural parishes in Scotland. 
Chapter 2. Spatial Econometrics 
40 
geography that “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970, p. 236), indicating that data observations are 
not independent.  
If spatial dependency is detected, the use of spatial models is justified. There are two 
main types of spatial models; lag and error (Anselin et al. 2008). The spatial lag model 
adds a spatially lagged dependent variable to account for the dependency of another 
variable being jointly determined by neighbouring values, known as the ‘spill-over 
effect’ (Ward and Gleditsch, 2008; Anselin et al. 2008). Alternatively, spatial error 
models assume that spatial dependency occurs in the error terms, indicating that a 
covariate has been omitted (LeSage and Pace, 2009). It is argued that both these models 
provide better classification and predictive accuracy than linear regression for spatial 
datasets that exhibit strong spatial autocorrelation (Anselin, 1988; Kazar and Celik, 
2012).  
Spatial dependency effects need to be clarified to justify the use of either the spatial 
lag or error models (Partridge et al. 2012; Gibbons and Overman, 2012) by identifying 
the distinction in ‘spatial dependence’, i.e. whether dependent correlation is caused by 
spill-over effects or explanatory variables (Partridge et al. 2012). In this study, it was 
expected that spill-over effects would be identifiable in a holding-to-holding analysis, 
for example, the participation of one farmer may lead to AEP uptake by neighbouring 
farmers (Vehkala and Vainio, 2000; Siebert et al. 2006). However these effects are 
unlikely to be identifiable at a parish level. Therefore it is more likely that spatial 
correlation for AEP will be detected and caused by a high correlation in the explanatory 
variables (Hynes et al. 2006). Therefore spatial error models are expected to be more 
suitable for this analysis. These hypotheses can however be tested to identify the most 
appropriate model type (Anselin, 2005). 
2.6 Summary of research aims  
The novelty of this study lies in the application of spatial econometric modelling to 
identify spatial targeting of agri-environmental measures. To do this, the study 
addresses four main questions in the context of Scotland’s RP scheme: 1) Are uptake 
and expenditure for the RP scheme AEP measure and AEP option categories spatially 
dependent? 2) What impact does the type of model: OLS, lag and error have on the 
model quality? 3) What are the spatial and non-spatial determinants of participation and 
expenditure in Scotland? 4) What do these results tell us about the targeting 
effectiveness of Scotland’s RDP? In order to answer these questions the following steps 
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of analysis were applied: 1) the construction of an appropriate spatial weight matrix; 2) 
identification of spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variables; 3) a comparison of 
model performance and results between OLS and the spatial models; 4) identification of 
significant determinants of participation and expenditure; and, 5) assessing how these 
variables meet desired policy objectives. Thus, this chapter illustrates the process and 
detection of spatial autocorrelation, the differing model quality. As well as describing 
the significant determinants of AEP participation and expenditure examining how these 
may relate to policy eligibility and scoring criteria.  
3. Material and methods 
Dependent and explanatory variable datasets were prepared for model analysis. The 
Scottish AEP measure, as the dependent variable, incorporates a large number and 
diversity of environmental management options, and consequently a breakdown into 
option groupings was expected to produce better fitting models. For in comparison to 
the whole measure analysis, the option groups would further account, at least to some 
extent, for the differing eligibility criteria and management requirements. The options 
were classified, therefore, into five groups relating to the main theme objectives: species 
control (total of 6 options); organic farming (total of 8 options); bird conservation (total 
of 12 options); water habitats (total of 10 options); and habitat management (total of 32 
options)11. The total number of participating holdings varied across the option groups as 
shown in Figure 9. Due to the low uptake for the ‘species control’ and ‘organic’ options 
these were omitted from the analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
11 For further details on each option group categories, see Appendix A 
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Fig.9. Total number of holdings uptake per category of AEP options in Scotland 
(Scottish Government data, 2008-2011) 
 
In total, 40 explanatory variables were collected as secondary datasets (summarised 
in Table 2). These included variables categorised as farm level variables and regional 
variables such as designated sites, LCA and accessibility and remoteness. 
Table 2. Dataset summary: dependent and explanatory variables 
 
Datasets Description  Data source 





Two types:  
i) Payments per UAA ha per parish  
ii) Percentage of participating holdings per 
parish  
Scottish Government - 
Scotland’s RDP data from 
2008 - 2011 
Explanatory variables (total 40)  
Farm types (n=11) 
Rough grazing 
Crops and grass 
Grass < 5 yrs old 
Grass > 5 yrs old 
Other land 
Crops and fallow  
Other crops l 




Proportion of total parish size (ha) e.g. 
percentage of crops and grass per parish 
 
Density of glasshouses is calculated from 
total number of glasshouses per parish 
divided by total UAA ha per parish 
Scottish Government – agri-
census data 2010 
Ownership (n= 5) 
Common grazing 
Owned agricultural  
Rented agricultural  
seasonal rented  
Seasonal let  
Proportion of total parish size (ha) e.g. 
percentage of  owned agricultural area per 
parish 
Livestock (total four) (n= 4) 
Cattle  
Sheep  
Beef Heifers  
Dairy Heifers  
Total number of livestock type per parish 
divided by total UAA ha per parish. e.g. 
Density of sheep per UAA ha 
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Testing for spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variables requires the 
development of W (the spatial weights matrix) by applying a theoretical approach that 
avoids misapplying spatial econometrics (Partridge et al. 2012; Corrado and Fingleton, 
2012). Applying W in an ad hoc way may lead to model deficiencies (Partridge et al. 
2012; Corrado and Fingleton, 2012). Therefore the weighting strategy of W should be 
applied in order to represent the spatial structure between features that best reflect how 
they interact with one other by systematically assessing the degree of connectivity 
between spatial units (ESRI, 2006). W’s were constructed using the parish spatial 
dataset12.  
The ‘Gabriel’ W was considered to be better than the two most commonly used Ws, 
‘queen contiguity’ (based on common boundaries and vertices) and ‘distance based’, 
since it incorporates the ability to include islands and limit ranges of neighbours 
between parishes (see discussion in section 4.1, below). The Gabriel W uses a 
standardised each row weighting strategy (Gabriel and Sokal, 1969). As with Delaunay 
triangulation (natural neighbours) the method works as a sub-graph where neighbours 
are constructed by creating Voronoi triangles from point features, so that each point 
connected by the triangle edge are considered neighbours (ERSI, 2012).  
                                                 
12 The W and models were developed using the R 2.13.1 software (2011) 12 
Labour (n= 5) 
Full-time occupiers  
Part-time occupiers  
Full-time spouses Part-time spouse  
Regular & casual staff  
Total labour type per parish divided by total 
number of holdings per parish. e.g. Density of 
regular and casual staff per holding 






Built up areas 
Inland water area 
Based on soil, climate and relief datasets land 
is ranked on its potential for productivity and 
cropping flexibility.  
 
Proportion of total parish size (ha) e.g. 
percentage of land capable for mixed 
agriculture per parish 
 James Hutton Institute 
(JHI) 2011 
Designated sites (n=3) 
SSSI area 
Complete national designated areas 
RSPB reserve areas 
 
Proportion of total parish size (ha) e.g. 
percentage of  SSSI per parish 
 
Designated sites variable contained the 
merged classifications: SSSI, SAC  SPAs and 
Ramsar sites (Scottish Government, 2011b) 
Scottish Government 2012a 
and RSPB 2010 
Accessibility and population (n=6) 
Large urban  
Other urban  
Accessible small towns  
Remote small towns  
Accessible rural  
Remote rural  
Based on population and accessibility to 
settlements to classify Scotland’s rural-urban 
areas. 
 
Calculated as a proportion of total parish size 
(ha) e.g. percentage of accessible rural areas 
per parish. 
Scottish Government 2010 
NB: Further detailed description on the datasets and how each variable was derived can be found in Appendix B. 
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Once the W was constructed, spatial autocorrelation was tested using Geoda 1.0.1 
(2011) to produce a Global Moran’s I (Moran, 1948) for each dependent variable. The 
Global Moran’s I, is a statistical measure that takes account of the clustering effects of a 
given variable between the values sampled at different points in space (Cliff and Ord, 
1973). The value can range from -1.0 to +1.0, with positive values indicating spatial 
clustering and spatial dependency (ERSI, 2012). Furthermore, the spatial significance of 
clusters (spatial autocorrelation) as well as spatial outliers in the dependent datasets was 
identified using a Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) test (Anselin, 1995). 
The LISA test provides a visual map indicating locations of high and low participation 
and expenditure for AEP.  
Identification of the significant explanatory variables per dependent variable was first 
achieved using the aspatial OLS model forward-backward stepwise function. This 
function identified the most significant variables and organised them in the most 
effective order to achieve the ‘best model fit’ based on AIC (Akaike Information 
Criterion) (Akaike, 1973; Bozdogan, 1987). The OLS model for multivariate analysis is 
expressed in equation (1). 
Y= β_0+ β_(1  ) X_1+β_(2  ) X_2+⋯β_(n ) X_(n )+ ε            (1) 
Y represents the dependent variables (the expenditure and participation of AEP and 
option groups); β refers to the coefficients, which are calculated by the regression; X 
refers to each of the selected explanatory variables; and ε represents the random error, 
which refers to the unexplained part of the dependent variable. The results from this 
analysis were examined to check for multi-collinearity between present variables and 
spatial dependency of the model residuals using the OLS model definition in Geoda. 
Furthermore, models for each of the dependent variables were tested with the Lagrange 
Multiplier diagnostic, which identifies the most appropriate spatial model: lag or error 
(Anselin, 2005).13 These tests produced mixed suitability for lag and error according to 
the dependent variable, and so subsequently both models were used. The same 
explanatory variables selected in the OLS models for each dependent were used in the 
spatial lag model and spatial error model. The spatial lag model is expressed in equation 
(2). 
Y= ρWY+β_(1  ) X_1+β_(2  ) X_2+⋯β_(n ) X_(n )+ ε                                       (2) 
                                                 
13 However the diagnostics confirmed that in the majority of cases both models types were significant. Therefore the model analysis 
proceeded to use both error and lag models. 
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W refers to the spatial weight matrix and ρ is a ‘scalar spatially autoregressive 
parameter, which determines the importance of spatial lag’, also known as “<Rho>” 
(Paraguas and Kamil, 2005). “<Rho>” measures the average influence of observations 
from their neighbouring observations. The spatial error model is similar to the original 
OLS model however the ε error term is altered by adding the W and lambda as 
demonstrated in equation (3). Where ε is the vector of auto-correlated error terms, the 
lambda ʎ is also a coefficient parameter, with μ as a vector of i.i.d errors14 (Anselin, 
2005): 
ϵ = ʎ W ε+ μ                                                                        (3) 
All the model results were compared and analysed. A distinction between option groups 
and entire measures was tested to compare model quality, Note that R² in the spatial 
models is comparable, but not for the OLS model as the spatial results produce what is 
known as a ‘pseudo R²’ (Anselin, 2005). Thus, model comparisons were based on the 
AIC. In order to compare the spatial dependency between the aspatial and the spatial 
models, the residuals from the spatial lag and error models were tested to compare the 
Global Moran I results and significance compared to the original OLS model residuals. 
This was done in order to test whether the spatial models had accounted sufficiently for 
the spatial dependency.  
4. Results 
4.1 Spatial weight matrix 
 The ‘Gabriel’ W (spatial weight matrix), illustrated in Figure 10, was developed 
as an improved alternative to account for the limitations of both the queen contiguity 
and distance matrixes. The queen contiguity W was, limited in being unable to include 
all parishes in the analysis. Results returned 25 parishes with no links and [on the 
islands] some blocks of parishes connected only to one other. Additionally, ‘Distance 
cut off’ presented limitations due to the varying size and number of parishes. This was 
demonstrated in the distance matrix results that included four parishes with only 1 link, 
compared with the most connected parish with 147 links to ‘neighbouring parishes’ 
.  
                                                 
14 i.i.d refers to the  independent and identical distribution of random variables 
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Fig.10. The Gabriel W diagram; representing spatial interactions between 
Scotland’s parishes 
However the Gabriel W had the added advantage, as does the Delaunay Triangulation, 
of not requiring a common border (i.e. islands can be retained) (Gabriel and Sokal, 
1969; ERSI, 2012). Additionally, row standardization is used to create proportional 
weights in cases where features have an unequal number of neighbours, with a total 
maximum of 8. Therefore Gabriel W was applied to each of the following spatial tests 
and models.   
4.2 Spatial autocorrelation detection 
The spatial autocorrelation test showed that each dependent variable in the OLS 
models had a significant Global Moran’s I, as all the values were positive indicating 
spatial clustering and therefore spatial dependency. Habitat expenditure had the highest 
spatial dependency with a Moran’s I of 0.46 (Table 3). By contrast, both bird 
conservation models were weakly significant with a much lower Moran’s I at 0.04 for 
expenditure, and 0.05 for participation. The spatial autocorrelation of the residuals from 
the OLS model compared to both the spatial models showed that in almost all the 
models, spatial dependency was accounted for in the spatial lag and error models.  
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Table. 3  Global Moran’s I of Residuals per model  
Models  OLS Moran’s I Lag  Moran’s I Error Moran’s 
I 
AEP pay 0.38 *** 0.08* 0.08* 
AEP % 0.19 *** 0.01 0.02 
Habitat pay 0.46 *** 0.09* 0.09* 
Habitat % 0.18 *** 0.01 0.02 
Bird pay 0.04 * 0.03* 0.01 
Bird % 0.05 ** 0.01 0.00 
Water  pay 0.18*** 0.05* 0.04* 
Water % 0.22*** 0.02 0.02 
 * p ≤0.05, ** p≤ 0.01, *** p ≤0.001 
 
The LISA maps also revealed regional clusters of significantly low and high values as 
well as outliers (referring to low-high and high–low neighbouring values). As seen in 
Figure 11, it is indicated that clustering patterns are dissimilar between expenditure and 
participation results for the whole ‘AEP’ measure with the exception of clusters of both 
high uptake and expenditure in the North Eastern Grampian region, and low value 
clusters in central Scotland. This demonstrates that whilst expenditure and uptake are 
unequivocally related, i.e. there would be no expenditure without uptake; they are still 














Fig. 11. LISA clustering maps of (a) AEP measure expenditure per UAA ha and 
(b) AEP measure percentage of holdings 2008-2011. Spatial autocorrelation is 
demonstrated with the darkened parishes, indicating collections of parishes with 





 Not significant 
 Outliers 
(a) (b) 
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4.3 Model outcomes and explanatory variables  
The results from all the spatial models per dependent variable had an improved AIC 
in terms of relative goodness of fit compared to the aspatial OLS models (Fig. 12. For 
instance, for the OLS habitat management’ expenditure model, the AIC was reduced by 
211 by the spatial models However the ‘bird conservation’ models showed the least 
improvement with the AIC in the spatial models reduced by 5. 
The AIC results between spatial lag and error models varied according to the 
dependents however they were either the same or only marginally different (Fig. 12). 
For example AIC figures were the same for AEP expenditure and bird conservation 
participation error and lag models. The AIC for spatial error was smaller for the rest of 
the participation models, with the exception of the water option group; whereas the AIC 
for spatial lag was smaller for the other expenditure models. 
In comparing the results of the whole AEP models with the option groups, both the 
model quality and the corresponding explanatory variables differed (Figure 12). For 
instance, each of the option group models showed an improvement in model quality 
with lower AICs compared to the whole measure analyses, as shown in Figure 12. 
Fig.12. ‘Expenditure per UAA’ and ‘Percentage of uptake’ model AIC results for 
OLS, lag, and error for each dependent category: water habitats, bird 
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For each model, the explanatory variables differed in number, type, and significance 
although the same type of relationship (positive or negative) occurred across the model 
types (OLS, error and lag)15. Further reference of the model results refers solely to the 
spatial error model results as shown in Table 4. This is mainly because the spatial error 
model was considered to better represent spatial dependency. Whilst the significance of 
explanatory variables did vary across the lag and error models, this difference was very 
small and in the majority of cases the same variables remained significant. 
The R² in the error models were relatively low in the majority of the models e.g. < 
0.28, with the exception of higher R² values for both AEP (0.37) and habitat 
management expenditure (0.42). The lambda, representing the coefficient of the 
spatially correlated errors, was found to have a positive effect and was highly significant 
in all the models. The variation and significance of the explanatory variables are 
discussed below. 
                                                 
15 For all spatial model results see Appendix C 
Table 4. Summary of spatial error model results; significant explanatory variables and coefficients 
per dependent variable 
  







Water % Bird pay Bird % 
       FARM-LEVEL VARIABLES 
Ownership 
Common grazing              0.08 **   
Owned land              -0.04 **   
Rented agricultural    0.06 **   0.04 *   0.04 **     
Farm types 




  0.08 *  
Crops and fallow 





    
-107.97 




Vegetables land                -3.16 *** 
Other crops     82.68 ***         
 
Woodland  -0.50 *        -0.17 **       
Labour employment 
Density of Part-time            1.96 *     
Density regular and 
casual staff 
  3.32 ***   2.79 ***       2.93 *** 
Livestock  
Density cattle         -0.92 ** - 1.13 * -0.88 ***   -0.73 ** 
Density of sheep          1.18 ***       
Density of dairy 
heifers  
  -5.03**   -4.17 **       -4.02 *** 
    REGIONAL VARIABLES  
Land capability 
LCA Mixed  0.23 * 0.07*** 0.33 *** 0.07 *** 0.08 *** 0.05 ***     
LCA rough  -0.48 *** 
      




LCA arable   
 
0.19 ** 0.03**         
LCA improved        -0.03 * 
Built up areas -0.51**       -0.08 * -0.07 ***  -0.09 **   
Inland water area   
 
      -0.25 ***   
 
Designated areas  
SSSI area 0.69 *** 0.25 ***   0.23 *** 0.24 *** 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.16*** 
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4.3.1 Ownership  
For ownership, only three explanatory variables were significant: ‘owned’, ‘rented’, 
and ‘common grazing’. However, the significance of each differed according to the 
model dependents. Percentage of ‘rented’ agricultural land had a positive effect across 
three participation models for the whole AEP measure, habitat management options and 
water options. Yet percentage of ‘owned land’ and ‘common grazing’ were significant 
only in the bird conservation expenditure models. As expected, these two variables 
displayed contrasting relationships, with ‘owned land’ having a negative effect and 
‘common grazing’ a positive one. 
4.3.2 Farming characteristics and land capability  
The six significant farming variables were mostly related to crop types, grassland and 
woodland. The crop related variables, ‘unspecified’ crop land had a negative effect in 
both the water habitat management expenditure model and water management 
participation model. Additionally, ‘vegetables’ were negative, and ‘crops and fallow’ 
positive in the bird conservation participation model. ‘Crops and fallow’ also had 
positive significance in the water habitat participation model. Alternatively, the 
percentage of ‘woodland’ had significant negative association with the AEP expenditure 
and water habitat expenditure models. 
The LCA variables differed in significance across all the models. ‘Mixed’ agriculture 
had a positive significant relationship for the majority of models, apart from the bird 
conservation models. Similarly ‘arable’ agriculture had a positive effect in both habitat 
management models only. ‘Improved grassland’ was only present in the bird 
participation model and was negatively significant. ‘Rough grazing’ also appeared as a 
significantly negative variable in five of the models. Additionally both ‘built up areas’ 
and ‘inland water’ also had negative coefficients. 
The labour variables occurred only in the participation models. For example ‘density 
of regular and casual staff’ had a strong positive significance in all the dependent 
Designated areas    -0.13 **   -0.14 *** 
 
-0.09 **   -0.09 ** 
RSPB reserve              0.79 *** 0.16* 
Accessibility and population  
Other urban   -0.07 * 
 
        -0.07 ** 
Accessible rural 
areas 
-0.25 *** -0.02* 
 
-0.03 ** -0.04 ** -0.02 ** -0.03 ** -0.02 ** 
Lambda 0.54 *** 0.34 *** 0.58 *** 0.33 *** 0.35 *** 0.39 *** 0.10 ** 0.11 ** 
R² 0.37 0.25 0.42 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.13 0.18 
Key:      * p >0.05,  ** p> 0.01,  *** p >0.001 
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models apart from water habitat participation. However, for water habitats, ‘density of 
part-time occupiers’ had a positive significant relationship. 
For the livestock variables, both density of ‘cattle’ and ‘dairy’ were negatively 
significant. For ‘cattle’ this determinant was present in the habitat management, water 
habitat, and bird conservation participation models, as well as the water habitat 
expenditure model. The ‘dairy’ livestock variable was present in the AEP, habitat 
management, and water management participation models. By contrast, the density of 
‘sheep’ was significantly positive in the water management expenditure model only.  
4.3.3. Designated sites  
The ‘SSSI’ variable was shown to have a strong positive significance in all the 
models, although it was absent in the habitat management expenditure model. The 
‘RSPB reserves’ variable was a positive factor in both the bird models only. However 
‘designated areas’ had a significant negative relationship in all the participation models. 
  4.3.4 Accessibility and population 
The two significant variables for accessibility and population included ‘accessible 
rural’ and ‘other urban’ areas. ‘Accessible rural’ area had a significant negative effect 
on every model, except for the habitat management expenditure models. Meanwhile 
‘other urban’ areas had a negative effect on the AEP and bird conservation participation 
models.  
5. Discussion  
Spatial dependency is present for participation and expenditure in the whole AEP 
measure and three major option group dependents, which justifies the use of spatial 
models. Furthermore, the determinants of either AEP participation or expenditure in 
Scotland vary according to the three major groupings of options. The relationship of the 
significant determinants with AEP was largely as hypothesised.  
5.1 Spatial dependency  
Spatial dependency was demonstrated for each dependent variable justifying the use 
of spatial models, and supporting Tobler’s (1970) theory that physical and social 
phenomena are highly clustered in space. Yet while most of the dependent variables 
demonstrated reductions in the AIC and the Global Moran’s I through the use of spatial 
models, these reductions were limited for the bird conservation dependents. 
This suggests that the use of spatial models only marginally improved model quality 
for the bird conservation option group. Possible explanations for this could be the 
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overall participation numbers for this group, or differentiation between option eligibility 
criteria. For instance, compared to the other dependents the bird conservation group had 
the lowest total number of holdings at 1,184 compared to habitat management that had 
almost twice as many holdings at 2,266. This suggests that a certain threshold of uptake 
could determine the suitability of employing a spatial analysis approach at the national 
scale. In addition, the twelve bird conservation options each have a large range of 
eligibility requirements; from the ‘broad brush’ aimed at wider diversity of farmland 
bird species to the ‘targeted and narrow’ aimed at single bird species. For example there 
are five options specifically targeting corncrake (Crex crex) conservation. Corncrakes 
have a specialised habitat distribution (Scottish Government, 2011c) and this is 
reflected in the option eligibility. However the most popular bird option; ‘wild bird seed 
mix/ un-harvested crop’ also included in this group, has less rigid eligibility criteria. 
Subsequently this option has, as with hedgerows, been adopted more widely by a large 
number of holding types, in both improved and arable land capabilities (Scottish 
Government, 2012b).  It is expected, therefore, that an option specific model analysis 
would be more likely detect stronger spatial dependency. 
Nevertheless, despite weaker spatial dependency for the bird conservation option 
group, the aspatial OLS models and the other dependents had comparatively higher 
AIC, and so, weaker model quality. However whilst the use of spatial error and lag 
models was shown to be appropriate, the spatial effects and improved suitability of the 
error models was not wholly as expected.  It was hypothesised, for instance, that spatial 
dependency at the parish level would arise from an important omitted explanatory 
variable, which could be addressed through the application of spatial error models. The 
participation models, in line with expectations demonstrated this, with the spatial error 
results having the lowest AIC indicating stronger model quality compared to the lag and 
OLS models. These participation (and spatial error) models also had markedly better 
model quality, compared with the overall expenditure models. For example, the spatial 
error model for the AEP participation model was reduced by 3324 compared to the AEP 
expenditure error model.  
It is assumed that the differences in model quality and the significance of the spatial 
lag models are due to data accuracy between the two variable types. For instance, in 
order to account for accuracy in the methods each of the variables was standardised: 
with expenditure to parish UAA size, and participation as proportion of the number of 
holdings per parish. Yet the analysis was constrained by the available datasets. An 
alternative for standardising expenditure would be the number of hectares of land under 
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AEP contract since AEP options are predominantly area based e.g. expenditure per ha 
(Scottish Government, 2011a). This would provide a more accurate calculation of 
expenditure per ha compared to the expenditure per total UAA ha, as AEP options are 
more likely applied to a ‘proportion’ of a farm holding’s land area, rather than to the 
whole UAA. Alternatively, if AEP and option area coverage datasets were available, 
model quality could be improved by reducing the AIC of the error model. However the 
associated explanatory variables would not be expected to alter significantly, as hectares 
under AEP contracts would still correspond (to an extent) with the analysed UAA 
parishes. 
5.2 Farming and land capability variables  
The range of explanatory variables varied according to dependents, but predominately 
met expectations. This was indicated by the positive significance of ‘rented’ and 
‘common grazing’ areas, and ‘sheep’ as well as LCA for ‘mixed’ farm type as 
explanatory variables appearing alternately or mutually between the expenditure and 
participation models. Meanwhile ‘cattle’ and ‘dairy heifer’ densities appeared as 
negatively significant determinants. As expected, these variables indicate characteristics 
of extensive farming practices, in keeping with Wynn et al. (2001) and Hynes and 
Garvey (2009) findings, as a positive influence on AEP uptake. 
Yet in contrast to expectations ‘rough grazing’ was a negatively influencing factor in 
a number of the participation and expenditure models. However, by examining the 
LISA clustering map (Fig. 4) the visible clustering of patterns in the north eastern 
region of Scotland provides a potential explanation. These regional clusters appear in 
areas of predominately ‘arable’ and ‘mixed’ farm types, both of which are positive 
significant variables in the AEP and habitat management models (SNH, 2013). 
Moreover, these regions also include a high number of applications funded for 
‘hedgerow development’ options. As identified earlier, hedgerow management is one of 
the most commonly adopted AEP options in Scotland (Scottish Government 2011a). 
This observation, on hedgerows options, also indicates the link between uptake and 
spending patterns with AEP option eligibility criteria. In line with expectations, more 
generally applicable options such as hedgerows with undemanding entry conditions are 
more commonly adopted (Wilson and Hart, 2001). Additionally, hedgerow option 
uptake will be determined by the bio-physical context, as hedgerows are less suited to 
areas of ‘rough grazing’; habitats that are limited by difficult physical and climatic 
conditions (Scottish Government, 2008). 
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Overall average uptake and expenditure still occur in rough grazing areas, i.e. in the 
western and north western regions of Scotland. This is indicated by the lack of 
significant clusters on the AEP LISA maps. This may also explain why ‘inland water’ is 
negatively associated in all the participation models; as ‘inland water’ mostly in the 
form of lochs, are prevalent in the rough grazing regions, e.g. the Western Highlands. 
Additionally where large areas of inland water persist in parishes, agricultural land 
management will not be viable.  
Likewise, the percentage of ‘woodland’ was negatively associated with AEP and 
water habitat expenditure. These results were expected as the AEP options are directed 
at agricultural businesses rather than forestry, with the main forestry related options 
present in other Axis 2 measures (Scottish Government, 2008).  
Labour variables were only significant in the participation models. The density of 
‘regular and casual’ staff showed strong positive significance, which logically indicates 
that the higher the density of workers in the parish, the higher the number of holding 
uptakes. This finding corresponds with Dupraz et al.’s (2002) research that argues that 
AEP participation costs are high and may be dependent on the opportunity costs of on-
farm labour. Additionally, results suggest that labour intensive conservation practices 
are more likely to be taken up by farmers with an excess of labour in times of workload 
peaks (Dupraz et al., 2002; Defrancesco et al., 2008). 
5.3. Regional variables  
In terms of accessibility and population, ‘accessible rural’, and ‘other urban’ areas 
both had a negative significant relationship across the expenditure and participation 
models. This was largely expected since any agri-holding can apply for funding even 
those classified in urban areas; yet the needs of ‘rural’ communities are prioritised in the 
RDP (Scottish Government, 2008). Nevertheless, the rural urban classification variables 
did not provide as much insight into AEP adoption as anticipated, possibly due to the 
broad classifications of rural and urban areas. Further differentiation within the area 
classifications could provide a better understanding of the relationship between AEP, 
accessibility and population.  
However, the explanatory variables related to designated sites did provide insights 
into the national targeting efforts of the Scottish Government or the Non-Governmental 
Organisation, RSPB. Only ‘SSSI’ had a significant positive association, whilst the 
amalgamated ‘designated areas’ were significantly negative. This suggests that SSSIs 
are primarily connected with AEP participation and expenditure, whilst the other 
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nationally important designated sites such as SAC, SPA’s and Ramsar are not.  The 
latter sites are aimed at bird conservation and mostly situated in wetlands, estuaries, and 
lochs and coastal habitats, which potentially are less suitable for AEP, which probably 
explains the negative relationship (Scottish Government, 2011b). This explanation is 
supported further by the negative significance of inland water for participation in water 
habitat options. Additionally, ‘RSPB reserves’ had a significant positive relationship in 
all the bird conservation models. These reserves are privately owned by the RSPB and 
primarily support bird conservation (RSPB, 2011). This suggests that the RSPB has 
been successful in gaining contracts and funding for AEP land management that 
promotes bird conservation. 
5. Conclusion 
The EU CMEF guidelines require Member States to assess individual RDP measures, 
as opposed to the individual options (COM, 2006a). The research presented here 
provides insights into AEP as a whole measure, but also assists in understanding the 
varying pattern of uptake and expenditure between option groups. Thus for Member 
States that have, as with Scotland for AEP, a high number and range of options under a 
single measure, an analysis of option groups could provide more informative insights 
into policy performance. Alternatively a breakdown into singular options would likely 
identify more specific trends and perhaps more homogenous distributions of uptake, but 
as a national policy assessment this would add complexity. For regional decision-
makers, however, such as the RPACs in Scotland, an individual option analysis at a 
regional scale would be more suitable, accounting for the regional diversity in land 
characteristics and the specifics of option eligibility. 
The low predictive capacity of the models meant that a strong explanation of the 
variance in the dependent variables was not possible. This is consistent with findings 
from other studies on AEP in which participation in schemes could be attributed to a 
large number of factors such as policy design, individual behaviour and attitudes 
(Wilson and Hart, 2000; Siebert et al. 2006; Edwards-Jones, 2006; Ruto and Garrod, 
2009). Siebert et al. (2006), assert that participation is likely to be influenced by an 
‘intricate interaction of contingencies’ between many variables. For RP this is 
especially likely to be the case considering the voluntary and competitive nature of the 
scheme. For instance, decisions are made by applicants not only about whether to apply, 
but also by the government authorities who design and implement policy, and assess 
and score applicant proposals. 
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In summary the spatial approach has provided broad insights into AEP participation 
and expenditure determinants indicating how and where policy priorities have been met. 
In the absence of explicit quantified measure and option targets, spatial econometrics 
has provided examples of how eligibility and scoring criteria can be used to assist in 
policy evaluation. The importance of particular explanatory variables such as farming 
characteristics, land capability, designated sites, and accessibility and population for the 
corresponding dependent variables of the AEP measure and option group participation 
and expenditure was, in most cases, as hypothesised. The study has provided, therefore, 
quantitative evidence about which explanatory variables concerning farm types, labour, 
and ownership are more likely to adopt AEP, according to option eligibility as well as 
how these environmentally centred AEP options meet national targets. 
For instance, the RSPB and SSSI results indicate that targeting efforts by government 
and NGOs can be effective. From a policy perspective these are informative results in 
relation to how national targets are being met. The scoring process is designed to 
prioritise AEP applications located in SSSI sites, and as the results of this study 
indicate, this has been effective (Scottish Government, 2009). However the 
environmental benefits of AEP option uptake at these sites is not yet apparent. 
Furthermore, the other nationally targeted designated sites (SAC, SPA and Ramsar), 
were negatively associated with AEP participation, suggesting further policy efforts are 
required to improve agri-environmental management uptake in these areas. 
Furthermore, habitats outside of SSSIs and designated zones, termed here the ‘wider 
countryside’, might be at risk of not being sufficiently competitive to receive funding 
under the current scoring system, despite the capacity to meet option objectives. This 
suggests that policy targeting for RP may need to develop further towards support for 
‘wider countryside’ applications, in order to promote and manage biodiversity, 
especially to reduce the impacts of already fragmented protected habitat areas 
(Sutherland et al. 2006; Jackson et al. 2009). 
The results presented here provide a potential policy tool for the evaluation of the 
extent and expenditure of the RDP measures, contributing to the understanding at a 
national level of the spatial patterns and determinants of policy implementation. 
Understanding spatial participation may reduce the risk of ‘implementation deficit’ by 
determining how policy objectives in terms of initial uptake and spending are being met. 
Moreover, understanding the potential determinants could guide and emphasise the 
importance of future targeting efforts to option level, and make these spatially explicit. 
Such actions are especially important with respect to the proposed reforms of the CAP, 
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which aim at ‘encouraging agri-environmental initiatives’ as well as ‘better targeted 
income support’ looking towards future challenges post 2020 (COM, 2012d; 2012e;). In 
addition there is a “need for a more radical and geographically-defined strategy of 
targeting” as argued by Potter et al. (1993, p.200) especially as RDP undergoes reform 
and proposed CAP spending cuts become reality (Marsden, 2011; COM, 2012d).
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Chapter 3:  
  
The implications of stakeholder power 
relationships within governance structures, and 
assessment of the EU good governance principles 
1. Chapter overview 
This chapter explores the implications of stakeholder power relationships within 
governance structures, and assesses the achievement of good governance principles in 
the context of the Scottish Rural Development Policy. This mixed method analysis 
provides an expansion to the previous spatial analysis approach which was restricted by 
available quantitative indicators and other explanatory variable datasets. These methods 
however provide the opportunity to explore less tangible policy influences including: 
various stakeholders influence and interest on RDP participation and environmental 
targeting efforts.  
2. Introduction 
In the European context ‘governance’ is defined by the European Commission as the 
“rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at 
European level” (Commission of the European Communities, COM, 2001b, p.8). 
Because of criticism of the traditional, top-down approach to government intervention, 
the European Commission’s White Paper recognised governance as key to effective 
European Union (EU) policy making and integration, and identified the principles of 
‘good governance’ based on “openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence” (COM, 2001b, p.8). Member States are encouraged to incorporate these 
principles into their national policies (COM, 2001b; 2009). An example of this is in the 
Scottish Rural Development Programme 2007-2013 (SRDP), which introduced the 
Rural Priorities (RP) scheme. The RP scheme brought together three established public 
organisations; Forestry Commission Scotland (FCS), Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) 
and the Scottish Government Rural Payments and Inspections Directorate (SGRPID) for 
policy delivery, and delegated decisions to regional committees in creating wider 
stakeholder funding opportunities (Scottish Government, 2008). 
There is a need to assess in European policy the implications of adopting 
centralised and decentralised policy approaches, both in terms of governance structure 
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and process (Berger, 2003). Moreover, there is a need to assess the evolving power 
relationships between stakeholders and institutions and various governance structures 
and processes (Berger, 2003). Bovaird (2005) suggests that this may be achieved 
through stakeholder analysis and ‘influence mapping’. This method can address 
questions of stakeholder position, interest, and influence as well as provide knowledge 
on interrelationships and networks (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). 
This chapter aims to assess the role of governance and power relationships of 
stakeholders in the SRDP. The chapter first discusses governance in the EU, based on 
the principles of good governance and governance structures. Secondly, it provides 
examples of their application in the context of Scotland’s RP scheme. Thirdly it reports 
on research findings from semi-structured interviews and a stakeholder mapping 
exercise to explore governance with key stakeholders in Scotland. Multivariate statistics 
are used to test gathered quantitative data for differences in interviewee’s perceptions. 
These results are triangulated with the analysis of qualitative interview data providing 
in-depth insights into the power relationships between stakeholders and how these 
influence policy implementation (Reed et al. 2009).  
2.1 Governance principles and decentralisation 
In light of criticism of more traditional top-down governance approaches, an EU White 
Paper proposed reforms to European governance systems, recognising a more 
decentralised approach as being key to effective EU policy making and integration 
(Metcalfe, 2000; COM, 2001b; Berger, 2003). This document identified five principles 
of ‘good governance’ based on: “openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness 
and coherence” (COM, 2001b). These principles are recommended for application at 
global, European, national, regional and local levels of government (COM, 2001b). 
All five principles are reinforced by the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, decision 
making at the most appropriate level from Europe wide to local (COM, 2001b; COM, 
2009d). The European Commission recommendations do not dictate the levels at which 
appropriate policy decisions should be made, which is at the discretion of Member 
States. However EU policy documents do encourage, where appropriate, a shift from 
centralised to decentralised policy making, embracing a system based on wider 
involvement, feedback and networks (COM, 2001b; Bovaird, 2005). Decentralisation is 
described as the “process involving the transfer of powers, competencies and resources 
from the central government… to a level of government closer and more easily 
influenced by citizens” (COM, 2009e, p.1).  
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Yet, with subsidiarity, determining what the ‘appropriate levels’ are for 
centralised or decentralised policy can be challenging. For instance, centralised policy-
making is thought to be more efficient, in terms of time, money and effort, and to 
positively impact on coherence and accountability (Mann and Gennaio, 2010). By 
contrast, a decentralised approach can be more resource intensive due to the added 
complexity of wider stakeholder engagement (Rhodes, 2006; Mann and Gennaio, 2010). 
However, by adopting a more inclusive approach, key benefits include greater policy 
acceptance and longevity can be achieved by creating a more informed and involved 
public (COM, 2001b; Mann and Gennaio, 2010). Furthermore, incorporating local 
knowledge can result in more informed policy decisions that better reflect the interests 
and concerns of those affected (Reitz, 1996; Mann and Gennaio, 2010; Bell et al. 2012).  
Mann and Gennaio (2010) argue that it is intuitive that certain policy areas are 
better dealt with at local levels, as opposed to centrally. Yet some impacts go beyond 
local, regional and national boundaries, to become ‘trans-boundary’ issues, which 
require, as with many environmental problems, an integrated policy approach between 
the different levels of government (COM, 2012f). This requires a balance between the 
cost and benefits of centralised and decentralised approaches in order to achieve cross 
territorial objectives through local action. Such policy actions can be examined through 
the governance structures and processes in place within the RDP. 
2.2 Governance structures and processes  
Governance structures and processes have become increasingly important for describing 
and proposing centralised and decentralised strategies in policy making and its 
implementation (Berger, 2003). Governance ‘structure’ refers to the institutional 
arrangements and inclusivity of stakeholders under new conditions, whilst ‘processes’ 
of governance refer to the interaction between these structures. Berger’s (2003) review 
of the governance literature identified five governance structures, including; networks, 
inclusion of wider parts of society, multilevel government, new public management 
(NPM), and hierarchies as summarised in Table 5.  
 Both structures and processes of governance can evolve over time, leading to 
changes in stakeholder behaviour, influence and involvement (Berger, 2003; Hudson 
and Lowe, 2004; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). These changes can cause policy-
making to be inherently conflictual with shifting uneven distributions of power between 
different policy institutions and actors (Berger, 2003). Thus an understanding of power 
relationships, in the context of ‘structures’ and ‘processes’ of governance as outlined by 
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Berger (2003), can potentially provide an appropriate framework for policy assessment, 
and furthermore the identification of opportunities for conflict resolution (Sidaway, 
2005). 
 
2.3 Case study: Scotland’s Rural Development Policy  
The RDP is a component of the EU Common Agricultural Policy, which is important in 
the management of natural resources (COM, 2008a). Funded, guided, and to some 
extent regulated by the EU, RDP’s are primarily developed at either a national or 
regional level to incorporate both EU and national objectives. The formulation of the 
SRDP 2007-2013 rural priorities (RP) scheme demonstrates evidence of incorporating 
the European Commission’s principles of ‘good governance’ in addition to each of the 
governance structures as defined by Berger (2003). 
The RP scheme for example, has attempted to strengthen ‘networks’, by 
bringing together three governmental organisations; FCS, SNH, and SGRPID for policy 
delivery (Scottish Government, 2008). Improving inter-organisational ‘networks’ could 
potentially ensure ‘coherence’ across the organisational approaches, for better scheme 
implementation. Moreover as the scheme is designed to deliver integrated economic, 
Table 5. Governance structures; adapted from Berger (2003)  
Governance structure Description 
1. Networks Policy networks are the “sets of formal institutional and 
informal linkages structured around...beliefs and 
interest in public policy making and implementation” 
(Rhodes, 2006, p.426).  
2. Inclusion of wider parts 
of society  
This approach “refers to notions of capacity building, 
inclusions and participation” (Berger, 2003, p.221).  
3. Multilevel government 
involvement 
This is described as the “coordinated action by the EU, 
Member States and local and regional authorities, based 
on partnership …and implementing EU policies” (COM, 
2009d, p.1).  
4. New public management 
(NPM) 
Links governance to efficiency and effectiveness of the 
market economy by incorporating private sector 
management methods (such as market competition) and 
incentive structures into public service provision 
(Rhodes, 1996; 1997; Berger 2003).  
5. Hierarchies Hierarchies describe legislative decisions and executive 
decisions that steer democratic governmental action at 
the national and European level (Scharpf, 1997).  
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social and environmental objectives the expertise of each organisation can be utilised 
(Scottish Government, 2008). However, cultural differences between the organisations 
could also create conflict (Berger, 2003). Contrasting values and behaviours may reflect 
uneven distributions of power, creating potential barriers to achieving consistency 
(Schultz, 1994; Berger, 2003). In order to address these potential issues while enhancing 
network benefits the three organisations have further core representatives on regional 
decision making committees. 
The ‘Regional Project Assessment Committees’ (RPACs) are administrative 
groups responsible for ensuring consistency in scheme management and assessment 
(Scottish Government, 2012d). Representing eleven regions of Scotland each RPAC has 
developed regional priorities according to the needs of those areas. Regional expertise 
from each of the delivery organisations and other committee members is intended to 
improve policy ‘effectiveness’ by having in place more informed decision makers for 
better policy targeting (Berger, 2003; COM 2008). Additionally RPACs also provide an 
example of a multi-level governance structure that reflects interactions between the EU, 
central Scottish and regional government levels.  
Another new and unique aspect of the RP scheme is its competitive nature. This 
is consistent with the NPM governance structure by providing incentives for public 
service provision and identifying and funding better quality projects (Berger, 2003). RP 
scheme applicants are invited to submit proposals for scheme funding by adopting one 
or more environmentally oriented land management ‘options’, and may then compete 
for funding having met certain eligibility and scoring criteria (Scottish Government, 
2012d). Successful proposals are expected to contribute to national and regional 
priorities, demonstrate value for money and manage risk effectively (Scottish 
Government, 2012d). The process is further controlled by government adjustments of 
scoring thresholds set by the National Project Assessment Committees (NPACs), based 
on the quantity of applicants and budget availability during each assessment round 
(Scottish Government, 2012d).  
Moreover, the eligibility of applicant types has been extended, which is 
consistent with Berger’s (2003) governance structure of inclusion of wider parts of 
society. Previously, the RDP was focused on the farming community, but rural 
businesses, land managers and community groups are also now able to submit proposals 
(Scottish Government, 2012d). However, as the majority of policy options relate to 
agricultural practices, the level of wider applicability and inclusivity proposed by the 
scheme is yet to be determined.  
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Hierarchies are inevitably present within EU policy and also therefore in the 
RDP (Berger, 2003). This is particularly relevant to policy evaluation where the SRDP 
is subject to EU audits and if in breach of EU rules financial penalties may be incurred 
by central government, known as ‘disallowances’ (Scottish Government, 2011d). Such 
regulatory procedures aim to enhance coherence and accountability between the 
expenditure of Member States (COM, 2008a). However, these checks are thought to 
also change the behaviour of applicants and institutional stakeholders because of the 
fear of financial repercussions (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008).  
Hence, the effectiveness of attempts to integrate these governance structures and 
principles into decision-making is yet to be evaluated, which is the principal aim of this 
study. Identifying the implications of these structures and processes is not possible by 
observing policy frameworks alone. Consultation with stakeholder with direct 
experience of the scheme is needed to further understand how compromises have 
worked in practice, and how stakeholders have shaped that process. Stakeholders are 
commonly defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.46) and in order to 
assess governance systems adequately, it is necessary to identify ‘who’ are the 
stakeholders and ‘how’ they interact in making decisions (Pahl-Wostl, 2002).  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research design and data collection 
This study applied a mixed method research design based on reviewing the SRDP 
policy literature (Scottish Government, 2008; Cook, 2009; Scottish Government, 2012d 
etc.) and conducting pilot interviews. Thirteen face-to-face, semi-structured pilot 
interviews were conducted to assess the feasibility of the interview process, test key 
questions, and to identify reoccurring themes. Interviewees were selected to include a 
wide a range of stakeholder types (including land managers, institutional stakeholders, 
and advisory groups). The interview outcomes were used to develop the stakeholder 
mapping approach.  
The initial research stage confirmed ‘institutional stakeholders’ (i.e. those 
working within the Scottish Government) as suitable participants for the second stage of 
the study, mainly due to the diversity in job roles, organisational affiliation, and direct 
involvement in implementing the scheme at varying scales. Furthermore the literature 
review identified a lack of studies that address the perceptions of those involved in 
administering the RDP, since most previous studies focus on the recipients of RDP 
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grants (Siebert et al., 2006). Consequently, institutional respondents were selected 
according to a non-random sampling scheme, based on three attributes: job roles, 
organisation and RPAC region to further refine stakeholder identification and 
interactions (Mitchell et al. 1997). 
The second stage of the research involved face-to-face, semi-structured 
interviews following the sampling scheme. Open ended questions allowed respondents 
the freedom to explore issues they felt important in relation to the RP scheme drawing 
on their experience and perceptions with respect to Berger’s (2003) governance 
structures. 
A ‘stakeholder mapping’ approach was developed as part of the quantitative 
aspect of the second stage of the study, which was used to identify and differentiate the 
levels of ‘interest’ and ‘influence’ of RP scheme stakeholders (Reed et al. 2009). 
Interest was defined as: the amount of professional or personal interest a particular 
stakeholder may have in the number and type of options taken up within their RPAC 
area. Influence was defined as: the amount of influence that stakeholder may have on 
the number and type of options taken up successfully in their RPAC area. Respondents 
identified and ranked stakeholders according to the definitions of interest and influence.  
Reed et al. (2009) argue that stakeholder mapping information may contain 
hidden assumptions, which can be addressed by capturing qualitative information from 
the interviews. Hence the stakeholder mapping worked as a visual tool in the interviews 
to open up discussions with respondents on the positioning of stakeholders. This 
included asking the respondent to explain their choices, to how influence and interest 
had changed over time, and what ideal change they would like to see. This, supportive 
questioning was used to verify the respondent’s mapping choices through triangulation. 
Furthermore in the final stage of the exercise stakeholder choices were reviewed and 
further modified according to respondent preferences (Reed et al. 2009). 
3.2 Data analysis  
A total of 61 interviews were conducted between August 2011 and May 2012, covering 
69% of the sample scheme, with 55 respondents completing the stakeholder power 
mapping exercise. The narratives from the semi-structured interviews were fully 
transcribed, coded and analysed with Nvivo (9.1.106.0). 
Data collection from the stakeholder mapping exercise was achieved by 
quantifying the respondents’ answers providing scores for both interest and influence 
for each identified stakeholder. The categories on the grid ranged from low (0-1), 
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medium (1-2) to high (2-3). A mark of zero represented no interest and/or influence 
whereas three represented high influence and/or interest. For further specificity between 
stakeholders, the ranks were taken as decimals. For example land managers may be 
classified as high interest e.g. 2.5 but low influence e.g. 0.50 and these scores were 
entered into a database. The means for the overall observations, for interest and 
influence per stakeholder, were calculated and displayed in scatter plots (Figures 2 -5) 
according to the stakeholder category groupings.  
The score data on interest and influence were analysed separately using a 
Kruskall Wallis (KW) test. This was used to identify whether the shared attributes of 
respondents influenced their perception of other stakeholders. The KW test was 
appropriate as it deals with non-parametric datasets; ranked data alongside nominal data 
(McKight and Najab, 2010). KW compares between the medians of two or more sample 
groups to determine if the samples have come from different populations, and produces 
a chi-squared probability (McKight and Najab 2010). This test is sensitive to sample 
size, and if considered ‘too small’ (e.g. < 5) a chi-square probability cannot be produced 
(McKight and Najab, 2010). Statistical data analysis was undertaken with Genstat 
(15.1.0.8821).  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Stakeholder identification and networks 
The respondents confirmed and identified 27 RP scheme stakeholders (individuals and 
groups), each with a varying number of observations, as shown in Figure 13. The 
number of observations ranged from 55 (for the majority of regional government 
stakeholders) to the lowest number of 6 for the Advisory group, Historic Scotland. 
These findings are based on the respondents understanding of the RP context (Hesse-
Biber and Leavy, 2011), and so the number of observations reflect the strength of the 
network links between the identified stakeholders and the institutional respondents. For 
example, the institutional stakeholder group consists of definitive job roles, as opposed 
to the more generalised identified stakeholder groups; reflecting respondents familiarity 
of roles within government.  
The identified RP scheme stakeholders and their policy networks are also 
illustrated in Figure 13, indicating both formal direct links and informal links (which 
indicate lobbying capacities) between each of the stakeholders. The network diagram is 
based on amalgamated perceptions, which is likely to be indicative of a respondent’s 
role within government and more specific respondent attributes. 



























































Fig.13. Identified SRDP RP scheme stakeholder network diagram and number of 
observations 
 
4.1.1 Description of RP scheme stakeholder network  
The following section provides further detail on the connections and roles between 
identified stakeholders and their links with government within the RP scheme network 
(Figure 13) as acknowledged through the qualitative interviews.  
Respondents with Scottish Government roles; for example the Cabinet Secretary 
and RP scheme manager, commonly being those within Central Government were 
considered as part of a single cohesive system. Scottish Government was also noted for 
having the highest number of informal and indirect links with all the other stakeholders 
identified. Furthermore, they were the only stakeholder group perceived to have direct 
formal links with the European Commission.  
The RPACs representing the regional government, contain five members, each 
from public bodies, and interact during infrequent proposal assessment and approval 
meetings. RPAC chairs and core members were acknowledged for having major roles in 
managing scheme delivery in their regions, whereas the RPAC wider members were 
perceived to have limited involvement apart from the RPAC meetings. Additionally, a 
select number of RPAC chairs form the NPACs (responsible for setting RPAC budgets 
and scores) and have additional formal links with Scottish Government.  
The interaction between the RPAC members (core and chair) with case officers 
was perceived to vary across regions, but the main consistent link is via the ‘pre and 
post approval’ coordinators. Both coordinator roles involve bridging concerns and 
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queries between the RPACs and the case officers in order to enhance consistency in 
application assessments.   
The main job role of the case officer’s was described as processing applications 
and communicating with those who submitted the proposal (either directly with the 
applicant or via consultants). Case officers were also reported to network with case 
officers from the other delivery organisations for advice exchange. Additionally, case 
officers networked with outside NGOs and had limited links with other public agencies 
(e.g. Historic Scotland) for advice exchange and to gain project consent.  
Consultants were identified as major players in developing proposals, with 
respondents commonly estimating that 90% of applications were completed by 
consultants. Their main link was with applicants who would hire them to develop and 
submit applications on their behalf. A few respondents perceived all applicant types to 
have an informal lobbying link to Scottish Government as members of the ‘general 
public’, whilst more specifically farm businesses categorised as land managers were 
also perceived to have stronger links to Scottish Government through association with 
the National Farmers Union of Scotland (NFUS). 
NGOs involved with the RP scheme primarily focus on habitat and species 
conservation, and have varying links with applicants by providing free advice and 
support in promoting environmental options such as Butterfly Conservation, and the 
Bumblebee Conservation Trust. Respondents acknowledged the RSPB as having the 
most prominent scheme involvement with the strongest links of any NGO with Scottish 
Government. However a number of NGOs also have more formal links to Scottish 
Government as representatives of the Programme Monitoring Committee, a decision-
making group that brings together stakeholder organisations and members of central 
government for SRDP monitoring (Scottish Government, 2012d). 
4.2 Kruskall Wallis test results  
The KW test identified if the shared attributes of respondents influenced their 
perceptions of certain stakeholders by scoring data on interest and influence. Overall the 
KW test produced significant results for job roles and organisations only, with no 
significant results for RPAC regions. Non-significant results could indicate coherence 
of opinion across attribute groups; however, as chi-squared probabilities for regions 
could not be produced these results are more likely indications of insufficient sample 
sizes. Small group sizes were due to limited capacity and the willingness of potential 
respondents with appropriate attributes to participate. Furthermore, a low number of 
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observations for identified stakeholders also resulted in insufficient group sizes (for 
example ‘the public’ had nine observations).  
The two significant results for job role (categorised as case officers, coordinators, 
RPAC members and Scottish Government) (please see Appendix D Table 1).  For 
‘interest’ the ‘RPAC core members’ revealed a significant difference between 
perceptions for these four groups with a P value of 0.03. The results illustrate that case 
officers perceived ‘RPAC core members’ to have lower interest compared to the other 
job role groups. For ‘influence’ ‘rural businesses’ also had a significant difference in the 
medians between job groups with a P value of 0.05. Coordinators and case officers both 
similarly perceived rural businesses to have an overall lower influence compared to the 
responses from the other job role groups.  
Representative responses were sufficient for the attribute ‘organisation’ despite 
numbers varying across the organisation types (please see Appendix D Table 2). The 
KW produced significant results for both influence and interest. For ‘influence’ four 
stakeholders: NPAC, RPAC member core, RPAC member wider, and Scottish 
Government, had significant results. Each of these institutional stakeholders represents 
those working within or who are linked closely to Scottish Government. Results reveal 
the SGRPID organisation respondents perceived each of these significant stakeholders 
to have overall higher influence comparative to the other organisation groups. 
Respondents’ perceptions of interest between organisations revealed two 
significant differences for RPAC chair and the RSPB (the first significant non-
institutional stakeholder). SGRPID respondents for instance perceived RPAC chairs to 
the have the most interest compared to the other groups, while those in Scottish 
Government perceived RPAC chairs to have the lowest interest.  
4.3 Stakeholder power mapping  
The results of the mapping exercise are displayed in scatter plots in Figures 14 – 
17, illustrating the mean scores attributed for respondent perceptions of interest and 
influence in RP scheme outcomes, i.e. the number and type of options taken up in their 
RPAC area, per stakeholder observation. The findings demonstrate that the means of 
interest and influence varied in and between stakeholder groups, as did the standard 
deviations (SD) per observations indicating the extent of differing perceptions.   
For institutional stakeholders, the means ranged according to overall respondent 
perceptions, yet the majority of institutional stakeholders were perceived to have a 
medium ‘interest’ in the scheme options and a medium to high ‘influence’ to promote 
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uptake of those options (see Figure 14). Post coordinators, involved with the RPAC 
regional administration of post approved RP contracts, were perceived to have the 
lowest interest (1.57) and influence interest (1.18) of the institutional stakeholders. The 
cabinet secretary, as a member of Scottish Government, takes a leading managerial role 
in the RP scheme and was perceived to have the highest interest (2.31) and influence 
(2.52). Variation in respondents’ perceptions of institutional stakeholders was relatively 
consistent, with a SD of 0.70, with the exception of the European Commission which 
had the smallest variation for influence (0.26), indicating the majority of respondents 
perceived them to have high influence.   
 
Fig.14. Stakeholder mapping; mean interest and influence of RP scheme 









Fig.15. Stakeholder mapping; mean interest and influence of RP scheme delivery 
organisations, with error bars indicating the standard deviation 
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Perceptions for the different delivery organisations interest in and influence on 
the RP scheme outcomes indicated that each stakeholder has medium to high influence 
and high interest (seen Figure 15). Results indicate two distinct groups; with both SNH 
(2.41) and FCS (2.36) having markedly higher interest compared to SGRPID (2.00) and 
Central Scottish government (2.01). The variation of perceptions per organisation 
observation was relatively consistent, although for both SNH and FCS influence was 









Fig.16. Stakeholder mapping; mean interest and influence of RP scheme advisory 
groups, with error bars indicating standard deviation 
The advisory group means in Figure 16 are relatively similar with predominantly 
high interest and medium influence for these stakeholders. However, ‘Historic 
Scotland’ and other environmental NGOs’ were both perceived to have comparatively 
lower interest and influence. SAC consultants were perceived to have the highest 
relative amount of influence amongst this group. There was a larger variation in the SD 
between advisory stakeholders with Historic Scotland and the Programme Monitoring 
Committee having the largest SD for influence, which could be explained in two ways. 
The large SD for Historic Scotland is probably due to the low number of observations 
(e.g. total of 6), as dispersion increases with smaller sample sizes (Rubin, 2013). 
Furthermore, the SD for the Programme Monitoring Committee was higher than 
average for influence at 0.98, probably because of the uncertainty of many respondents 
about the role of this committee, as indicated in the interviewees responses. 
The applicant stakeholder group results, illustrated in Figure 17, apart from the 
general public, indicate similar levels of interest and influence. Land managers were 
perceived to have higher interest (2.21) and medium influence (1.30), but also had the 
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between respondents’ perceptions for land managers could arise from differences 
between the types of land manger. This was indicated by some respondents who chose 
to further define land managers as ‘large’ and ‘small’, with different levels of influence 
accordingly. For instance large land managers were described as having larger more 
intensive farms and estates and were perceived as having the highest relative influence 
(1.43) of the group. Conversely, small land managers, including crofters (often a 
relatively small agricultural tenant; Crofting Commission, 2013) were perceived as 











Fig.17. Stakeholder mapping; mean interest and influence of RP scheme applicants, 
with error bars indicating standard deviation 
Rural businesses and community groups were perceived as having a similar 
level of influence (0.97 and 0.10 respectively), but with slightly higher interest (1.98 
and 1.83 respectively). The ‘public’ was the only stakeholder across all of the 
observations perceived to have both low interest (0.87) and influence (0.57). 
 
5. Discussion  
A strong drive towards incorporating the ‘principles of good governance’ was evident in 
the formulation and structuring of the SRDP RP scheme (COM, 2001b; Scottish 
Government, 2008). However the results reported here highlight that, as Berger (2003) 
predicted, inevitable power imbalances have prevailed, with varying influence between 
stakeholders, which brings into question the effectiveness of these efforts. The 
following discussion is framed around Berger’s (2003) five structures of governance, in 
order to assess how ‘good governance’ efforts have been implemented in practice. 
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5.1 Networks 
Results from the interviews about the perceived RP scheme network revealed both the 
formal institutional and informal structural links between stakeholders. Respondents 
also provided examples of both the positive and negative aspects of network 
interactions within the scheme, and emphasised the importance of organisational 
networks. For instance respondents mostly perceived the collaboration of the three 
delivery organisations - FCS, SNH, and SGRPID - as positive for promoting co-
operation and networks. Organisational collaboration often occurred in relation to 
applications between RPAC members, and also between case officers, benefiting from 
drawing on different areas of expertise from each of the differing organisations and 
across regions. However, despite overall ‘improvements’, results also suggest obstacles 
are perceived to remain in developing a more cohesive working relationships between 
the organisations.  
For instance, evidence from this study supports the argument that different 
institutions and actors can exhibit uneven power distributions as a consequence of 
organisational cultures and consequently varying approaches to objective delivery 
(Berger, 2003). Uneven power distributions were demonstrated in the perceived 
differences of influence and interest between the three organisations demonstrated in the 
KW test and stakeholder mapping results. The KW tests indicated that there was a 
significant difference between organisations’ perceptions about centralised stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the stakeholder mapping indicated that overall respondents perceived 
SNH and FCS to have relatively similar interest and influence, whilst SGRPID was 
perceived to have comparatively lower interest.  
The importance of differing organisation cultures and approaches to objective 
delivery (Schultz, 1994) was evident in the results presented here; with FCS and SNH 
more alike compared to SGRPID. FCS and SNH differ in terms of specific targets and 
strategies, but have similar organisational goals for environmental outcomes (FCS 2012; 
SNH 2012). Both organisations were perceived to have higher interest in option 
implementation. Staff from SNH and FCS concurred that before the RP scheme they 
were capable of facilitating option uptake and stated the importance of advice for 
specific option uptake, yet with the current scheme their role has shifted to become 
more administrative and process focused. Yet both SNH and FCS staff argued that 
targeted advice and assistance were still required to achieve co-ordinated policy 
objectives. Moreover avoiding the situation in which applications were repeatedly 
submitted and rejected due to lack of feedback and advice. Consequently FCS and SNH 
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respondents commented on the disempowerment of case officers in this newer role, 
believing their influence had decreased since RP scheme implementation. 
Alternatively, SGRPID were identified as having lower interest in scheme 
outcomes relative to the other organisations, but to have higher influence. 
Organisational power imbalances were perceived to be a consequence of SGRPID’s 
influential role as the single EU paying agency and regulatory body, as well as the size 
of their work force, and their position within central government. For instance, SGRPID 
was perceived to have more influence as “they’re almost on a par with senior 
management within Scottish Government” (Scottish Government interviewee). SGRPID 
works as an administrative regulatory body with emphasis on the applicant’s ability to 
meet checks and criteria as opposed to advice. Consequently respondents perceive, as 
with Scottish Government, that SGRPID are procedure driven as opposed to outcome 
driven.  
These results indicate some of the underlying differences between the three 
organisations, despite the policy drive for consistency across the three organisations. In 
spite of network improvements, a number of respondents indicated that differences in 
organisational preferences, between advice and regulations, and emphasis on outcomes 
or process, were both an obstacle to scheme efficiency. These differences and conflicts 
are potentially exacerbated by perceived power imbalances between the organisations. 
 
5.2 Inclusion of wider parts of society  
In line with the European Commission’s good governance principle and the second of 
Berger’s (2003) governance structures, inclusion of wider parts of society, were also 
identified in the RP scheme design. The RDP was originally aimed at farm holdings, but 
under the new RP scheme applicant eligibility types have been widened so that rural 
businesses and community groups may also now compete for funding. Findings from 
both the interviews and stakeholder mapping exercise however indicate that barriers 
remain for ‘wider’ applicant involvement. This is indicated in Scottish Government data 
(2007-2011) for the RP scheme, with 500 rural business contracts issued compared to 
15,000 contracts for farm holdings. Furthermore, land managers, particularly ‘large’ 
land managers were perceived by the majority of respondents to have the highest levels 
of influence. Case officers suggested this was due to the ability of larger land managers, 
including estates, to match funds and adopt a wider range of policy measures. In 
contrast, ‘smaller’ land managers, such as crofters, rural businesses and community 
groups were at a disadvantage due to limited land, access to advice and finance, and 
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were therefore considered to have relatively lower influence. Furthermore the RP 
scheme option and eligibility criteria are also considered a constraint for the ability of 
smaller land managers to compete for funding; as one respondent said, whilst “their 
interest is high, they are wanting to use SRDP but they can’t. It’s too complicated or 
they can’t get enough to score” (FCS, case officer). 
It was recognised by the majority of respondents that certain types of applicants 
have been better able to win a scheme contract than others, such as large land managers; 
and consequently they have a higher influence. For community groups these issues have 
been partly resolved by deferring cases to LEADER, which is a local action group that 
assesses RDP applications which contribute wider community benefits (Scottish 
Government, 2008). However, lack of finance and access to advice for smaller land 
mangers and rural businesses persist as obstacles to wider scheme adoption (COM, 
2001b).  
 
5.3 New public management  
New public management (NPM) is a way in which governance can be linked to 
efficiency and effectiveness of the market economy, providing incentive structures for 
public service provision (Rhodes, 1996 and 1997; Berger, 2003). NPM is apparent in 
the RP scheme as a competitive mechanism, with applicant proposals evaluated in terms 
of offering the best value for money. The majority of the respondents accepted this and 
understood that public funds require justification and therefore the need within the 
scheme scoring mechanism to select proposals on the basis of quality. However, the 
interview findings suggested that the design of the current scoring mechanism did not 
always guarantee quality, with almost half of the respondents sharing the opinion that 
even when an application scores well “that doesn’t necessarily mean its good” (FCS, 
coordinator).  
Respondents indicated that consultants could often navigate the scoring system 
and knew the formula, despite questionable suitability for a high scoring proposal. For 
instance, consultant led proposals were reported to be “not necessarily reflecting what is 
right for that business or right agri-environmentally on the land” (SGRPID, Case 
officer). Therefore consultants were perceived to have a relatively higher influence 
compared to the majority of stakeholders including applicants and case officers, 
although this was often seen as a shortcoming of the scheme. Respondents suggested 
that because of this, applicants were likely to become disengaged from the scheme, and 
that case officers were unable to rectify this situation because of constraints on the 
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advice they could provide. The scoring mechanism was also perceived to occasionally 
fail some applicants, in spite of the suitability and potential environmental benefits of 
their applications, due to an inability to meet the scoring thresholds. The rejection of 
potentially suitable proposals due to low scores was recognised as a consequence of 
having one uniformed scoring criterion for a huge variation in project types. As one 
SGPRID coordinator said: “you’re going from play parks, to milking parlours, to 
butterflies, [and] you have one scoring sheet that covers everything”. However most 
respondents assumed that this could be rectified by having a “separate scoring system 
for the different [objectives]…[which] would allow them to target the scoring more to 
the priorities that were coming in” (Coordinator, SGRPID). 
The requirement of an NPM approach was accepted but criticised. The inability 
of the schemes scoring system to differentiate quality among diverse applications was 
perceived to be the biggest issue, with respondents recommending that a more tailored 
scoring system to particular objectives would go some way to promoting better 
targeting. Furthermore, imbalances of influence between consultants and institutional 
stakeholders in driving option uptake may need to be addressed; in as much as the role 
of consultants affects the ability of government to coordinate option uptake in order to 
meet regional and national priorities. 
 
5.4 Multilevel government involvement  
Multilevel governance is clear in the RP scheme, with EU, Scottish Government and 
RPAC involvement. The introduction of the RPACs as a regional decision making body 
represented a move towards decentralisation adhering to the principle of subsidiarity. 
However, the interviews and the stakeholder mapping exercises showed that the 
influence of the RPACs was limited because of a lack of decision-making capabilities 
arising from the inadequate transfer of power and resources from central government.  
RPACs, for instance, were tasked with formulating their own regional priorities, 
which was seen as a potential tool for enhancing regional stakeholder influence and 
participation in all regions. In practice, however, regional prioritisation was reported as 
a ‘non-process’ by the majority of respondents, as priorities were demonstrated to be 
“pretty standard across all the regions” (SGRPID, case officer). Regional priorities 
were argued to be uniform as a consequence of regions competing for a national pot of 
money. Respondents felt that there was “tendency of some of the RPACs to say any 
money coming into our region is a good thing” (SGRPID, RPAC member). It was 
therefore often suggested that regional budgets are required in order to improve the 
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ability of RPACs to prioritise effectively, and this would also enhance accountability. 
For instance “if you had a regional budget you then have to decide on…we have to get 
the best for our region” (SGRPID, RPAC Member). However, others argued that the 
complexity of allocating regional budgets would introduce its own set of problems and 
that “administratively it’d be a nightmare”. (SGRPID, RPAC member) with the 
possibility that it would “cause more infighting between areas” (SGRPID case officer). 
Yet, despite concerns, local budget allocations have been demonstrated to work 
successfully. For instance, the SRDP LEADER scheme already allocates variable 
budgets to over 20 local action groups who then determine what projects to fund 
(Scottish Government, 2008). 
RPAC members also perceived their ability to prioritise and make decisions to 
be hindered by the sheer number of applications and strict scoring procedures. One 
RPAC chair commented that: “It all depends how the [scoring] cut off has been set and 
whether there is a buffer … if it’s in the buffer you can approve it”. As a result, RPAC 
members commonly felt that their expertise was being underutilised in the scheme. In 
response, a common recommendation was that RPAC meetings should only address 
atypical or high spends projects, standard applications being checked by the 
coordinators, thus allowing further time and effort for specific application reviews.  
The ability for regionalised government to make effective decisions is hindered 
by financial resource allocation and the rigid scoring system set and managed by central 
government. Regional budgets are thought to provide the means for RPACs to 
effectively prioritise their own needs, providing an incentive to narrow down the 
options. Furthermore, decision making capabilities could be enhanced by creating 
flexibility in the scoring system and prioritising specific cases for RPAC approval. 
Whether or not these recommendations are suitable in practice, the issues identified 
under multilevel governance structures by respondents highlight some of the core 
weaknesses of the RP scheme. This area of research would benefit from further 
exploration due to the importance of this governance structure and its implications in 
the schemes ability to meet initial decentralised policy objectives.  
 
5.5 Hierarchies 
The findings of this research indicate that hierarchies, and the legislative and executive 
decisions from the higher tiers of government (Berger’s (2003), were perceived to 
influence both RP scheme formulation and implementation (Sharpf, 1997; Hèritier and 
Lehmkuhl, 2008). Both central Scottish Government (including those in recognised 
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centralised job roles) and the European Commission were perceived to have similarly 
high overall influence compared to all other stakeholders, indicating that the RP scheme 
is largely dominated by a centralised tiered hierarchy. However, while this influence 
was removed from the sharp end of scheme implementation, the power of the European 
Commission and Scottish Government was argued to reside indirectly through scheme 
amendments and the monitoring and auditing process.  
Within Scottish Government, the Cabinet Secretary, a politician in government 
tasked with overseeing the RP scheme, was perceived by the majority of respondents to 
have the highest influence, with the ability to promote specific options indirectly. The 
Cabinet Secretary was seen as the figurehead of central government with the authority 
and ability to amend the scheme, in terms of objectives, procedures and budget. 
Respondents identified an example of this influence with the success of national targets 
in the RP scheme; for example, driving the uptake of woodland expansion options 
linked to climate change mitigation as part of the central government’s policy to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions at least by 42 % by 2020 (SNP, 2011) 
However, the interviews showed that the ultimate power in influencing the 
scheme was still perceived to be the European Commission, which was acknowledged 
as having final authority over scheme implementation, amendments, budgets, but 
moreover the ability to wield the threat of penalisation (Scottish Government, 2007). 
Through audits directed by the European Commission, the scheme is under constant 
scrutiny, which could result in a national disallowance and this was stated by 
respondents as a primary critique of the scheme (Scottish Government, 2007).  
This relates to the discourse on the conflict between the scheme as being 
outcome or process led: the scheme is promoted as an ‘outcome oriented approach’ in 
policy documents, yet in practice respondents perceived it to be ‘process led’ as a 
consequence of the emphasis on checks and audits directed by Scottish Government to 
satisfy the demands of the European Commission (Scottish Government, 2008; Scottish 
Government, 2010a). Respondents understood the necessity of audits for accountability 
and consistency, but felt the balance in resources was misplaced. For example, undue 
resources in both personnel and paperwork were perceived to be allocated to 
bureaucratic audit checks, as opposed to focusing on outcomes. As one respondent 
argued,  the scheme is: 
 “not delivering nothing, but it’s delivering far less than it should or it could, 
and a lot of that is down to what’s lost in continually having everything verified, 
validated, revalidated and checked, and the penalties that everybody’s so scared of” 
(SNH, case officer).  
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Thus, hierarchies linked with multilevel governance structures are hugely 
influential in scheme outcomes; with these two tiers of European and Scottish 
Government, RP policy outcomes are perceived to be driven indirectly by the 
domination of policy process design and procedural enforcements and checks. This 
influence is perceived positively with the ability to drive specific options such as 
national targets, but also negatively with burgeoning bureaucratic complexities. 
However whilst essential for accountability, respondents proposed that simplifying and 
streamlining the procedures for applications and assessment, would be desirable by 
improving transparency of the auditing process. Furthermore, respondents argued that if 
outcomes were prioritised in practice, then the majority of resources would be further 
directed to monitoring and evaluating what the scheme was achieving in practice. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the implications of power relationships within governance 
structures and assessed whether good governance principles were achieved in the RDP 
RP scheme in Scotland. Whilst the principles of ‘good governance’ - openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence - outlined by the European 
Commission (COM, 2001b), were incorporated into the RP scheme design they were 
not applied equally. Trade-offs were identified between the principles, which 
highlighted the difficulty of achieving good governance in practice.  
Overall the RP scheme has taken a centralised approach emphasising the good 
governance principles of ‘accountability’ and ‘coherence’. However, this may come at 
the expense of policy ‘effectiveness’ (COM, 2001b). For both decentralised and 
centralised decision making approaches, tradeoffs are inevitable (Bovaird, 2005; Mann 
and Gennaio, 2010). Both ‘accountability’ and ‘coherence’ are used to justify the rigid 
controls for RDP implementation between the European Commission, the Scottish 
Government and the RPACs. However, such controls have negative effects on the 
behaviour of institutional stakeholders and applicants because of the complexity and 
fear of inspections (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). Furthermore, the focus has been 
diverted from achieving effective targeting and policy outcomes by diverting resources 
into ensuring policy process regulation and control.  
The imbalances between stakeholder influence and interest were also perceived 
to impact scheme outcomes. Respondent job roles and organisation affiliations 
influenced stakeholder perceptions, highlighting the underlying differences and possible 
areas of conflict in spite of the policy drive for consistency. Furthermore, stakeholder 
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mapping was able to distinguish between similarities and differences in the 
opportunities and barriers for cohesive network relationships as well as wider applicant 
participation. These distinctions can support future policy decisions about whether a 
participative policy process is needed with parity in power between individual 
stakeholders (Sidaway, 2005). 
Berger (2003) suggests the need for formal decision making structures and 
clearly defined rules between levels of government and stakeholders.. Otherwise, policy 
risks becoming informal and non-transparent, and getting the right balance for the RP 
scheme has proven difficult. Whilst the RP policy aims to take advantage of the benefits 
of both a centralised and decentralised approach, it has compromised the ability for 
localised decision making. Thus stronger initiatives are needed in terms of resource and 
power distribution at all stages of the policy chain if decision makers truly want to 
embrace a decentralised approach in practice. If decentralisation is the chosen strategy 
in rural development then involvement of wider stakeholders needs to go beyond 
consultation and towards actual partnership between all levels of government.
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Chapter 4:  
  
An assessment of multilevel governance, and the 
implications on environmental targeting  
 
1. Chapter overview 
This chapter leads on from the previous chapter to go further in-depth into a single 
prominent governance structure of Scotland’s RDP Rural priorities scheme. Focussing 
on purely the qualitative interview findings with institutional stakeholders, an 
assessment of the application of multilevel governance and decentralisation has been 
made. This chapter therefore firstly discusses the concept of multilevel governance and 
the relationship between centralised and decentralised decision making and policy 
effectiveness. Secondly, it examines how EU RDP – and subsequently Scotland’s RP 
scheme – has incorporated aspects of a more inclusive governance approach to enhance 
environmental targeting into its policy design then reports on results from a qualitative 
methodology used to assess these efforts .  
2. Introduction  
Effective environmental targeting of rural policy has never been more necessary. 
Increasing pressures on natural resources in parallel with an uncertain economic climate 
means policy efficiency to achieve ‘best value for money’ is paramount (Hodge, 2012). 
In order to meet changing rural priorities in the European Union (EU), the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has undergone numerous reforms since it was created in 
1957. As a core mechanism for agricultural and rural support, the CAP has increasingly 
prioritised wider environmental, economic, and social objectives across the EU, driven 
by the formation of the Rural Development Policy (RDP). The RDP 2007-2013 includes 
a set of policy measures with objectives which focus on land management actions that 
improve the environment and countryside (COM, 2006c). 
Alongside these changes to the CAP, EU policy in the last decade has also 
emphasised ‘improved governance’, particularly through more inclusive participatory 
multilevel government systems (COM, 2001; 2009a; Chapter 3). The European 
Commission’s White Paper on multilevel governance published in 2009, promotes 
participation, collaboration, and coordinated action of the EU Member States and 
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regional authorities in policy design and implementation (COM, 2001; 2009a). 
Following criticism of more traditional centralised EU policy making, a multilevel 
approach is intended to make for better ‘differentiation and specialisation’ in policy 
implementation, creating adaptive policy that is suited to the diversity of territorial 
needs across Member States (COM, 2009d, p.18).  
Policy-makers have attempted to incorporate both principles of multi-level 
governance and environmental objectives into Scotland’s RDP, through the Rural 
Priorities (RP) scheme (Scottish Government, 2008). The policy design of the RP 
scheme emphasises a strong regional approach, along with national and regional targets 
to support environmentally beneficial land management (Scottish Government, 2008). 
This includes the introduction of eleven regional decision making bodies known as 
RPACs (Regional Project Assessment Committees); which have been tasked with 
selecting ‘regional priorities’ to target the needs of their areas (Scottish Government, 
2008). 
However, as the current RDP period draws to a close in 2013, the effectiveness of 
the RP scheme to promote regionalised governance and its impact on environmental 
targeting has yet to be explored, in-depth, and doing so is a key aim of the research 
presented here. In this chapter the concept of multilevel governance and the relationship 
between centralised and decentralised decision making and policy effectiveness are 
discussed. To examine how EU RDP – and subsequently Scotland’s RP scheme – the 
chapter has incorporated aspects of a more inclusive governance approach to enhance 
environmental targeting into its policy design. The chapter also presents results from a 
qualitative methodology used to assess these efforts. In doing so, the chapter explores 
the following three questions: 1) How have environmental targeting and multilevel 
governance been incorporated into RDP design? 2) How effective have these efforts 
been in practice? 3) What recommendations can be made, if any, to better improve 
targeting at a regional level?   
2.1 Multilevel governance and participation  
The concept of governance has become important to both describe and develop 
strategies for policy making (Berger, 2003). Governance in European policy making 
was defined as “the means, rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which 
powers are exercised at European level particularly as regards openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence” (COM, 2001, p.8). Recognising the need 
to apply a more inclusive approach to policy in response to criticism of a top-down 
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centralised policy approach, the European Commission has promoted wider 
participation (COM, 2001).  
The emphasis on wider participation has been further supported in EU policy, 
with the promotion of ‘multilevel governance’ (COM, 2009d). Multilevel governance 
refers to the coordination of EU policy development and implementation between the 
European Commission, Member States and regional authorities (COM, 2009d). 
Furthermore, the implementation of multilevel governance depends, and should be 
cohesive with, the principle of subsidiarity (COM, 2009d). Subsidiarity refers to 
decision-making made at the most appropriate level of government (COM, 2013c). 
Member States are predominately responsible for determining what is appropriate 
decision making, and whether to take a centralised or more decentralised strategy in 
administering specific policies (Beckmann et al., 2009). Central governments must 
decide therefore on the extent of the autonomy needed to plan, finance, and administer 
policy at a regional level depending on policy structuring and resource provision 
(Grocnctulijkll, 1998; De Sadeleer, 2012). How such resources are allocated will 
arguably be a strong indicator of the extent of decentralisation, and will likely influence 
policy outcomes as a consequence (Bennett, 1980; Grocnctulijk, 1998).  
For example, a decentralised approach may arguably be less efficient than a 
centralised system (Bovaird, 2005). Decentralisation is linked with capacity building, 
inclusion and wider participation and may consequently lead to increases in financial 
costs and delays in decision making (Bovaird, 2005). Such costs can be referred to as 
‘transaction costs’ associated with the expenditure in designing, implementing and 
enforcing contractual arrangements (Beckmann et al., 2009). The same efficiency issues 
are associated with multilevel governance systems due to increased complexity and 
interaction among a range of actors (Tsebelis, 1995; Paavola et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
accountability may consequently become fragmented in multilevel systems (Peters and 
Pierre, 2004; Boviard, 2005). Berger (2003) argued that these issues can be accounted 
for by careful policy management and through formalised decision-making structures 
with clearly defined rules for each level of government. However despite potential 
efficiency losses with respect to process, for environmental policy, decentralised, 
participatory governance approaches are assumed to achieve more effective outcomes 
(Yearley et al., 2003; Pellizzoni, 2003; Newig, 2007; Dietz and Stern, 2008; Newig and 
Fritsch, 2009). It is argued that more ‘appropriate’ decisions can be made by the 
localised authorities who better understand the needs and processes at that scale level 
(Beckmann et al., 2009; Mann and Gennaio, 2010). Additionally, effectiveness would 
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be enhanced since a more localised, inclusive approach to decision making is expected 
to contribute to higher levels of acceptance and implementation rates (Sabatier et al., 
2005). 
In contrast others argue that collective matters are better dealt with by a national 
centralised system rather than at the local level (Dahl, 1994), especially for trans-
boundary environmental issues with implications across local, regional and international 
borders (Falleth and Hovik, 2009; COM, 2009d). Forestry, for example, has wider 
trans-boundary environmental implications for carbon sequestration and the mitigation 
of climate change and hence implications go beyond those of the local region (Scottish 
Government, 2008; Falleth and Hovik, 2009; COM, 2009d;). Under the ‘collective-
action dilemma’ it is assumed that the cost of taking environmental action is greater 
than the benefits gained locally (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1969). Locals may be less in 
favour of local environmental action and more predisposed to prioritising economic 
considerations (Demmke, 1997).  
In summary, the number of costs and benefits associated with decentralisation 
supports the rationale for adopting a multilevel governance approach. A multilevel 
system is considered a “conducive mediation between centralised and decentralised 
decision-making” (Newig and Fritsch, 2009, p.202). This mediation is indicated in EU 
policy with the joint goals of both encouraging ‘participation’ and reinforcing 
‘efficiency’ through community action (COM, 2009d). Participation would likely be 
encouraged through decentralisation, whilst policy efficiency would be steered by 
European and central governments. However, how multilevel governance is 
administered in practice is indicative of how differences between centralised and 
decentralised systems have been, if at all, reconciled (Bovaird, 2005). 
2.2 Rural Development Policy (RDP)  
RDP as a component of the CAP is a policy area in which the European Commission 
actively encourages more inclusive governance, following the principle of subsidiarity. 
Consequently RDP’s are encouraged to be as decentralised as possible (COM, 1999b). 
In addition a decentralised approach is seen to be cohesive with improved 
environmental targeting. Spatial differentiation in the targeting mechanism achieved 
through input from regional experts assists targeting by applying more informed 
decision making to local needs (Wünscher et al., 2008; Finn et al., 2009; Chapter 2 &3).  
The European Commission RDP guidelines recommend targeting EU priorities 
at the most appropriate geographical level in addressing climate change, enhancing 
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biodiversity and water quality, or reducing the risk or impact of natural disasters (COM, 
1999b). Furthermore, the highest mandatory budget allocations are associated with 
‘improvement of the environment and countryside’ reflecting again the EU’s drive to 
have RDP as a prominent policy for environmental enhancement (COM, 2008a). The 
RDP environmental objective is the second of four compulsory objectives, known as 
Axes, incorporated into RDP’s for the period 2007- 2013 (COM, 2008a). How specific 
environmental areas are targeted in practice is at the discretion of the Member States.  
The RDP objectives, for instance, can be prioritised through budgetary 
allocations proposed by Member States according to their needs, requiring them to 
match their targeting needs and estimate the number of applicants. Member State 
proposed budgets require final approval from the European Commission who decide 
overall central budgets and require Member States to justify through their RDP plan the 
‘Axes objectives’ and associated measures for which they require funds (COM, 2008a). 
In addition, Axes are linked to policy measures that, whilst determined by the European 
Commission, can be selected by Member States. Apart from ‘agri-environmental 
payments’ (AEP), a single mandatory measure outlined by the European Commission as 
having a crucial role in protecting and enhancing public goods (COM, 2012b), measure 
selection is flexible. Member States can further refine measures by the use of ‘options’ 
to provide financial incentives that encourage land managers to participate in specific 
environmentally beneficial activities (COM, 2008a). Options should link the measure to 
the Axes, and indicate how the broader EU strategic objectives intend to be met (COM, 
2008a). 
Since RDP implementation post 2007, Member States are also obligated under 
EU guidelines to assess progress in meeting national and EU objectives by consistent 
RDP monitoring and evaluation (COM, 2008a). Member States are also subject to 
auditing to ensure the consistency, accuracy and legality of their RDP systems as if any 
element of the RDP is in breach of the RDP EU rules then financial penalties can apply 
(COM, 2011a). However, such ‘complex financial accountability processes’ have been 
argued to cause considerable burden to the administration of the RDPs (Lockwood et al., 
2004, p.176). Consequently applicants may become disenfranchised further limiting the 
capacity to deliver policy outcomes (Lockwood et al., 2004). Yet such tradeoffs are 
even more necessary in decentralised systems to compensate for fragmented 
accountability (Boviard, 2005).  
In summary, the European Commission has broadly attempted to delegate 
decisions to the ‘appropriate’ administrative level by allowing Member States to 
Chapter 4. Qualitative interviews 
85 
formulate their own RDPs. However RDP design is still guided by EU policy 
recommendations, and bounded by mandatory policy requirements related to objectives, 
measures, budgets, monitoring and evaluation. Individual Member States incorporate 
these aspects with their own varying environmental priorities (Beckmann et al., 2009). 
To better understand the implications of this EU strategy and the implications for opting 
for a more decentralised approach, Scotland’s RDP is explored as a case study. 
2.3 Case study: Scotland 
The Scottish Government’s RDP for 2007-2013 incorporates mandatory as well as 
recommended policy actions promoted by the European Commission. This is evident in 
the design of Scotland’s RDP Rural Priorities (RP) scheme. The scheme incorporates a 
strong environmental focus, evident in its budgetary and targeting strategies as well as a 
multilevel governance design by regionalising administration and promoting a 
decentralised participatory policy approach to RDP delivery (Scottish Government, 
2008).  
Regionalisation is evident in the new RP scheme with the introduction of the 
RPACs. This involved the division of eleven regions of Scotland, each with designated 
representative decision making committees to develop regional priorities and assess 
individual funding proposals (Scottish Government, 2008). The introduction of the 
RPACs demonstrated an aim by the Scottish Government to reinforce institutional 
representation and influence (COM, 2009d). This included the partnering of three major 
governmental organisations; Forestry Commission Scotland (FCS), Scottish Natural 
Heritage (SNH) and the Scottish Government Rural Payments and Inspections 
Directorate (SGRPID), tasked with scheme delivery (Scottish Government, 2008).  
These three organisations were chosen in order to more effectively deliver the 
integrated RDP’s economic, social and environmental objectives (Scottish Government, 
2008). Each of these organisations has multiple case officers tasked with administrating 
the scheme according to their expertise and designated RPAC regions. Furthermore, the 
regional committees have a senior representative from each of the organisations along 
with additional members from other relevant public bodies.  
The RPAC is responsible for judging proposals during periodic assessment rounds 
to assess their eligibility for funding (Scottish Government, 2012d). Eligibility is 
assessed as part of a ‘competitive process’ established to encourage funding for projects 
that offer the ‘best value for money’ and meet both national and regional priorities 
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according to centrally devised scoring criteria, scoring thresholds and budgetary 
allocations (Scottish Government, 2008).  
‘Regional priorities’ as a component of the scoring criteria are based on national 
priorities as outlined by central Scottish Government, many of which are 
environmentally focussed and relate to biodiversity, soil and water quality, and climate 
change (Scottish Government, 2008). Prior to the RP scheme implementation, RPACs 
were required to develop priorities with aspects of habitat and biodiversity suitable for 
their region (Scottish Government, 2008). Land managers able to meet these priorities 
can enhance their eligibility to compete for funding (Scottish Government, 2008). 
Furthermore, the funding scores that applicants receive are influenced by their ability to 
meet ‘national targets’, another component of the scoring system (Scottish Government, 
2011e). Six of the seven national targets focus primarily on environmental objectives. 
For example, bringing into or maintaining in a favourable condition Scotland’s 
nationally important nature sites, (such as Sites of Special Scientific Interest), and 
expanding woodland to mitigate climate change, are both national targets (Scottish 
Government, 2011e).  
Scoring thresholds are further determined by the Scottish Government, which 
periodically amends the scores required by applicants to successfully receive funding 
for each RPAC round. This can be modified according to the availability of Axes and 
measure funding, in accordance with application numbers (Scottish Government, 
2011e). The AEP measure for example has the highest total committed budget at £158 
million and 77% of the total number of RP contracts (15,322) between 2008 and 2011 
compared to the other RP scheme measures (Scottish Government data; 2008-2011). 
Therefore, as the scheme progresses, funding availability is reduced so the scoring 
thresholds are assumed to increase.  
In summary, the multi-level targeting and environmental targeting can be 
observed at a European, national, and regional level, in Scotland’s RDP RP scheme, as 
summarised in Table 6. At a European level, environmental targeting is indicated 
through the environmental minimum funding and compulsory AEP adoption. This is in 
parallel to the EU-wide promotion of decentralised, participatory policy making, 
providing flexibility to Member States to enable them to pursue their own policy 
preferences. The Scottish Government has consequently employed these 
recommendations into their RDP design, primarily with the introduction of the RPACs, 
budget allocations, and scoring criteria including both national and regional priorities. 
These actions indicate a strong centralised drive to promote environmental RDP 
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outcomes through a regionalised approach. This chapter explores the success of these 
efforts by examining the Scottish RDP RP scheme 2007-2013.  
 
3. Methods  
Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key central and regional institutional 
stakeholders in order to assess the effectiveness of Scotland’s multilevel, RDP 
governance approach in targeting environmental issues. The interview method is 
described in more detail in Chapter 3. These interviews were also used to examine the 
role of the RPACs in parallel to an assessment of decision-making capabilities at the EU, 
central and regional, governmental levels. Semi-structured pilot interviews were 
conducted with eleven RP scheme policy experts (including institutional staff, RDP 
researchers, NGO staff and land managers). This assisted in identifying key 
stakeholders, as well as developing questions for the second stage of the interview 
approach.  
A semi-structured approach was adopted to allow respondents to explore issues 
that they feel are the most important (Kitchin and Tate, 2000; Longhurst, 2010). 
Respondents in regional offices were recruited through email contact, which included an 
interview information sheet and covering letter. A snowball technique otherwise known 
as ‘chain referral sampling’ was also used, whereby respondents were asked to suggest 
further interviewees. Both confidentiality and anonymity were ensured throughout the 
research design, and respondents’ permission sought regarding the recording of 
interviews, storage of data and attribution of results (Longhurst, 2010).  
Second stage interviews were conducted with institutional stakeholders involved 
in central and regional Scottish Government. These primarily included personnel tasked 
Table 6. Summary of multilevel government mechanisms for environmental targeting  and 
decentralisation strategies for the SRDP RP scheme policy 2007- 2013  
Government 
Level  











Axes 2  ‘environment’ 
objective: compulsory 




LEADER approach.  





allocated budgets  
National targets  
Broad regional priorities 




Partnership of delivery 
organisations (FCS, 
SNH, and SGRPID) 
Regional level:  
RPACs  
Regional priorities, 
assess and authorise 
applications 
Regional priorities,  
RPAC application 
assessment rounds 
Consultation of wider 
stakeholders; 
RPAC meetings   
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with the delivery of the RP scheme and included representatives from: Scottish 
Government involved in centrally-managed policy decisions; RPAC chairs and 
members; coordinators who assist in managing application and advising case officers; 
and case officers tasked with assessing and scoring applications ready for the RPAC 
rounds. Respondents were selected as a representative sample across core job roles, 
from each delivery organisation (FCS, SNH and SGRPID) and across the RPAC regions. 
In total, 61 second stage interviews were conducted between August 2011 and March 
2012. The narratives from each interview were fully transcribed and these transcripts 
were managed, coded and analysed with Nvivo9 (Version: 9.1.106.0). 
 
4. Results  
The following results represent respondents’ opinions on the strengths and weaknesses 
of the RP scheme, with specific reference to perceptions of the roles of the EU, central 
and regional government, and influences on decentralisation and environmental 
targeting efforts. In some cases more unique views are identified indicating alternative 
perspectives, and recommendations according to the varying experiences and roles of 
the respondents.  
4.1 EU level: The European Commission  
The European Commission was perceived to have the greatest influence on the RP 
scheme. However this was often perceived negatively as a consequence of EU 
bureaucratic and regulatory controls in particular in reference to the auditing process. 
As a mandatory aspect of RDP monitoring for the European Commission, the auditing 
process was accepted by the majority of respondents as necessary to ensure that the 
rules are followed. For example “the audit rules are there for a purpose, they’re there 
because they’ve been abused in the past” (Central Government member). However the 
auditing process was also heavily criticised and perceived to hinder the efficiency of the 
RP scheme, and subsequently its effectiveness. As one respondent commented: “all the 
outcomes that the policy lot want to achieve with that European money… it’s not 
delivering nothing but it’s delivering far less than it should or it could. And a lot of that 
is down to what’s lost in continually having everything verified, validated, revalidated 
and checked” (coordinator). This comment was representative of the majority of 
respondents who were critical of the extensive resources required to administer the 
policy rather than contributing directly to outcomes.  
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By contrast, fewer respondents perceived auditing to assist the policy in 
focusing on outcomes; “I think that if we didn’t have a European structure, the 
programme might be the poorer for it, because Europe is asking for a number of 
controls, and seeking to ensure that the program delivers against particular outputs or 
outcomes”(Central Government member). Nevertheless, the same controls were 
believed by others to negatively affect policy inefficiency and policy outcomes by 
deterring applicants. The majority of respondents indicated that auditing was associated 
with bureaucracy and that the threat of financial penalties deterred applicants as “that’s 
what’s got everybody scared now” (RPAC member). This fear was harboured by the 
staff administrating the scheme also as “If we [regional staff] go out and inspect 
something and get it wrong, you know the repercussions from an audit point of view is 
that Scottish Government has to pay back millions of pounds to Europe” (coordinator). 
Both these comments also indicate that the system is working as expected to encourage 
rules are abided by, ensuring accountability, irrespective of the administrative burden. 
However, some of the issues associated with auditing are reportedly avoidable 
as a result of central government’s policy development and decision to prematurely 
launch the scheme. For instance one respondent insisted that “a lot of the early 
applications went in before the guidance was even out...and inevitably there’s been a lot 
of discrepancy and inconsistency” (RPAC member). Furthermore some argued that the 
scheme could have benefited from linking the European Commission inputs to those 
administering it at local level, as “… if you were designing something you would check 
first of all whether people are likely to use it; like us [the case officers] that it was 
working, and you would check with the people who were auditing it [European 
Commission] that its supplying everything that they need” (case officer). This 
highlights how some respondents believed that the initial implementation of the policy 
could have been improved with increased contributions from both an EU, and more 
regionalised level, consistent with the model of multilevel governance. 
Another weakness in the RP scheme is the time taken for decisions to go 
through the European Commission. For instance, for an option amendment “…we had 
to get it changed internally, and it had to go up and up and up, and it had to go to 
Europe and it came back and it was over a year, and effectively it involved changing the 
word ‘and’ to the word ‘or’” (case officer). So whilst the European Commission does 
not formulate the options, the process and authorisation checks required at that level are 
perceived to inhibit scheme implementation. This includes not only a longer time frame, 
but also links to the rigidity of the process once policy options are framed. A Central 
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Government member for instance commented “that kind of [option] detail is getting 
approved within Europe and therefore that has to go through statutory instruments in 
Scottish parliament, …and if we don’t translate it properly into the option and then 
translate that into the application process then we are deemed to of breeched the 
European sanction we’ve been given for it”. Such responses indicate that despite the 
possibility of those at a regional level influencing and improving policy, the processing 
requirements at each level of government and subsequent delays acted as barriers not 
only to decentralised decision-making, but also for affected applicants. 
Lastly a few respondents were critical of the budgetary controls set by the 
European commission. For example, one member of Central Government said “It’s 
quite inhibiting in terms of budget management, and also because of the fact that you 
are committing money in advance, you don’t know if the project’s going to happen, so 
there could be multi-millions of pounds committed to projects that might fall”. This was 
noted to have problems with domestic funding that needs to be matched with EU 
contributions “…because of the way government accounting works, … If you don’t 
spend the money this year then it’s gone, so we can’t roll it forward to the next 
year…[due to] treasury accounting regulations” (Central Government member). This 
highlights the issue that if allocated budgets remain unspent due to the uncertainty of 
policy uptake, unspent budget allocations will no longer be available in the future. This 
consequently limits the flexibility of policy implementation in terms of the ability to 
shift funds according to policy uptake and/or changing rural priorities over the course of 
the five year programme. 
4.2 Central Government 
The influence of the Scottish Government on the RP scheme was also considered to be 
high, although respondent perspectives varied according to their roles and experience of 
the centralised government system. For instance, respondents in central Government 
and regional level RPACs had first-hand experience of the Scottish Government’s role 
in RP policy formulation, targeting abilities, and financial controls.  
Almost all respondents acknowledged that the Scottish Government had the 
biggest role in formulating the RP scheme.  For instance: “There were a number of 
people who were really driving it from the Scottish Government and they introduced the 
scheme, the minister obviously approved it. They had meetings with representatives 
from these organisations, and sometimes they were influenced and changed things, and 
sometimes they stuck to their guns” (RPAC member). This indicates that while RP 
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policy formulation did involve wider consultation, it was the final decision of Central 
Government and minsters that had the most influence. The majority of regional 
respondents perceived regional influence on policy formulation as minimal: “I would 
say it was a done deal. I don’t think the RPACs had any influence over that really, I 
mean maybe around the edges, but nothing substantial we were presented with as it is” 
(RPAC member). Some respondents perceived central government to be ill-equipped to 
make decisions about the practicalities of scheme implementation.  For example, one 
said: “they may well be perfectly effective managers and all the rest of it, but they do 
not understand what they’re dealing with, not at that level, and they certainly don’t 
understand the operational level, and the problem you get is that basically they make 
choices and make decisions without a proper understanding” (RPAC member). This 
reflects a common viewpoint of respondents that those closer to the level at which the 
policy is being implemented are better informed and experienced to make decisions that 
will impact those areas.  
Regional staff often argued that further decentralisation of the RP scheme was 
needed in order to make decision making more effective. As one respondent from 
Central Government admitted “RPACs felt in some way strangled...they felt they could 
have given more added then they were essentially allowed”. Another from regional 
government added “our role should have been have been to bring our expertise at a 
regional level to bear influence on policy“. However, despite a common call for the 
devolution of further powers to the RPACs it was also recognised that further 
decentralisation would still not be the solution and Central Government still needs to 
retain control of the process. For instance one Central Government member claimed;  
“regionalisation didn’t work in this program…and we [central 
government] need to make sure it happens next time. But whether that is 
through the RPACs or through a collaborative approach between 
central and local government and other players…Europe doesn’t give 
us the money and say here you are get on with it, we [central 
government] have to draw up our own priorities and defend them to the 
[European] Commission, so we’d be asking others [e.g. regional 
governments] to do the same”.  
This point highlights that how regionalisation is achieved in practice is still undecided 
for the future of the RDP. Nevertheless it suggests that a multilevel approach is a pre-
requisite for the accountability of public spending. 
The results indicated mixed responses about the effectiveness of centralised 
government targeting efforts with comments centred on the introduction of national 
targets and the scoring mechanism of the RP scheme. It was suggested that projects that 
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met certain wider national government objectives were being effectively prioritised. 
This was noted by respondents, for example, to be the case for climate change options 
relating to the creation of woodlands. One respondent suggested that: “when the 
national targets came in for woodland planting or for protected sites, then it gives such 
a boost on the scoring it gives more reassurance to the applicant that if they try to hit a 
national target more chance that it will get successful” (case officer). This would be the 
case for all the national targets where applicants would automatically score highly and 
therefore their projects were more likely to be approved, and hence proving an effective 
incentive to apply for the target associated options. 
Respondents also commented on the success of central government’s decision to 
amend the scheme post implementation to further prioritise the national targets for both 
woodland and SSSI management options by introducing an ‘ongoing approval process’. 
This refers to the ability of the RPACs to allow applications that are directed at forestry 
and other designated sites to bypass the RPAC rounds. This consequently “has been a 
positive recent innovation … we’ve had a number of sites which have gone forward 
under that because we’re not tied in with the RPAC application assessment process” 
(RPAC member). This was viewed positively by all respondents as it meant the faster 
processing of cases providing further incentives to eligible applicants and consequently 
increasing uptake of those options. 
However respondents also voiced concerns about the exclusivity of the scoring 
system and national targets. For example, as one respondent said, “unless you are 
introducing management on a designated site or otherwise meeting a national target, or 
examples where a number of land managers have collaborated …unless you are doing 
those things you are not going to get funding” (case officer). Whilst some respondents 
saw this as the competitive process working effectively, others felt that some high 
quality applications were consequently slipping through the system. This was especially 
the case for environmental projects applied in the ‘wider countryside’, which reportedly 
often failed to achieve funding because they were not directly targeting one of the 
central government objectives. The consequences of this were made clear by an RPAC 
member: “….if we spend all our time looking after SSSI’s, the jewels in the crown, and 
we don’t look to the impoverished sites that need upgrading for the species to migrate 
out and survive and so on, we’re wasting our time”. This comment could be interpreted 
as caution for strong targeting efforts, however more likely highlights that the scoring 
system itself is the problem as another respondent added “the trouble with national 
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targets is that because they confer an advantage in the scoring, that everyone wants to 
hit the national target. We get a lot of tokenism” (case officer).  
The scoring system, despite amendments, still suffers an inability to adequately 
differentiate between the application types from capital projects to agri-environmental. 
Representative of many respondents opinions, it was recognised that “trying to provide 
a scoring process that fits all types and all measures…is quite difficult to do, because 
they are so different in nature” (coordinator). It was proposed that the scoring system 
would work better if tailored to the types of projects that were being assessed, for 
instance to “make it [the scoring system] cleverer and so it reflects a different type of 
measure” (coordinator). Thus environmentally-oriented applications would have 
specific criteria suited to those types of projects with a necessity for flexibility in 
decision making to recognise cases that may not necessarily hit national targets, but still 
offer good value for money and environmental benefits. 
Overall, the majority of respondents felt Central Government power was 
ultimately retained through financial controls. Autonomy was perceived to have 
remained centralised through the setting of budgets and the scoring thresholds, and the 
control of option payments. The majority of respondents believed that central 
government “does have influence because it decides… that money is available or that 
money isn’t available” (Central Government member). The control of budgets is 
perceived to directly impact outcomes as to how options are incentivised to applicants 
e.g. associated payments, as well as what applications are approved in the scoring 
system. As an RPAC member noted about the scheme “ultimately what gets through is 
how you weight the scoring system” which is determined by Central Government.  
4.3 Regional Government: RPACs 
The RPACs were perceived by respondents to have some influence on the scheme, but 
less than that of central government and the European Commission. In the design of the 
scheme, the main influence of the RPACs was reported to relate to the development of 
the regional priorities and assessment and approval of project proposals for their region. 
RPAC inputs were expected to improve policy targeting at a localised level, through 
their knowledge of regional needs and wider stakeholder engagement, however in 
retrospect many respondents believed this was a ‘non process’. This was evident by the 
setting of fairly unanimous priorities across each of the RPAC regions. For example, 
one respondent said regional priorities were “bit of a misnomer…, they are pretty 
standard across all the regions. There are very minor variations in the wordings but in 
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general they are national priorities rather than regional” (case officer). This was 
perceived amongst other reasons to be due to the multiple inputs from a wide range of 
stakeholders: “everyone wanted their own priorities, so in effect, unless you have a 
tightly managed process it just ended up that all the regional priorities are exactly the 
same” (RPAC member). Wider stakeholder engagement can often lead to such 
outcomes whereby increasing participation in decision making also increases the 
number of opinions making it more difficult to identify specific targets that can be 
agreed on unanimously. Yet as the respondent advises this issue could be addressed by 
stricter facilitation, following consistent guidelines as set out by central government.  
The formulations of regional priorities were also agreed to have failed due to the 
lack of regional financial autonomy. Respondents frequently identified the lack of 
financial control at a regional level as hindering RPAC decision-making. The provision 
of a regional budget was perceived by most respondents to be essential to achieve 
flexible regional prioritisation.  For example:  
“if you had a regional budget you then have to decide on…we have to 
get the best for our region, which is judging very high quality 
applications in our region against average applications in our region. 
Whereas at the moment what we’re judging is the money coming into 
our region, and the risk is that if we turn down something average here, 
the high value one is somewhere else” (RPAC Member). 
This would result not only in prioritisation, but also greater flexibility during the course 
of the programme in targeting emerging issues.  
Whilst some respondents felt that further regional autonomy was necessary to 
achieve better targeting, others felt that a central decision making system was preferable 
as “if you invite someone onto the RPAC whose only remit is to represent their region, 
be it local council or economic development or what not, they’re not pre disposed 
towards the national interest” (RPAC member). Another respondent argued for the 
need of central government to control management and budgets to avoid inequitable 
funding and to ensure that disadvantaged areas also benefit, for example:  
“a lot of the funding has gone to a lot of the well-heeled areas, because 
that’s where the demand is, whereas in a policy context the reverse may 
have been what you wanted to achieve, that you put your funding into 
the more deprived areas, so regional delivery has huge flaws unless it’s 
tightly controlled” (RPAC member).   
However, respondents felt that the lack of prioritisation was not determined by 
the inability of these regional decision makers to prioritise specific needs, but due to the 
absence of financial incentives. In the current RP system each RPAC competes for a 
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national pot of money, yet many regional respondents felt further targeting and the 
formulation of regional priorities would have been improved by the allocation of 
regional budgets. However respondents often noted the complication of managing and 
allocating regional budgets, e.g. a coordinator commented that: “Trying to match up the 
domestic budget demands against Europe drawn down is really difficult at national 
level, to then split that up into 11 agents … I can see from budget manager point of view 
that’s really a very difficult process”. Despite this concern, the vast majority of 
respondents believed that regional budgets would be essential if the scheme were to 
become truly regionalised and for effective targeting to be achieved. 
 
5. Discussion 
Multilevel governance and wider stakeholder participation as encouraged by the 
European Commission, has evidently been the template for the structure of the Scottish 
Government’s RP scheme (COM, 2005; 2011; Scottish Government, 2008). Given the 
diversity of regional characteristics, adopting a multilevel governance approach to 
promote regionalisation was a logical approach for Scotland’s RDP development. 
Consequently these recommendations were incorporated into the design of the RP 
scheme, through the introduction of the RPACs (Scottish Government, 2008). However, 
the results presented here indicate that whilst distinct multilevel structuring and 
interactions are in place in the RP scheme, the perceived potential for participatory 
decision making remains limited. A consequence of this is to hinder environmental 
targeting efforts.  
Respondents felt that both central and EU level government have a monopoly of 
power, mainly through regulatory and financial controls. It was noted that across 
government levels, predefined budget allocations were perceived to hinder flexibility in 
decision making and adaptation of national and regional targets. For example, this was a 
critique from central government of the European Commission requirement for budget 
allocation predictions pre-RDP launch. Additionally regional RPACs felt that the 
central government’s current funding allocation per RPAC round and the setting of the 
scoring thresholds prevented them from adapting to changing regional needs. It is 
debatable whether this was a deliberate decision by centralised decision makers to keep 
control of the process and avoid the ‘fragmentation of accountability’ (Peter and Pierre, 
2004; Bovaird, 2005). Hence, the current RP system attempts to ensure consistency and 
accountability, but reduces flexibility as a consequence. The European Commission 
actions are evident of this, by ensuring Member States take a balanced approach in 
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addressing each of the Axes objectives with predefined budget allocations that also 
indicate which areas of RDPs are to be prioritised (COM, 2008a). The predefined 
budgets are indicated as a problem as post RDP launch priorities have evolved and the 
response of applicants to certain RDP options is also unpredictable, thus the need for 
flexibility. 
The regulatory controls and monitoring through the auditing rules and checks 
imposed by the European Commission were clearly unpopular. Auditing also provides 
conflicts within a multilevel governance system because of an apparent mismatch 
between interests and inputs. This arises from the regional preference for a focus on 
outcomes and targeting contrasting with a centralised focus on process to ensure 
accountability. Central Government is required to audit the scheme to check rules and 
guidelines are being followed, but the core criticisms centred on scheme formulation 
and premature implementation (COM, 2011a). Respondents felt that as a consequence 
of centralised policy maker’s inadequate preparation, and the guidance and rigidity of 
the RP policy, effective delivery was compromised. Consequently, auditing has since 
identified numerous faults within the RP implementation and required a 
disproportionate amount of resources to monitor and resolve these issues. Respondents 
recognised that participatory governance cannot overlook the need to provide value for 
money mainly through checks and balances to ensure compliance with wider EU rules 
and regulations (Bovaird, 2005; COM, 2008b). However the issue remains that it is 
these very checks and balances that raise scheme transaction costs and decrease 
efficiency. Beckmann et al. (2009) argued that higher transaction costs were a result of 
decentralisation, yet the results of this research indicate that for the RP scheme this is a 
consequence of a centralised approach. 
Moreover, apart from policy pre-launch issues, respondents criticised Central 
Government auditing as negatively influencing scheme effectiveness. For example, the 
strict policy formulation and framework with rigid option criteria, and cumbersome 
scoring and assessment processes were perceived to inhibit prioritisation by regional 
decision makers. Regional government staff felt that their expertise is underutilised in 
the current system because of central government withholding power in order to 
regulate the policy process. The emphasis on the policy process was seen to outweigh 
consideration for policy outcomes, in terms of the effectiveness of policy targeting. This 
was suggested to be a consequence of having a multilevel governance system. Those at 
a regional level felt detached from the process because of multiple governmental levels. 
In one example a case officer was able to pass an option amendment through to Europe, 
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but reportedly this took over a year to happen. This example emphasises the major cost 
of a multilevel system, supporting the assertion (Tsebelis, 1995) that multiple 
administrative levels and ‘clearance points’ lower policy effectiveness creating time 
delays in decision making. 
Respondents suggested that future policy formulation would improve by 
integrating EU level government requirements with regional expertise on the 
practicalities of decisions, thus avoiding many of the issues identified post 
implementation. These suggestions are in line with the principles of subsidiarity 
allowing the involvement of regional decision makers who better understand the needs 
and processes at that scale level (Leach et al., 2002; COM, 2009d; Newig and Fritsch, 
2009; Mann and Gennaio, 2010). Central government recognised the need for regional 
input however failed to achieve this in practice (Scottish Government, 2008). 
The results supported the observation that local authorities are predisposed to 
prioritise economic considerations (Demmke, 1997). This was demonstrated by the 
formulation of the regional priorities and the willingness of the RPACs to keep national 
funding options as wide as possible through broad regional targets for each of their 
regions. 
Yet, regional respondents recognised this weakness, and believed that this 
becomes inevitable when regions compete for a national pot of money. The majority of 
regional decision makers perceived financial incentives to be essential in order for them 
to successfully narrow down regional targets. Groenendijk (1998) suggests that 
centralised funding mechanisms are detrimental to the establishment of integrated and 
responsive policy making at a local level, and that for true regional autonomy; regional 
budgets are required to enable appropriate decisions at an appropriate level 
(Groenendijk, 1998; COM, 2009d).  Although a few respondents were concerned about 
the complexity of the allocation process, the majority contended that this was a crucial 
step for regionalisation to work in practice (COM, 2008a).  
The results also indicated that despite scheme pitfalls in accomplishing 
regionalisation, some central government environmental targeting efforts were 
successful. Respondents noted that the strengths of the scheme came through the 
national targets and the ongoing approval system for SSSI and forestry applications. 
These scheme amendments were perceived to have influenced both the type and 
increased the number of applications associated with the desired targets. Yet some 
respondents remained sceptical that applications tailored to meet these objectives, were 
based on ‘tokenism’ rather than suitability. From a broad policy perspective this is not 
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an issue as collective action is required to achieve nationally rather than locally 
important outcomes (Dahl, 1994).  
Conversely, with such an important influence on policy uptake it was recognised 
that other potentially good quality applications that did not meet appropriate targets 
were slipping through the system. For example, applications related to the ‘wider 
countryside’ areas, outside of targeted zones, had difficulty entering the scheme 
(Chapter 3). However, it is argued that these very areas are essential to promote and 
manage biodiversity, especially to reduce the impacts of already fragmented protected 
habitat areas (Sutherland et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2009). Wünscher et al. (2008) and 
in Chapter 3 argue that spatial differentiation in the targeting mechanism can improve 
policy efficiency and assist the assessment of the cost and benefits of option uptake with 
respect to the spatial characteristics of those regions and locations. This is especially 
important in avoiding the risk of habitat fragmentation and over saturation of particular 
regional options ensuring better value for public money, by supporting more informed 
decision making (Finn et al., 2009; Chapter 2). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Whilst multilevel decentralised governance systems are encouraged as the preferred 
approach to EU RDP development, their administration has an impact on the 
effectiveness of environmental targeting efforts. In Scotland, the RDP design attempted 
to incorporate both a centralised and decentralised approach. However, in spite of the 
introduction of regional decision making bodies, in practice these only enact centrally-
driven procedures with limited local autonomy. In addition management and financial 
resources and accountability are determined at the central government level.  
It is unclear what direction future RDP policy will take, both at an EU level and 
by individual Member States. However a balance between efficiency and effectiveness 
needs to be achieved in line with the principle of subsidiarity. The difficulty will be 
balancing how decision making capabilities can be enhanced and supported, but also 
regulated across each tier of government. From a regional perspective this would 
require further financial autonomy of RDP funds, but also a system that allows 
flexibility to incorporate professional judgements of locally informed decision makers 
(Leach et al., 2002; COM, 2009d; Newig and Fritsch, 2009; Mann and Gennaio, 2010). 
From a central government standpoint consistency, transparency and accountability are 
paramount for public policy implementation, yet arguably this could still be achieved 
more efficiently through a less complex, streamlined system (Berger, 2003).  
Chapter 4. Qualitative interviews 
99 
Ultimately within a successful multilevel, governance system integrating policy 
from the EU and regional levels is critical in incorporating European objectives, 
guidelines and regulatory expectations with inputs from regional experts. In this way, 
regional decision makers can take ownership of the policy and arguably provide realistic 
solutions to achieve European Commission requirements alongside opportunities to 
promote regional environmental needs. The role of central government would be to 
oversee the process and ensure efficiency and accountability. Moreover each level of 
government should emphasise policy outcomes that provide the best value for public 
money but that also differentiate between the needs of both national and local levels in 
effective targeting. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
  
1. Chapter overview 
This final Chapter synthesises the findings from the RDP three evaluation 
approaches taken in this study: 1) spatial econometrics; 2) stakeholder analysis; and 
3) qualitative interviews. The strengths and weaknesses of using these different 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies and their abilities to give in-depth insights 
into RDP are examined. Key findings from the three methods are summarised 
alongside future policy recommendations. Finally the Chapter identifies the future 
outlook for RDP 2014-2020 drawing on final insights on policy evaluation. Overall 
the findings from each of these approaches combined provide a broader 
understanding into how policies design, stakeholders, and spatial characteristics 
impact policy implementation and environmental targeting abilities.  
 
2. Introduction 
Rural Development Policy (RDP) as a component of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) is an important EU policy mechanism to achieve integrated economic, 
social and environmental objectives (COM, 2008a). Policy evaluation is a mandatory 
aspect of RDP (COM, 2008a). As a consequence, the European Commission 
introduced the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF), which 
provides a consistent approach to RDP evaluation across the EU for the 2007-2013 
programming period (COM, 2006a). However implementation of the different 
CMEF methods has varied across EU Member States. In particular, assessing 
environmental impacts has proved complex due to insufficient time for the collection 
of monitoring data, accounting for other influential factors, and comparatives to 
counterfactuals16 (Scottish Government 2010; COM, 2010; COM, 2013d; Chapter 2).  
In addition to measurement difficulties, CMEF indicators are limited in their 
capacity to capture the systems, processes and influences that determine policy 
outcomes. To develop an informative policy analysis, influential factors (whether 
quantifiable or qualitative) need to be assessed in terms of whether they have 
                                                 
16 Counterfactuals refer to what would have happened without a given policy intervention (COM, 
2013d). 
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impeded or facilitated successful implementation (Fudge and Barrett 1981; Winter 
1996; Berger, 2003; Juntti and Potter, 2002). Spatial econometrics and the 
quantitative indicators of RDP policy can be used to explore uptake and expenditure; 
(Chapter 2). However, the less tangible aspects of policy design and the influence of 
individuals, groups and institutions on uptake can also be understood through 
qualitative methods. Stakeholder analysis techniques, in particular ‘stakeholder 
mapping’, can identify the role of stakeholders and power relationships in policy 
implementation, and stakeholder interviews can identify further influential aspects of 
policy design and implementation (Chapters 3 and 4). These methods can address the 
notion of causality by considering the relationship between policy actions and their 
implications. Hence, understanding the casual influences of policy performance 
provides a potential tool for enhancing future decision making capabilities.  
This chapter assesses the ability of three methods: 1) spatial econometrics, 2) 
stakeholder influence mapping, and 3) qualitative interviews, for RDP policy 
analysis. This chapter firstly provides a brief overview of policy evaluation and its 
application to RDP. The three methods are then described, and their strengths and 
weaknesses discussed, based on an analysis of Scotland’s RDP Rural Priorities 
scheme. Finally the chapter discusses the implications of using these different 
methods in future policy evaluation and the benefits of adopting a mixed method 
approach. 
 
3. Policy evaluation  
Policy evaluation is necessary to assess the processes and impacts of governmental 
policies and programmes, and their ability to meet desired outcomes. Policy 
evaluation is described as: “a range of research methods to systematically 
investigate the effectiveness of policy interventions, implementation and processes, 
and to determine their merit, worth, or value” (Government Social Research, GSR, 
2007 p.3). Policy evaluation is however inherently complex due to the number of 
possible methods and indicators that can be used for assessment, further complicated 
by the number of potentially influential factors.  
In policy analysis ‘indicators’ are useful for assessing states and trends, and 
to help in comparing policy performance from local to international levels (COM, 
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2006a). Indicators can identify if there are differences between what policy makers 
hope to achieve and the actual outcome, often known as the ‘implementation deficit’ 
(Weale, 1992). However policy actions may not translate well in reality for a number 
of reasons such as clarity, time, resources, and interdependencies between other 
policies and other external factors (Winter, 1996). Therefore as Fudge and Barrett 
(1981, p. 12) assert “it is essential to look at implementation not solely in terms of 
putting policy into effect, but also in terms of observing what actually happens or 
gets done and seeking to understand how and why”. This highlights the need in 
policy evaluation to identify not only if differences exist between objectives and 
outcomes, but also to understand why. 
A number of studies have attempted to do this, based primarily on 
investigations into the RDP agri-environmental measure that have explored the 
influences and impacts of its implementation. Such factors, as summarised in Figure 
18, include, agricultural characteristics e.g. farm characteristics, labour, livestock etc. 
(Wynn et al., 2001; Dupraz et al., 2002;  Hynes and Garvey, 2009; Defrancesco et al., 
2008); stakeholder influence e.g. farmers attitudes and behaviours, access to advice 
etc. (Wilson and Hart, 2000; Siebert et al., 2006; Edwards-Jones, 2006; Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009); bio-physical characteristics (Giupponi, et al., 2006; Langeveld et al., 
2007); economic factors (Wilson and Hart, 2000); socio demography 
(Vanslembrouck et al., 2002); and policy design (Classen et al., 2001; Ferraro, 2008).  
 
 
Fig. 18 Determinants of RDP implementation 
RDP 
Determinants 
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To account for these complexities and interacting policy determinants, the 
European Commission introduced a consistent system for monitoring and evaluating 
the RDP (COM, 2006a). This system requires Member States to provide a number of 
indicators to assess whether RDP 2007-2013 is meeting its objectives, based on the 
Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF). 
 
4. RDP evaluation 
The CMEF is based predominately on quantitative indicators to assess RDP 
implementation (COM, 2006a). These indicators reflect the series of steps in policy 
delivery, as shown in Figure 19. This includes the ‘baseline’ indicators, which reveal 
economic, social, and environmental conditions pre-policy implementation, and the 
‘input’ indicators, which represent allocated funds reflective of those conditions 
(COM, 2006a). The ‘output’ indicators, post RDP implementation, represent initial 
activities such as committed expenditure and numbers of participants, followed by 
‘result’ indicators that go further in representing the benefits gained by 
implementation e.g. area of land under successful management (COM, 2006a). 
‘Impact’ indicators measure the wider effects of policy implementation, e.g. 
reversing the decline in biodiversity by measuring farmland bird species (COM, 
2006a). 
 
Fig. 19.  CMEF indicators and example of associated indicators 
 
There are varying degrees of difficulty in collecting CMEF indicators 
(Chapter 2). For instance, the ‘impacts’ of RDP measures are very difficult to assess, 
especially with respect to environmental indicators, due to insufficient time from 
implementation, establishing counterfactuals, and identifying actual cause and effect 
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relationships (COM, 2010). To some extent these difficulties were anticipated in the 
formulation of the CMEF impact indicators, with the inclusion of expert qualitative 
assessments (referred to as ‘bottom-up estimation of impact’) also deemed acceptable 
as an alternative (or in addition) to quantitative indicators (COM, 2006a, p.14). The 
strength of quantitative indicators however, is in their ability to make ‘statistical 
generalisations’, so that inferences can be made (Onwuegbuzie and Collins, 2007). 
This is noted as a ‘positivist’ approach concerned with objectivity, replicability and 
causality (Bryman, 1984). The European Commission has mostly taken this approach 
with the CMEF indicators, identifying EU averages and comparing RDP Member 
States at programme level in order to assess if they are above or below the overall 
average (COM, 2011b; 2012a; 2012b).  
The CMEF indicators have further potential for statistical analysis at a 
disaggregated level, allowing Member States to examine RDP in greater detail. 
Although not a European requirement, CMEF quantitative indicators can be used to 
decipher, through a spatial analysis and modelling approaches, potential determinants 
of policy outcomes (Chapter 2). Such analysis provides insights into ‘where’ and 
‘how’ RDP objectives are being met in practice (Chapter 2). Despite being a 
‘voluntary’ addition to evaluation, qualitative investigations into RDP may also offer 
valuable, but alternative, policy insights (Chapters 3 and 4).  
Qualitative research, an as ‘interpretivist approach’, is based on human 
judgements and is increasingly recognised as a valuable contribution to policy 
formulation, evaluation and refinement (Spencer et al., 2003; Cook, 2009; Scottish 
Government, 2010a; Chapters 3 and 4). Research techniques include in-depth 
interviews and participant observation, enabling the researcher to gain the 
perspective of those experiencing the phenomena (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011). 
However qualitative research has been criticised for validity and reliability, although 
these issues can be addressed through a rigorous methodology (Guba, 1981; Krefting, 
1990). 
To address the limitations of both quantitative and qualitative policy research, 
a mixed method approach has potential value. By using the two approaches in 
combination, it is possible to offset their weaknesses as well as increasing the 
breadth of the study (Blake 1989; Greene et al., 1989, Rossman and Wilson 1991; 
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Driscoll et al., 2007). Different mixed method approaches produce different 
outcomes. For example triangulation ‘seeks convergence in results’ and therefore the 
findings from combined approaches are used to validate each other by seeking the 
same objective17 (Mark and Shotland, 1987). Alternatively there is ‘expansion’ in a 
mixed method approach that extends the breadth and range of inquiry by using both 
methodology types for answering differing questions on the same topic (Mark and 
Shotland, 1987; Greene et al., 1989). 
In summary, to understand in practice the strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach for RDP evaluation, (whether qualitative, quantitative, or mixed), their 
application to the same study location and policy should be compared. A 
comparative review of each will further identify their utility individually and in 
combination for RDP evaluation purposes. This is based on the chapters 2, 3 and 4 
focused on RDP evaluation for environmental targeting, and Scotland’s RDP Rural 
Priorities scheme. Firstly a quantitative approach was taken by using spatial 
econometrics to identify the determinants of RDP measure uptake and expenditure 
(Chapter 2). Secondly a mixed method approach, triangulating interview data with 
quantified stakeholder mapping results was undertaken, to assess the influence of 
stakeholders and governance structures on RDP policy outcomes (Chapter 3). Finally, 
a purely qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews with policy 
stakeholders was conducted to assess multilevel governance, decentralisation and 
implications for the environmental targeting of RDP (Chapter 4). Each of these 
methods will be discussed systematically, with a brief description of the method, data, 
and findings, and the associated methodological strengths and weaknesses. 
 
4.1 Spatial econometrics; quantitative RDP evaluation  
4.1.1 Method description  
Chapter two explored the use of spatial econometrics to analyse the determinants of 
participation and expenditure for Scotland’s RDP 2007-2013 agri-environmental 
measure. The approach was undertaken to utilise the availability of quantitative 
CMEF output indicators, and to examine the factors influencing policy participation 
and expenditure for the agri-environmental measure, while accounting for spatial 
                                                 
17 Triangulation refers to two or more methods being applied to the same phenomena to verify or 
refute outcomes (Greene et al., 1989) 
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dependency18. The analysis identified statistically significant explanatory variables 
based on farming characteristics, land capability, designated sites status, and 
accessibility and population. These significant determinants were related back to 
policy criteria in order to assess how agri-environmental measure priorities were 
being met and consequently to provide insights into the targeting performance of the 
measure. For example, the majority of the models indicated a positive significant 
relationship with the SSSI’s (Sites of Special Scientific Interest), which as designated 
sites are prioritised in Scottish policy. The findings showed that, to some extent, 
national environmental targets were indeed being met in practice. 
3.1.2 Method Review  
The use of a spatial model was justified because model fit was better than the 
equivalent non-spatial linear regression models, indicating that spatial 
interdependency was important. By using municipality level datasets, the study was 
also able to assess Scotland’s RDP measure performance, and provide nationally 
relevant policy generalisations. The same analysis could also be conducted for 
regional comparatives to account for regional diversification and to inform regional 
decision making.   
However, the predominant weakness of this approach is data availability. The 
analysis focused on CMEF output indicators, however if available the same methods 
could be applied to assess impact indicators, which would give greater insight into 
actual policy ‘effectiveness’. Consequently, the method lacked flexibility, because 
understanding phenomena was only possible within the constraints of the available 
data (Bryman, 1984). This may also explain the low correlation coefficient (r²) in the 
models (i.e. ranging from 0.42 to 0.13), which suggests that while numerous 
influential factors can still be attributed to RDP agri-environmental measure adoption, 




                                                 
18 Spatial dependency if the form of autocorrelation demonstrates near things are more related than 
those distinct, indicating that data observation are not independent, as assumed with non-spatial linear 
regression models  (Tobler 1970; Hynes et al. 2008). 
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4.2 Stakeholder mapping; mixed method RDP evaluation 
4.2.1 Method description  
The third chapter examined the implications of stakeholder power 
relationships within different governance structures in the context of Scotland’s RDP. 
This study adopted a ‘mixed method’ approach synthesising the findings from 61 in-
depth semi-structured interviews with institutional policy stakeholders and a 
stakeholder mapping exercise. The aim was to quantify the perceptions of 
respondents about the relative ‘influence’ and ‘interest’ of different policy makers 
(Chapter 3). Analysis of the qualitative interview data consisted of identifying, 
coding, and categorizing patterns or themes in the data, whilst for the mapping, 
multivariate statistics were used to test differences in respondents’ perceptions 
according to their group attributes (related to job role, region and organisation 
affiliation). In addition, the mean observation for interest and influence per 
stakeholder was calculated and displayed in scatter plots. The stakeholder analysis 
and mapping assessed the application of the EU’s good governance principles in the 
implementation of the RDP in Scotland. Whilst the principles of ‘good governance’ - 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence - outlined by the 
European Commission (COM, 2001), were incorporated into the Rural Priorities 
scheme design they were not applied equally. Trade-offs were identified between the 
principles, which highlighted the difficulty of achieving good governance and the 
prioritisation of environmental needs in practice. Furthermore, the attempts to widen 
decision making has resulted in a number of stakeholders perceiving themselves as 
less empowered within the revised scheme. Moreover the statistical analysis revealed 
that the differing perceptions between respondent groups presented barriers to 
consistent and coherent policy delivery, findings which were further supported by 
interview responses. Results from both methods indicated that power imbalances 
between stakeholders prevail, questioning the equity and effectiveness of RDP policy 
efforts (Chapter 3). 
4.2.2 Review 
The mixed method approach was potentially able to compensate for the weaknesses 
of using qualitative or quantitative methods alone. For example stakeholder mapping 
may contain hidden assumptions either from the respondents or the researchers, but 
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by supporting results with qualitative findings further verification and support were 
provided for respondent choices (Reed et al. 2009; Chapter 3). Moreover whilst 
qualitative findings are arguably subjective, further validation is achieved through 
triangulation with the stakeholder mapping in addition to sufficient respondent 
representation.  
However a notable weakness of the quantitative statistical analysis was that 
the respondent attribute sample sizes were sometimes too small to produce 
significant results. This reflected the limited capacity and willingness of potential 
respondents with those attributes to participate, and a low number of observations for 
identified stakeholders also resulted in insufficient group sizes. This latter point was 
influenced by respondents’ individual experiences and perceptions, which meant 
certain stakeholders, to which they had no direct network links, were not recognised. 
However, for the mean analysis of stakeholder power this was not an issue due to the 
overall respondent sample size and diversity allowing a more comprehensive 
identification of the policy network. 
 
4.3 Semi-structured interviews; qualitative RDP evaluation   
4.3.1 Method description 
The fourth chapter focused on purely qualitative research techniques, drawing on 61 
semi-structured interviews with institutional policy stakeholders. The aim of this 
Chapter was to assess in detail the application of multilevel governance and 
decentralisation, and the implications of this for policy targeting. Multilevel 
governance refers to the coordination of EU policy development and implementation 
between the European Commission, Member States, and regional authorities (COM, 
2009). The Scottish RDP rural priorities scheme was first examined to identify 
aspects of a more inclusive governance approach to enhance environmental targeting 
in its policy design (Chapter 4). Secondly, qualitative interviews were conducted 
with regional and central government policy stakeholders to assess efforts to 
regionalise decision making and further prioritise environmental needs. The findings 
indicated that despite including objectives to regionalise decision making, power 
remained centralised, and this in turn impeded the effectiveness of regional targeting  
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4.3.2 Method Review 
The qualitative interviews provided a number of deeper insights into the performance 
of the RDP rural priorities scheme (Chapter 4). Respondents were able to draw on 
their personal experiences of how policy was formulated and implemented and 
provide in-depth critiques as a result. This meant that in contrast to quantitative 
studies, the analysis was primarily inductive rather than deductive. The large 
representation of institutional stakeholders gives further validation to the findings, 
drawing on the common perception that regional autonomy was hindered by the 
strict controls of the scoring, financial and auditing procedures (Chapter 4). 
However the study would have been enhanced by gathering responses from 
members within the European Commission, to understand the perspectives at a 
higher governance level. The findings were also highly reflective of individual 
knowledge and experiences, and therefore subjective. However, the respondents’ 
roles within government and their direct involvement in the scheme mean that they 
are arguably best equipped to critique the regional scheme implementation and its 
policy targeting. Moreover, whilst targeting effectiveness can be quantitatively 
measured to some extent, governance processes and policy implementation are 
particularly suited to a qualitative analysis, to explore and capture individual and 
collective policy encounters and perspectives. 
 
5. Discussion 
The differing methodologies and their ability to provide a wider breadth of 
knowledge on RDP evaluation is a strength of this thesis. Policy evaluation is 
inherently complex due the involvement of multiple stakeholders at various scales, 
and accounting for a vast range of determinants. The mixed method approach 
adopted, in this thesis, accounts for the complexities of evaluation. Spatial 
econometrics provided insights on the uptake and expenditure of AEP through a 
quantitative modelling approach. Whereas the stakeholder mapping and interviews 
provided insights on the governance arrangements of RDP, and stakeholder power 
imbalances. Each of these methods are explored in detail and their findings and 
potential recommendations are discussed. 
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5.1 Spatial Econometrics  
The European Commission introduced the CMEF indicators in order to 
address difficulties and inconsistencies in monitoring and evaluation of RDP. 
Chapter 2 demonstrated the opportunities and limitations of these indicators. In the 
absence of impact indicators, the Chapter explored insights into patterns of RDP 
uptake and expenditure. The spatial econometric analysis of the CMEF indicators 
presents an opportunity to go further than simply measuring change of RDP outputs, 
but enabled an assessment of influential determinants and how these relate to 
progress towards policy goals. Additionally, the assessment and breakdown of the 
AEP measure to option groups can provide both national and regional decision-
makers the opportunity to better understand how and where RDP is being 
implemented locally. Spatial maps can  indicate visually regional clusters of high and 
low uptake and expenditure but the methods further the understanding to why those 
clusters and anomalies may be occurring. For example whether determined by site 
designations, and /or biophysical or structural aspects etc. The provision of such 
information could be a powerful tool to justify flexible targeting and policy 
amendments to adjust to changing needs. 
 For example the RSPB and SSSI results indicate that targeting efforts by the 
government and NGOs can be effective. From a policy perspective national targets 
are being met. However the environmental benefits of these implemented options is 
not apparent, in addition other designated sites outside of SSSI were negatively 
associated with AEP participation. This could indicate that the habitats outside of 
SSSI are may not be able to receive support despite their capacity to meet option 
objectives. These findings highlight that without RDP support for the ‘wider 
countryside’ the heightened risk of fragmentation and further degradation may occur 
(Sutherland et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2009).  
 Another important finding, in Chapter 2, was the differences in model 
qualities between the whole measure analysis and the option groups. The model 
results for the bird, habitat and water option group were stronger than those of the 
whole AEP measure. Chapter 2 identifies this as an issue for implementation and 
evaluation of AEP when a vast number of associated management options come 
under one measure. For example Scotland’s AEP measure has 69 options and sub 
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options. The strengths of having such a comprehensive list is to ensure eligibility and 
management criteria are clarified so that applicants and case officers can define the 
suitability of that option to the land under proposal. These options can be narrowly 
targeted to specific species e.g. mown Grassland for Corncrakes or wider options 
such as Mown Grassland for Wildlife (Scottish Government, 2008). The weaknesses 
of having so many options is that it undoubtedly impacts efficiency with differing 
option criteria and requirements putting pressure on resources in terms of option 
formulation, administration, monitoring and evaluation burdening both applicants 
and implementing authorities. However simplifying the options could impact 
effectiveness, particularly as specific areas have specific needs. Hence, guidance on 
suitable options and management are needed. It would however be advisable that 
RPACs could promote and select AEP options most suitable for their own conditions 
and needs. RPACs including wider stakeholders should refine priorities and short list 
appropriate options. Regional decision makers should also have the flexibility to 
adapt option criteria if necessary to enhance suitability to their area. This is 
particularly important in a country such as Scotland with a vast range of biophysical 
conditions.  
Also despite complexity policy evaluation should go beyond the AEP 
measure to single options or option groups at both a national and regional level (as 
done in Chapter 2) to gain more accurate insights into option adoption and progress 
towards environmental objectives. Chapter 2 demonstrated the potential for spatial 
econometrics to address agricultural, socio-demographic, economic and biophysical 
factors that may impact policy performance. However despite the importance of 
these findings the quantitative analysis is limited by the availability and quality of the 
datasets available. This point reflects why evaluation needs to go beyond quantifiable 
indicators and seek alternative methods to understand further the intangible aspects 
that influence policy efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
5.2 Stakeholder mapping and interviews  
Chapters 3 and 4 explored the intangible aspects of policy evaluation, such as 
implementation features including policy design and stakeholders. This included the 
analysis of governance structures and processes, the good governance principles, in 
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addition to the influence and interest imbalances between stakeholders. In Chapter 3 
the stakeholder mapping attempted to make the intangible tangible by quantifying 
respondent’s choices on the extent of influence and interest of varying stakeholders. 
The means of all the observations per stakeholder were calculated and then 
triangulated with the qualitative interview data to explain differing levels of interest 
or influence. This approach worked to verify responses and uncovered potential 
hidden assumptions found in the mapping results (Reed et al., 2006). Verification 
was further achieved in the stakeholder mapping by gaining a sufficient overall 
sample size to capture the breadth of perspectives19 and the standard deviation of the 
means further indicating the extent of opinion variation. The KW test was able to 
statistically verify differences in perceptions according to respondent attributes i.e. 
organisations and job roles. All these steps contributed to verifying, with the 
qualitative data, explanations for differing perceptions, accounting for the homogeny 
of heterogeneity in responses. This was evident in the underlying differences and 
possible areas of conflict between the delivery organisations in spite of the policy 
drive for consistency. Results in Chapter 3 highlight the need for continued 
networking and exchange, but equally the need to resist uniformity in the way in 
which organisations, with different expertise, are required to deliver policy (Lipsky, 
1980; Gibson, 2006; Hupe and Hill 2007).  
Yet because of the small sample size the results in the KW test did not 
determine a significant difference in perceptions between the RPACs eleven regions. 
This would have indicated different approaches to decentralisation and RDP delivery 
regionally. Despite these results the qualitative interviews did indicate differences 
between how decentralization had occurred across regions. Respondents from 
differing RPACs perceived an improved ability to define and accomplish regional 
priorities due to differences in how they operated. In examples where RPACs had 
better success in decentralisation e.g. the Borders and Argyll RPACs, this was 
indicated primarily to be due to the existing strength of networks between RDP 
implementers and wider stakeholders. Wider inclusivity positively impacted regional 
decision-making with a clearer definition of regional needs and gaining wider 
support through the exchange of information and capacity building. However these 
                                                 
19 A total of 61 respondents. 
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approaches still had their limitations with consensus across RPACs that 
regionalisation of the scheme, as intended, was predominately unsuccessful. 
  Decentralisation was supported by the majority of respondents in principle, 
the issues however relate to the process and how those visions were translated into 
practice. The original vision for the consolidation of RDP measures and objectives 
into one system fit for all, was ambitious. The problem came as the Rural Priorities 
scheme aimed to deliver on multiple objectives, increasing its complexity, alongside 
attempts to regionalise increasing a need for top down accountability. Findings 
indicated that attempts for stronger accountability came in the form of strict 
regulatory and financial controls as retained by Central Government.  
It is recommended, that to enable regionalisation to work in practice, regional 
decision-makers need to be provided greater flexibility and discretion to make 
decisions appropriate to their identified needs. To adequately address these needs and 
priorities a regional budget, providing regional financial autonomy, could potentially 
be a step in the right direction. The allocation of funds to regions should be 
dependent on economic, social and environmental criteria so each RPAC region 
could prioritise and justify their local needs. CMEF baseline indicators, as in original 
RDP proposals, could be used to match needs with predicted expenditure. Central 
Government could then allocate expenditure to regions accordingly and it is then 
‘once’ budgets are allocated, regional decision-makers can decisively identify 
specific regional targeting requirements within the resources available. Expenditure 
and uptake can be reviewed annually by Central Government to assess if there is 
excess or shortage of regional RDP funding in comparison to needs and amended 
accordingly. 
In addition to regional budgets the role of RPACs should also be reconsidered 
in order to utilize their expertise and also that of case officers. For example currently 
all applications (apart from those eligible for the on-going approval process, see 
Chapter 4 p.94) have to go through approval during the irregular RPAC meetings. 
Respondents argued this was an ineffective use of time and expertise as these checks 
were based on already allocated scores calculated by case officers. On occasion 
RPACs considered more unique applications i.e. those with high funding 
requirements, or proposals that were borderline of the scoring thresholds. However 
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decisions remained constrained by the scoring criteria and thresholds determined by 
Central Government.  
It is proposed that the RPAC role could be emphasised if case officers [with 
coordinators] took responsibility for straightforward scoring and approval of 
proposals. Then RPACs would be freed to concentrate decision-making on the more 
atypical, borderline, and high-spend proposals. This should, as previously mentioned, 
include the flexibility to adjust priorities and spending accordingly. This latter point 
is also crucial to provide RPACs the discretion to guide priorities reflective of 
current circumstances based on policy assessments. For example if uptake reaches 
saturation in a particular region for a particular option, e.g. enhancing hedgerows, 
funding could then be re-directed to other options. 
 
5.3 Qualitative interviews  
Chapter 4 logically builds on from the key themes identified in Chapter 3; 
such as decentralisation, multilevel governance and the implications on 
environmental targeting. The qualitative approach explored in Chapter 4 revealed 
more clearly the implications of local authorities restricted decision-making 
capabilities. The open ended interviews allowed respondents to explore these issues 
freely and discuss the strengths and weakness of the Rural Priorities scheme at length. 
For policy evaluation the advantages of this approach are by gathering perceptions 
from key stakeholder, new and unexpected insights can be found. Subsequently, 
through a qualitative approach, further determinants of policy performance outside 
the limitations of available quantifiable datasets can be identified. Thus findings 
from the interviews captured information unattainable within the CMEF indicators. 
Quantifiable indicators are limited in their capacity to capture the systems, processes 
and influences [the how and why] that determine policy outcomes. This is a frequent 
issue in policy evaluations which often bypasses the agenda setting and policy 
making stages in their assessments (Schneider, 1986). An oversight like this could be 
costly as unexpected policy outcomes could easily be a consequence of those earlier 
stages.  
The findings from Chapters 3 and 4 both identified such factors; including the 
failure to translate goals into practical operational plan, or the provision of adequate 
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resources each impacting implementation effectiveness (Ingram and Mann, 1980; 
Schneider, 1986). Whilst multilevel decentralised governance systems are 
encouraged as the preferred approach to EU RDP implementation, how this is 
formulated into policy design will impact on the effectiveness of environmental 
targeting efforts. The qualitative interviews provides evidence of this in the RDP 
design of the Rural Priorities scheme. For example the emphasis from Central 
Government had been on process as opposed to outcomes of the scheme. This was 
indicated to be largely due to the threat of disallowance from the European 
Commission, and as a result of audits which required a disproportionate amount of 
resources. Respondents highlighted this unbalanced focus detracted human resources 
and finances away from providing support for achieving prioritised environmental 
outcomes. It was recommended that future RDP formulation could improve through 
a wider stakeholder process. This would require regional stakeholders to contribute 
to developing transparent strategies, in the policy design phase, that meet the EU 
guideline requirements but also compliments the expertise of those delivering the 
policy on the ground. Through an improved multilevel governance arrangement the 
links between objectives, and a strategy that is practical and implementable can be 
better defined.  
Another key finding in Chapter 4 however was the triangulation of findings 
from the interviews with those from Chapter 2. As mentioned earlier, Chapter 2’s 
quantitative analysis indicated success in options taken up in SSSI sites, as prioritised 
in the national targets. Chapter’s 4 findings, verify this with the qualitative 
interviews, identifying some of the [hypothesised] associated issues. One respondent 
commented that by focusing funds on the ‘crown jewels’ i.e. the SSSI sites, was a 
mistake. For ignoring already ‘impoverished’ sites would reduce the effectiveness of 
efforts to enhance biodiversity also necessary for species survival. Respondents felt 
that due to the inflexibility of the scoring criteria and approval process many good 
quality applications were slipping through the system. As identified in the previous 
recommendations, this could be addressed by providing adequate discretion and 
autonomy to regional decision-makers. But this needs to be in addition to ensuring 
that optimal, and spatially explicit targeting of environmental needs are consistently 
being addressed.   
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5.4 Method summary  
The combination of the approaches from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provides evidence of 
the benefits of adopting a mixed method approach for policy evaluation. These 
chapters provide a deeper and more holistic understanding of the performance of 
RDP than any one method could bring. They indicate both the opportunities and 
limitations of the CMEF indicators and the ability of stakeholder mapping and 
qualitative interview to supplement for these weaknesses. The RDP evaluation 
methodologies discussed here identified the immediate effects of policy 
implementation, but also went further in understanding how and why certain policy 
outcomes occurred (Fudge and Barrett, 1981). This provides broader understanding 
of how policies design, the role of stakeholders, and spatial characteristics impact on 
RDP implementation and environmental targeting capacity, and highlighted the 
multifaceted nature of the determinants of policy performance. Whilst each method 
has limitations, these are to some extent compensated for by the other methods 
(Greene et al., 1989). Moreover, in combination these approaches provide a mixed 
method analysis of ‘expansion’ increasing the breath of understanding of influences 
and outcomes that are both essential for policy evaluation (Mark and Shotland, 1987; 
Greene et al., 1989). 
For instance, spatial econometrics was used to identify significant bio-
physical, agricultural, socio-demographic and policy targeting determinants for AEM 
participation and expenditure in Scotland (Chapter 2). Moreover, the analysis 
indicated the opportunities and weaknesses within the CMEF indicators for more 
comprehensive policy evaluation. A strong explanation for the variance was 
subsequently not found. However, the qualitative and mixed method approach 
moved beyond a spatial econometric analysis, and revealed further intangible 
determinants, which would not otherwise have been identified (Bryman, 1984; 
Chapters 3 and 4). 
Chapters 3 and 4 identified aspects of the RDP policy framework and the 
varying influence of stakeholders as key determinants of policy outcomes. The in-
depth qualitative study identified the failed attempt to regionalise RDP policy in 
Scotland; with power and budgets remaining centralised and consequently 
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environmental priorities remained broad and vague (Chapter 3). The mixed method 
approach further explored and validated power imbalances between stakeholders 
identified the perceptions behind respondent selections. The findings were limited to 
some extent by the respondents’ understanding of the phenomena under question, 
and may also have benefited from further representation of wider stakeholders (Guba, 
1981; Krefting, 1990). However, the quantitative spatial models provided an 
‘expanded’ understanding of RDP implementation, identifying influences and spatial 
patterns that may not have been apparent otherwise. 
Thus, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 demonstrated between them the strengths and 
caveats of using quantitative and qualitative research techniques. Although the 
findings were specific to Scotland, the methods are applicable to RDP analysis 
elsewhere. The CMEF indicators present a step in the right direction for providing a 
consistent approach to RDP monitoring and evaluation across the EU, but policy 
makers need to go further in assessing how different determinants facilitate or 
impede policy performance, especially with respect to achieving environmental 
targets (Fudge and Barrett 1981; Winter 1996; Berger, 2003; Juntti and Potter, 2002). 
In-depth, mixed methods can support policy making both at the EU and national 
levels by ensuring cost-effectiveness and better policy targeting. 
 
6. Conclusion 
It is as yet still unclear if the Rural Priorities scheme will be reformed, or 
even included in Scotland’s next RDP, but as a key aspect for environmental delivery, 
and in response to heavy criticism, change in implementation is inevitable. The 
future direction of the RDP policy at an EU level however continues to call for better 
prioritisation and wide actor involvement. Furthermore in the proposed reforms of 
the CAP, aims outlined include ‘encouraging agri-environmental initiatives’ as well 
as ‘better targeted income support’ looking towards future challenges post 2020 
(COM, 2012a, 2012b) calling for a “more radical and geographically-defined 
strategy of targeting” as argued by Potter et al. (1993, p.200). This is especially 
pertinent as RDP undergoes reform and undergoes reform and proposed CAP 
spending cuts become reality (Marsden, 2011; COM, 2012a). 
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These continuing RDP proposals for improved governance and 
environmental targeting highlight the need for rigorous ex-ante and ex-post policy 
evaluation, to ensure lessons are drawn on, with a constant aim for improvement. 
This direction is thankfully evident in the ex-ante guidelines for the RDP programme 
period 2014-2020 (COM, 2012d). These comprehensive guidelines emphasise the 
need for evaluation not only as a legal requirement, but to ensure resources are used 
optimally to ensure effective outcomes (COM, 2012d). Hence, evaluations are 
advised to draw from previous programmes to formulate objectives, prioritise 
measures and policy strategies. This includes the continued use of the quantitative 
CMEF indicators to set the foundations for indicating RDP achievements and to 
strengthen subsequent monitoring and evaluation efforts (COM, 2012d). Guidelines 
also mention drawing on qualitative or qualitative analysis of implementation aspects 
encouraging the evaluators to work with programming authorities. Yet these 
guidelines are unspecific. Moreover the request for qualitative information remains 
ad hoc related only to specific cases, and for the ex-ante analysis.  
Overall the direction of the new RDP 2014-2020 calls for better evaluation 
but evaluation approaches need to link to the proposed objectives such as 
improvements to environmental targeting efforts and governance (COM 2012d). 
Policy analysis of the kind presented in Chapters 3 and 4 can provide the baseline 
against which governance improvements and the impact of stakeholders can be 
measured. Furthermore Chapter 2 presents a method by which the CMEF indicators 
could be further utilised to increase our understanding of the hidden policy aspects 
that qualitative techniques may not address. In summary, these mixed methods can 
be used as a tool to support future policy making by providing evidence based policy 
assessments.  The information provided by these methods creates a platform to build 
efforts for the further involvement and influence of stakeholders and groups in 
accordance with policy objectives. This in turn may lead to readjustments in policy 
priorities to ensure accountability is not at the detriment to effectiveness, as has been 
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Appendix A. AEP measure option groups and number of contracts per option 
Bird protection 
Total number of 
contracts 
RP21402 - Wild Bird Seed Mix/Unharvested Crop Count 953 
RP21408 - Management of Cover for Corncrakes Count 215 
RP21405C - Mown Grassland for Corncrakes - 1 Sept Count 164 
RP21406 - Grazed Grassland for Corncrakes 135 
RP21405A - Mown Grassland for Corncrakes - 1 Aug  119 
RP21410C - Mammal and Bird Control - for Black 
Grouse/Capercaillie 
86 
RP21405B - Mown Grassland for Corncrakes - 15 Aug  62 
RP21404 - Mown Grassland for Corn Buntings  57 
RP21407 - Creation and Management of Cover for Corncrakes  47 
RP21411B - Supplementary Food Provision for Raptors - Golden 
Eagles  
6 
RP21412A - Wardening for Golden Eagles - Farm unit  2 
RP21411A - Supplementary Food Provision for Raptors - Hen 
Harriers  
1 
Non- native species control 
RP21413E - Control of grey squirrel for red squirrel conservation      100 
RP21413A - Control of invasive non-native species - Rhododendron  27 
RP21410A - Mammal and Bird Control - Predator control      16 
RP21413C - Control of invasive non-native species - Giant Hogweed      6 
RP21413B - Control of invasive non-native species - Japanese 
Knotweed      
5 
RP21413F - Control of grey squirrel for broadleaf woodland 
protection      
2 
RP21410B - Mammal and Bird Control - crow control 18 
Habitat management   
RP21433A - Hedgerows - 3 years for biodiversity benefits      1601 
RP21414 - Management of Species Rich Grassland      1131 
RP21403 - Mown Grassland for Wildlife      947 
RP21417 - Management of Habitat Mosaics 635 
RP21435A - Grass Margins and Beetlebanks - mixed arable 488 
RP21427 - Management of Moorland Grazing      343 
RP21434 - Extended hedges      338 
RP21416 - Creation and Management of Species Rich Grassland      278 
RP21439 - Scrub and Tall Herb Communities      274 
RP21415 - Bracken Management Programme for Habitat 
Enhancement      
269 
RP21441A - Conservation Management for Small Units - Individual      239 
RP21429 - Moorland - Stock Disposal      222 
RP21432 - Muirburn and Heather Swiping      213 
RP21433B - Hedgerows - 2 years for landscape benefits      161 
RP21430 - Away-Wintering of Sheep      138 
RP21442B - Grazing Management of Cattle - Introduction      130 
RP21436A - Biodiversity Cropping on In-Bye - basic management      107 
RP21442A - Grazing Management of Cattle - Retention      93 
RP21431 - Off-Wintering of Sheep      92 
RP21428 - Moorland Grazings on Uplands and Peatlands      67 
RP21437A - Cropped Machair - with FYM/seaweed      43 
RP21441B - Conservation Management for Small Units - Collective      38 
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RP21425 - Lowland Heath      27 
RP21426 - Wildlife Management on Upland and Peatland Sites      26 
RP21440 - Arable reversion to grassland      24 
RP21437B - Cropped Machair - with FYM/seaweed and 
binder/stooks      
18 
RP21438A - Ancient Wood Pasture - In-bye Land      14 
RP21437D - Cropped Machair - without FYM/seaweed, with 
binder/stooks      
11 
RP21438B - Ancient Wood Pasture - Rough Grazing      11 
RP21435B - Grass Margins and Beetlebanks - organic      11 
RP21436B - Biodiversity Cropping on In-Bye - with binders/stooks      2 
RP21437C - Cropped Machair - without FYM/seaweed      7 
Organic farming  
RP21401F - Maintenance of organic farming - improved grassland      100 
RP21401E - Maintenance of organic farming - arable      78 
RP21401H - Maintenance of organic farming - rough grazing      78 
RP21401B - Conversion to organic farming - improved grassland      51 
RP21401A - Conversion to organic farming - arable      44 
RP21401D - Conversion to organic farming - rough grazing      37 
RP21401C - Conversion to organic farming - fruit and veg      10 
RP21401G - Maintenance of organic farming - fruit and veg      5 
Water habitat   
RP21421A - Water Margins - Enhance biodiversity      1691 
RP21409 - Open Grazed or Wet Grassland for Wildlife      1680 
RP21418 - Management of Wetland      1189 
RP21421B - Water Margins - reduce diffuse pollution      248 
RP21424 - Coastal or Serpentine Heath      131 
RP21422 - Management of Flood Plains      120 
RP21419 - Create, Restore and Manage Wetland      80 
RP21420B - Lowland Raised Bogs - Basic plus Grazing Management      25 
RP21423 - Buffer Areas for Fens and Lowland Raised Bogs      24 















Appendix B. Data details  
 
 
Table 1. Summary of independent variables at parish level (percentage unless otherwise stated) 
A, Dependent Variable at 
parish level 
 Data information 
 
Source 
Percentage of Holdings  uptake 







 This data is derived from both total number of holdings 
uptake for measure 214 AEP and per options groups per 
parish 2008 – 2011, and total number of all agri-
holdings per parish, 2011. 
 
This data was processed in order to provide values that 
could be standardised. Due to data confidently issues 
i.e. if there are less than five holdings per parish, data 
on individual holdings could not to be disclosed. 
Consequently the data rows were represented as 
‘contracts’ per option, with their associated parish code 
but not the Main Farm Location Codes (MLC). One 
holding is able to take up multiple options (average 6 
options), therefore 15,322 contracts are associated with 
AEP measure, and notably this number does not 
represent the true number of holdings. Therefore data in 
its original state could not be standardised against the 
total number of agricultural holdings per parish. In 
order to derive a more accurate number of holdings per 
parish, the contracts with matching associated farm 
characteristics in the same parish were identified.  
 
From these values the data was further standardized to 
adjust to the size of the parish as well as the total 
number of actual holdings present in that parish area. 
For the ‘percentage of holdings’ per parish these were 
calculated using the following expression: 
 
 
 The  represents the dependent value ‘percentage of 
participants’ according to the AEP measure, or option 
group; with ɑ as the total number of beneficiaries in that 
parish, and b as the total number of holdings within that 
parish in 2011. The final percentage values still abide to 
confidentially guidelines, additionally these results will 





census data (2008 – 
2011) 
Total expenditure per parish per 
UAA hectare (Payments) 
 The data ‘total expenditure for measure AEP and option 
groups per parish’ was  included after processing 
(following the same method as above) this data was   




The Zn represents the final dependent value as the ‘total 
payments per UAA (Utilized Agricultural Area) ha 
(hectare) per parish’ according to the AEP measure, or 
option group; d refers to the total payments (£) per 
parish, with e representing the total number of UAA ha 
per parish in 2011, obtained from agri-census dataset. 
 




B. Explanatory Variables at 
parish level 
 
 Data information Source 
Ownership:    
Common grazings Each variable was derived from the agri-census 
dataset; to obtain the standardised value the total ha 
per parish was calculated, using GIS. Each variable 
was then calculated as a percentage of ha per parish, 
by dividing the ‘total ha of each variable per parish’ 




census data  via 
Edina 
Owned agricultural area 
Rented agricultural area 
seasonal rented agricultural land 
Seasonal let agricultural land  
Farming type:  




Crops and grass  
Grass land less than 5 years old  
Grass land more than 5 years old  
Other land  
Crops and fallow land    
Other crops land    
Unspecified crops land    
Vegetables land     
Woodland     
Density of glasshouses (glass 
structures) per UAA ha 
This data was derived from the ‘total number of 
glasshouses per parish’.  This variable was 
standardised by using the following expression: 
Y = A 
    B   
With Y representing  the average ‘density of 
glasshouses per UAA ha’; with A ‘total number 
of glasses house per parish’ divided by B the 
‘total UAA ha per parish’  
  
Livestock:    
Density cattle per UAA ha  
Density of sheep per UAA ha  
Density of  beef heifers per UAA ha 
Density of dairy heifers per UAA ha 
This data was derived from the ‘total livestock 
dataset’s and ‘total UAA ha’. The variables 
were standardised by using the following 
expression:  
Y = A 
      B 
With Y representing each of the livestock 
explanatory variables as a ‘density per UAA ha 
per parish’; with A as the ‘total number of 
livestock per parish’, and B as the ‘total UAA 
ha per parish’. 




Labour:    
Density of Full-time occupiers per 
holding 
Density of Part-time occupiers per 
holding 
Density of Full-time spouses per 
holding 
Density of Part-time spouse per holding 
Density of regular & casual staff per 
holding 
This data was derived from the total labour 
dataset and was standardised using the 
following expression: 
Y = D 
      E 
The dependent Y, as the density of labour 
variable per parish; with D as the ‘total number 
of labour per parish’, with E as the ‘total 
number of holdings per parish’. 




Bio-physical:     
land capable for supporting arable 
agriculture 
 
The Land Capability for Agriculture (LCA) 
1:25000 scale vector dataset is used to “rank 
land on the basis of its potential for productivity 
and cropping flexibility. This is determined by 
the extent to which physical characteristics of 
the land (soil, climate, and relief) impose on 
long terms restrictions on its use” (JHI, 2013). 
 
Land in the ‘arable’ class is considered “prime 
agricultural land, capable of supporting a wide 
range of crops” (Wright et al., 2013). This data 
was derived firstly by reclassifying (class 1 to 











3.1) from the LCA dataset to extract the ‘arable’ 
class only; this was converted to parish scale 
and then calculated as a proportion of total 
parish size (ha). 
land capable for supporting mixed 
agriculture 
 
Same as above (extracting ‘mixed’ class only 
(class 3.2 to 4.2). 
 
Land in this class is considered “capable of 
being used to grow a moderate range of crops 
including cereals, forage crops and grass” 
(Wright et al., 2013). 
 
  
land capable for supporting improved 
agriculture 
 
Same as above (extracting ‘improved’ class 
only (class 5.1 to 5.3). 
 
Land in this class “has the potential for use as 
improved grassland… limitations on this land 
include climate, slope, wetness and other 
heterogeneous patterns that render even 
occasional cultivation unsuitable” (Wright et al., 
2013). 
  
land capable for supporting rough 
agriculture 
 
Same as above (extracting ‘rough’ class only 
(class 6.1 to 7). 
 
 Land on this class “has very severe limitations 
that prevent sward improvement my mechanical 
means. The land is either too steep, very poorly 
drained, has very acidic or shallow oils and 




Built up areas Same as above (extracting built up class only 
(class 888). Land in this class represent’s built 
up/urban areas. 
  
Inland water area Same as above (extracting inland water class 
only (class 999). Land in this class represents 
inland water e.g. lochs, rivers etc. 
  
    
Protected Areas      
SSSI area The SSSI (Sites of Special Scientific Interest) 
are those areas of land and water that Scottish 
Natural Heritage (SNH) considers to best 
represent it’s natural heritage, many of which 
are designated as Natura sites (Scottish 
Government , 2012). 
 
This data is derived from the spatial SSSI vector 
dataset using GIS to reclassify to simplify the 
data class this was converted to parish scale.  
The variable was standardised as a proportion of 
total parish size (ha). 
 Scottish 
Government 
(2012) via Scottish 
Natural Heritage, 
natural spaces 
Complete national designated areas This data is derived from SSSIs, SACs (Special 
areas of conservation), SPAs (Special protected 
areas) and Ramsar sites spatial datasets.  The 
four datasets where merged and reclassified, 
and converted to parish scale. The variable was 
standardised as a proportion of total parish size 
(ha). 
 As above.                             
RSPB reserve areas The RSPB (Royal Society for the protections of 
birds) reserve data is derived independently 
from the spatial RSPB Scotland vector dataset 
using GIS to reclassify the data the convert to 
parish scale.  The variable was standardised as a 
proportion of total parish size (ha). 
 RSPB (2012) 
Rural –urban classification:    
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large urban areas 
Other urban areas 
Accessible small towns areas 
Remote small towns’ areas 
Accessible rural areas 
Remote rural areas 
The Scottish Government (SG) Urban/Rural 6 
fold classification system provides a consistent 
way of defining urban and rural areas across 
Scotland. The classification is based upon two 
main criteria: (i) population as defined by the 
General Register Office for Scotland (GROS), 
and  (ii) accessibility based on drive time 
analysis to differentiate between accessible and 
remote areas in Scotland (Scottish Government 
2010b).  Each class was based on the following: 
 
Large Urban Areas =Settlements of over 
125,000 people. 
 
Other Urban Areas= Settlements of 10,000 to 
125,000 people. 
 
Accessible Small Towns= Settlements of 
between 3,000 and 10,000 people and within 30 
minutes’ drive to a settlement of 10,000 or 
more. 
 
Remote Small Towns= Settlements of between 
3,000 and 10,000 people and with a drive time 
of over 30 minutes to a settlement of 10,000 or 
more. 
 
Accessible Rural= Areas with a population of 
less than 3,000 people, and within a 30 minute 
drive time of a settlement of 10,000 or more. 
 
Remote Rural= Areas with a population of less 
than 3,000 people, and with a drive time of over 
30 minutes to a settlement of 10,000 or more 
 
Each classification was converted to 
standardised variables, were areas (ha) per class 
type were calculated then converted to parish 
scale. Then each class was standardised as a 









Appendix C. Model results 
Table  1. Model results for payments per UAA ha for AEP measure    
Variables Mean  SD OLS model Spatial lag Spatial error 
Common grazings 2.92 12.60 0.38 ** 0.18 ns 0.01 ns 
Total rough grazing 19.89 21.60 -0.25 * -0.15 ns -0.20 ns 
Total woodland  4.39 5.59 -0.71 ** -0.48 . -0.50 * 
Glass houses per UAA  0.93 6.08 -0.47 . -0.23 ns -0.15 ns 
LCA  Mixed  34.86 26.60 0.34 *** 0.21 ** 0.23 * 
LCA rough  21.27 28.70 -0.44 *** -0.27 ** -1.48 *** 
Built up areas 4.20 13.50 -0.63 *** -0.36 ** -0.51 ** 
SSSI area 6.00 11.50 0.50 ** 0.48 ** 0.69 *** 
RSPB reserve areas 0.43 3.01 1.69 ** 1.02 . 0.88 ns 
Other urban areas 2.26 8.44 -0.52 ** -0.35 . -0.29 ns 
Accessible small towns areas 0.55 2.20 -1.31 . -0.35 ns 0.25 ns 
Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.70 -0.26 *** -0.14 * -0.25 *** 
Rho / Lambda 
   
0.51 *** 0.54 *** 
constant      54.60 *** 27.44 *** 55.30 *** 
















AIC     9680.58   9469.42   9468.94   
. p >0.1, * p >0.05, ** p> 0.001, *** p >0.0001, ns = not significant  
 
 
Table 2. Model results for percentage of uptake per parish for whole AEP measure  
Variables Mean  SD OLS model  Spatial lag  Spatial error  
Rented agricultural area 16.92 14.80 0.07 *** 0.05 ** 0.06 ** 
Seasonal rented  4.89 4.24 0.11 . 0.08 ns 0.05 ns 
Seasonal let  7.25 6.79 -0.09 ** -0.08 . -0.06 ns 
Total other crops land 0.06 0.10 -4.38 . -3.69 ns -3.30 ns 
LCA supporting arable  22.51 30.06 0.03 ** 0.02 * 0.02 ns 
LCA supporting Mixed 34.86 26.64 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.07 *** 
Inland water area 0.93 2.10 -0.28 ** -0.21 ** -0.22 . 
Density of dairy heifers  0.01 0.17 -4.22 ** -4.70 ** -5.03 *** 
Density of regular & casual staff  0.55 0.85 3.40 *** 3.25 *** 3.32 *** 
SSSI area 6.00 11.48 0.24 *** 0.23 *** 0.25 *** 
designated areas 7.21 13.97 -0.12 ** -0.12 * -0.13 ** 
 Other urban areas 2.26 8.44 -0.09 ** -0.07 * -0.07 * 
 Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.69 -0.03 ** -0.02 * -0.02 * 
Rho/ lambda 
   
0.32 *** 0.34 *** 
constant      1.34 . -0.36 ns 1.66 . 















AIC     6271.72   6145.59   6144.53   
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. p >0.1, * p >0.05, ** p> 0.001, *** p >0.0001, ns = not significant 
 
Table 3. Model results for payments per UAA ha for Habitat management options 
Variables Mean  SD OLS model Spatial lag Spatial error 
Common grazings 2.92 12.55 0.21 * 0.14 ns 0.18 ns 
Total other crops land 0.06 0.10 87.18 *** 70.68 *** 82.68 *** 
Total unspecified crops land 0.05 0.09 -111.82 *** -92.20 *** -107.10 *** 
Total woodland  4.39 5.59 -0.38 . -0.25 ns -0.33 ns 
Glass houses per UAA ha 0.93 6.08 -0.33 . -0.12 ns -0.07 ns 
LCA supporting arable 22.51 30.06 0.37 *** 0.16 *** 0.19 ** 
LCA supporting Mixed  34.86 26.64 0.55 *** 0.27 *** 0.33 *** 
Other urban areas 2.26 8.44 -0.45 ** -0.26 * -0.21 ns 
Accessible small towns areas 0.55 2.20 -0.99 . -0.19 ns 0.22 ns 
Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.69 -0.18 *** -0.08 * -0.10 . 
Rho/ lambda  
   
0.58 *** 0.60 *** 
constant     7.27  2.07 ns 13.30 ** 












 AIC   9134.55  8835.16  8837.00  
. p >0.1, * p >0.05, ** p> 0.001, *** p >0.0001, ns = not significant 
Table 4. Model results for percentage of uptake per parish for Habitat management options   
Variables Mean  SD OLS   Spatial lag  Spatial error 
Rented agricultural area 16.92 14.80 0.04 ** 0.04 * 0.04 * 
Seasonal rented agricultural land 4.89 4.24 0.12 . 0.09 ns 0.06 ns 
Total grass land >5 years old 11.19 6.51 -0.11 . -0.10 * 0.06 ns 
Total other crops land 0.06 0.10 -3.53 ns -3.00 ns -2.54 ns 
LCA supporting arable  22.51 30.06 0.05 *** 0.04 ** 0.03 * 
LCA supporting Mixed  34.86 26.64 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 
Inland water area 0.93 2.10 -0.25 ** -0.20 . -0.22 . 
Density cattle per UAA ha  0.58 1.21 -1.12 *** -0.91 ** -0.92 *** 
Density of sheep per UAA ha  1.51 1.66 0.39 . 0.29 ns 0.27 ns 
Density of dairy heifers per UAA ha  0.01 0.17 -3.34 ** -3.92 ** -4.17 ** 
Density of Full-time occupiers  0.12 0.20 3.58 ns 3.37 ns 4.48 * 
Density of regular & casual staff  0.55 0.85 3.09 *** 2.90 *** 2.79 *** 
SSSI area 6.00 11.48 0.21 *** 0.20 *** 0.23 *** 
Complete national designated areas 7.21 13.97 -0.13 *** -0.13 *** -0.14 *** 
RSPB reserve areas 0.43 3.01 0.14 ns 0.10 ns 0.07 ns 
Other urban areas 2.26 8.44 -0.07 ** -0.05 . -0.05 . 
Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.69 -0.03 *** -0.02 ** -0.03 ** 
Rho /Lambda 
   
0.31 *** 0.33 *** 
constant     0.94 ns -0.40 ns 1.38 ns 

















 AIC   6135.33  6079.66  6078.67  
 
Table 5.  Model results for payments per UAA ha for bird conservation options 
Variables Mean  SD OLS model  Spatial lag  Spatial error 
Common grazings 2.92 12.55 0.10 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 * 
Owned agricultural area 53.70 27.13 -0.04 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** 
LCA rough agriculture 21.27 28.71 -0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.10 *** 
Built up areas 4.20 13.50 -0.09 ** -0.09 ** -0.09 * 
SSSI area 6.00 11.48 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 
RSPB reserve areas 0.43 3.01 0.85 *** 0.80 *** 0.79 *** 
 Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.69 -0.03 ** -1.03 ** -0.03 * 
Rho /Lambda 
   
0.13 ** 0.10 * 
constant     7.47 *** 7.00 *** 7.92 *** 














 AIC   6827.88  6822.26  6823.87  
. p >0.1, * p >0.05, ** p> 0.001, *** p >0.0001, ns = not significant 
 
Table 6. Model results for percentage of uptake per parish for bird conservation options 
Variables Mean  SD OLS model Spatial lag Spatial error 
Common grazings 2.92 12.60 0.03 ns 0.03 ns 0.02 ns 
Rented agricultural area 16.92 14.80 0.03 . 0.02 . 0.02 . 
Total grass land > 5 years  11.19 6.51 -0.08 ** -0.08 . -0.08 * 
Total crops and fallow land 7.06 6.14 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.18 *** 
Total other crops land 0.06 0.10 -3.27 ns -3.08 ns -3.00 ns 
Total vegetables land  0.19 0.30 -3.09 *** -3.16 *** -3.16 *** 
LCA supporting Mixed  34.86 26.60 0.02 . 0.02 . 0.02 . 
LCA supporting improved  16.24 16.00 -0.03 * -0.03 * -0.03 * 
LCA supporting rough  21.27 28.70 -0.06 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 *** 
Inland water area 0.93 2.10 -0.22 ** -0.20 * -0.20 . 
Density cattle per UAA ha  0.58 1.21 -0.79 *** -0.73 ** -0.73 ** 
Density of sheep per UAA  1.51 1.66 0.26 ns 0.23 ns 0.24 ns 
Density of dairy heifers  0.01 0.17 -3.74 ** -4.00 *** -4.02 *** 
Density of regular & casual  0.55 0.85 2.97 *** 2.93 *** 2.94 *** 
SSSI area 6.00 11.50 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 *** 
Complete national designated  7.21 14.00 -0.09 ** -0.09 ** -0.09 ** 
RSPB reserve areas 0.43 3.01 0.19 ** 0.17 * 0.16 * 
 Other urban areas 2.26 8.44 -0.07 ** -0.06 ** -0.07 ** 
 Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.70 -0.02 *** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** 
Rho/Lambda 
   
0.12 ** 0.11 * 
constant     4.17 *** 2.91 *** 3.38 *** 
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 AIC   5782.81  5777.97  5777.88  




Table 7. Model results for payments per UAA ha for  water habitat options 
Variable Mean  SD OLS model spatial lag  Spatial error 
Common Grazings 2.92 12.55 0.09 ** 0.04 ns -0.01 ns 
Seasonal rented agricultural land 4.89 4.24 0.14 . 0.14 ns 0.15 . 
Total woodland  4.39 5.59 -0.21 ** -0.17 ** -0.17 * 
Density of Total glass houses  0.93 6.08 -0.11 . -0.08 ns -0.09 ns 
LCA  supporting Mixed  34.86 26.64 0.11 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 
LCA supporting rough  21.27 28.71 -0.06 ** -0.05 * -0.07 ** 
Built up areas 4.20 13.50 -0.09 * -0.06 * -0.08 * 
Density cattle per UAA ha  0.58 1.21 -1.00 * -0.93 * -1.13 * 
Density of sheep per UAA ha  1.51 1.66 1.06 *** 0.96 ** 1.18 *** 
SSSI area 6.00 11.48 0.27 *** 0.22 ** 0.24 *** 
Complete national designated 
areas 
7.21 13.97 -0.11 
 
-0.07 ns -0.06 ns 
RSPB reserve areas 0.43 3.01 0.36 ** 0.24 . 0.19 ns 
Accessible small towns areas 0.55 2.20 -0.27 . -0.17 ns -0.09 ns 
Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.69 -0.04 *** -0.03 ** -0.04 ** 
Rho /Lambda 
   
0.33 *** 0.35 *** 
constant     4.81 *** 2.79 * 5.73 *** 

















 AIC   6936.66  6870.13  6877.35  
. p >0.1, * p >0.05, ** p> 0.001, *** p >0.0001, ns = not significant 
 
Table 8. Model results for percentage of uptake per parish for Water habitat options 
Variable Mean  SD OLS model spatial lag Spatial error 
Rented agricultural area 16.92 14.80 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 
Total grass land > 5 years  11.19 6.51 -0.07 * -0.06 * -0.05 . 
Total crops and fallow land 7.06 6.14 0.12 * 0.13 ** 0.12 * 
Total unspecified crops land 0.05 0.09 -6.33 * -6.09 * -6.05 * 
Total vegetables land  0.19 0.30 -1.45 ns -1.67 . -1.47 ns 
Density of Total glass  0.93 6.08 -0.06 . -0.04 ns -0.05 ns 
LCA supporting Mixed  34.86 26.60 0.05 *** 0.04 ** 0.05 *** 
LCA supporting rough  21.27 28.70 -0.03 * -0.02 ** -0.03 * 
Built up areas 4.20 13.50 -0.09 *** -0.06 *** -0.07 *** 
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Inland water area 0.93 2.10 -0.34 *** -0.26 ** -0.25 *** 
Density cattle per UAA ha  0.58 1.21 -0.83 *** -0.78 *** -0.88 * 
Density of Full-time  0.12 0.20 4.25 
 
3.54 ns 3.63 . 
Density of Part-time  0.33 0.57 2.01 * 1.96 * 2.26 ** 
SSSI area 6.00 11.50 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.17 *** 
Complete national designated 
areas 
7.21 14.00 -0.09 * -0.08 ** -0.09 ** 
RSPB reserve areas 0.43 3.01 0.11 ns 0.07 ns 0.05 ns 
Accessible small towns areas 0.55 2.20 -0.25 ** -0.19 * -0.14 ns 
Accessible rural areas 48.47 42.70 -0.02 *** -0.01 ** -0.02 ** 
Rho / lambda 
   
0.37 *** 0.39 *** 
constant     4.17 *** 2.13 ** 4.13 *** 









-2845.82   -2848.00   
AIC   5815.40  5731.64   5733.90   

























Appendix D. KW significant test results  
Table 1. KW significant test results for job role 
Stakeholder  H Chi-square 
probability 







9.21 0.03 Case officer 22 20.02 
Coordinator  13 34.35 
RPAC 11 32.09 
Scottish Government 9 33.33 
Rural business 
(influence)  
7.83 0.05 Case officer 15 17.77 
Coordinator  9 15.83 
RPAC 8 30.19 
Scottish Government 9 23.39 
 
Table 2. KW test results for organisation  
Stakeholder   H Chi-square 
probability 






7.59 0.05 SNH 13 27.62 
FCS 11 16.18 
SGRPID 22 30.82 
Scottish Government 5 22.20 
RPAC member 
core (influence)  
8.67 0.03 SNH 16 26.56 
FCS 11 17.82 
SGRPID 23 34.59 




9.60 0.02 SNH 16 26.25 
FCS 11 18.32 
SGRPID 23 34.70 




7.66 0.05 SNH 14 28.75 
FCS 10 16.65 
SGRPID 21 29.55 
Scottish Government 5 17.10 
RPAC chair 
(interest) 
8.24 0.04 SNH 16 23.81 
FCS 11 37.45 
SGRPID 23 29.17 
Scottish Government 5 15.20 
RSPB (interest) 8.60 
 
0.03 SNH 16 31.25 
FCS 10 14.35 
SGRPID 21 27.52 
Scottish Government 5 31.30 
 
